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The focus of this study is two-fold. First, it examines the relationship between financial 
development and growth. Second, it investigates the role of foreign banks, inflation and 
openness in the state of financial development. The above are discussed in relation to a 
comparative study of regional economic blocs of Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in three essays for the 
period 1980-2011. The dissertation comprises four essays as stated below. Existing studies on 
financial system development usually rely on single measure of financial development which 
is inadequate in capturing the financial system properly and leads to mixed results. This 
research addresses this critical issue by constructing a composite measure of the variable. 
The first essay provides a comparative analysis on the impact of financial development on 
growth and development between the two regions. In addition, it investigates the influence of 
financial development through political development on growth. The motivation stems not only 
from inadequate studies on regional economic blocs, but, importantly, the methods applied in 
previous panel studies ignored issues of heterogeneity. To address this, the study employs a 
combination of methodologies, Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group and Dynamic Fixed Effect 
approaches. These approaches also capture both the short run and long run dynamics. The 
results indicate that financial development induces economic growth in both regions with the 
impact in SADC more than that of ECOWAS. Also, more political development robustly 
supports more financial sector to impact on growth positively in ECOWAS, but not in SADC. 
Finally, the speed of adjustment suggests that deviations from the long run equilibrium path 
following a shock are corrected at about 13% per year in ECOWAS and 15% in SADC 
The second essay, which is another comparative study, addresses the question of why some 
countries having underdeveloped financial systems after it has been established that the sector 
is vital for growth. SSA has one of the least developed financial system, and, since the first 
essay documented that indeed the sector is crucial to growth, the main aim of this essay is to 
investigate whether inflation and openness to trade and financial system (that is, Rajan and 
Zingales Hypothesis) matter for financial development. Importantly, the effects of the growing 
communication infrastructure on financial development is also captured, which is a novelty. 
Four approaches were used: Least square dummy variable, Feasible GLS, Panel corrected 




in both regions inflation robustly reverses financial development with the effect in ECOWAS 
much more. Overall, the results seem to indicate that the cost of inflation to the financial system 
is genuine and not explained by a sort of omitted variable bias. Access to communication 
indicated a strong positive effect on financial development in both regions, with the impact in 
SADC more. Finally, the study indicates that even though more simultaneous opening of the 
financial sector and trade lead to more financial development in SADC, trade openness alone 
still enhances development in the sector. However, more financial openness alone is 
detrimental to financial development in the region. Hence, this seems to provide partial support 
for the hypothesis in SADC. The hypothesis, however, is rejected in ECOWAS.  
The third essay examines the asymmetric effects of inflation on financial development. It is 
motivated by existing theories which posit that the detrimental effects of inflation on the 
financial development is only observed beyond certain threshold level. The study is the first of 
its kind to be conducted on SSA, especially on regional economic blocs. Using a novel Panel 
smooth transition regression that endogenously determines this threshold value, a comparative 
study is conducted between the two regions. The results suggest evidence of the existence of a 
robust single threshold of 17.9% inflation for ECOWAS and 14.5% for SADC. The result 
indicates that inflation above these thresholds presents significant detrimental effects for 
financial development in both regions.  
The last essay focuses on financial sector stability via banking sector stability. It is motivated 
by the evidence that the financial system of the two regions are bank based which is also over 
50% foreign bank dominated. Specifically, the essay investigates the effects of foreign banking 
inflows on banking crisis (financial instability) of both regions for the period 1995-2009. This 
objective is informed by the widely held conventional wisdom that foreign banks lack long 
term commitment to the domestic financial system and will leave at the first sign of trouble. 
This can stir instability in the sector. The study employs two econometric approaches, namely, 
the multivariate logit and the two-step system generalised method of moment using bank crisis 
measure constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2012) and bank z-score (Bankscope). The main 
results of the methods indicate evidence that the presence of foreign banks in the domestic 
banking sector reduces the probability of bank crisis. Generally, the results reveal that the 
benefits from the foreign banks in the financial system are unaffected by any sort of omitted 




This study has significant implication for policy formulation since it is the first study on 
comparative analysis between two regional economic groups in SSA. The study argues that 
more efforts should be committed in improving the financial system and governance. 
Improvement in the legal system can enhance financial development and this should be coupled 
with good macroeconomic policies. The study recommends that price stability policies with 
inflation targeting framework that falls below the estimated threshold, should be the primary 
objective in monetary policy.  Furthermore, more investment into telecommunication industry 
is necessary for FSD and should be given attention.  In terms of foreign banking inflows, the 
study advocates for a cautious approach towards attracting more foreign banks as well as more 
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1.1 Background and Motivation of the Study 
 
The relationship between financial sector development (FSD) and economic growth and 
development has drawn the interest of many academics around the world. Numerous studies 
have been done on this important topic following the seminal study of King and Levine (1993), 
which rekindled a lot of interest in this area. This relationship between FSD and economic 
growth was observed over a century ago by  Bagehot (1873) who argued that the financial 
system played a crucial role in igniting industrialisation in England. This was done by 
facilitating and propelling the mobilisation of capital in the industrialisation process. About 
eight decades ago, Schumpeter (1939) also observed and emphasised the importance of the 
banking system in economic growth. According to Schumpeter (1939), banks can actively spur 
innovation and future growth by identifying and channelling funds to productive investments1.  
Based on the above, several models have been proposed to demonstrate how FSD promotes 
economic growth.  For instance, Pagano (1993) and Murinde (1996) developed a theoretical 
framework which show the positive effects that the financial sector has on economic growth, 
and Levine (1997) established the theoretical channel of this link.  According to Levine (1997), 
the five key  functions of the financial system that lead to growth are (i) Producing information 
on investment and allocating capital (ii) Monitoring and exerting corporate governance (iii) 
Facilitating trading and management of risk (iv) Mobilising and pooling of risk, and (v) Easing 
exchange of goods and services. Therefore a well-functioning financial system is able to 
execute these functions adequately and this will indeed, enable it to induce growth positively. 
Also, some hypotheses have been established to show how financial sector promotes growth 
                                                          





which is described as Supply-leading hypothesis and growth inducing financial development, 
also known as the Demand-following hypothesis.  
Why is the financial sector deemed relevant to economic growth? According to Mishkin 
(2006),  
“…the financial system is like the brain of the economy: it is a coordinating mechanism that 
allocates capital to building factories, houses and roads. If capital goes to the wrong uses or 
does not flow at all, the economy will operate inefficiently and economic growth will be very 
low.” (p. 8) 
Following the above developments on the issue of FSD and growth and as part of the wider 
debate on the link between financial development and economic growth, large volumes of 
empirical studies have tried to address the potential link between these measures, for example, 
Allen and Ndikumana (2000), King and Levine (2004), Ghirmay (2004), Deidda and Fattouh 
(2008), Esso (2010), Bangake and Eggoh (2011), and  Oluwatosin and Festus (2012) and 
Menyah et al. (2014) among others. While the theory presents a strong case for a positive effect 
of financial development on economic growth, empirical work shows inconclusive evidence. 
There has been considerable number of empirical studies that lend support to the financial 
sector inducing economic growth positively (King & Levine, 1996; Rousseau & Wachtel, 
2000; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000; Beck & Levine, 2004; Apergis et al., 2007; Kar et 
al., 2011). However, other empirical evidence does not reveal causality running from finance 
to growth, but from growth to finance (Jung, 1986; Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 1999; Zang, 
2007). In addition, while other studies provide bidirectional relationship between finance and 
growth (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Greenwood & Smith, 1997; Luintel & Khan 1999; 
Shan et al., 2001; Al-Yousif, 2002: Bangake & Jude, 2011), some argue no relationship 
between the two measures (Lucas, 1988; Shan & Morris; 2002; Andrés et al., 2004) which 
supports China as a counter-example to the findings of the finance-growth literature. The 
Chinese economy has a malfunctioning financial sector, but is one of the fastest growing 
economy in the world. This presents enigma and could be a motivation for further investigation.  
In light of the above startling different views and ambiguity, there is no definite consensus on 
this issue. This convincingly indicates that the debate is far from over.  Accordingly, Levine 
(1997), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck (2002) observed that the issue of the role of a 
financial system in inducing growth is an area that has received a lot of attention in economic 




advancement in econometric techniques and statistical software2. Part of this study constitutes 
a portion of this renewed interest in finance-growth literature. This gives motivation for this 
thesis. 
Furthermore, despite the numerous studies on this issue, studies that focus on Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) have been relatively sparse compared with other regions. More importantly, 
available studies that are dedicated to regional economic groupings failed to conduct 
comparative studies of these regional groupings. This is especially ignored in SSA. This has 
implication for regional economic integration that is at the center stage for policy deliberations 
in SSA. Although evidence on SSA is still limited, existing studies on the region generally 
indicate that financial development has positive effects on growth (see Odedokun, 1996; Allen 
& Ndikumana, 2000) 
To our knowledge, empirical studies are silent concerning the studies in the context of 
comparing regional economic blocs. Consequently, among its aims, this thesis aims to fill this 
gap by considering a comparative analysis on the impact of financial development on economic 
growth and development between the Economic Community of West Africa States 
(ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Supporting this idea, 
Ghirmay (2004) suggests that it is important to conduct comparative study regarding finance-
growth nexus between countries at different levels of development in order to reach a more 
conclusive causal relationship.  
Furthermore, over the years, SSA have made tremendous improvement in governance and its 
institutions resulting to political stability across the region. Institutional experts such as 
Acemoglu et al (2005) argue that institutions are important in the process of economic growth 
and development. Therefore based on this development in governance system of the region, 
the question to ask is, does this development complement the financial system of the two 
regions to induce economic growth? Therefore, in addition to investigating the role of financial 
development in the growth process, this study seeks to examine the influence of financial 
development through institutional development on economic growth.  The motivation 
emanates from not only because of the lack of such studies in SSA, but also due to the fact that 
                                                          






such studies may reveal differences from those that exist for developed economies, due to their 
level of economic advancement. 
Additionally, and more importantly, despite the lack of comparative studies, previous studies 
have provided useful insights into the effects of financial development on growth. However, 
some important methodological issues are observed in these studies. These include (i) the use 
of a single measure of financial development which does not capture the functional definition 
or different aspects of the financial system adequately, and (ii) heterogeneity effects among 
countries are usually ignored. These methodological flaws can bias the results and lead to 
inefficient estimates. This thesis is motivated by these observations. It estimates a composite 
measure of financial development using three indicators: Liquid liabilities as percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP), ratio of domestic money bank asset to the sum of central bank 
assets and domestic money bank assets, and bank private credit as percentage of GDP. The 
study uses this composite measure in the first three chapters. 
It is worth noting that the financial sector, which is an important component of the economy or 
‘the brain of the economy’ as Mishkin (2006) describes it, is relatively underdeveloped in many 
regions, especially in developing regions. The financial system of SSA is relatively the least 
developed compare to other developing regions (this is discussed in details in chapter 2)3. 
Considering the theoretical positive effects that the sector has on economic growth4, the 
question is, what is responsible for this underdeveloped state of the financial sector after years 
of financial sector reforms in SSA? Even though some studies have tried to address this issue, 
as in Boyd et al. (2001), Aziakpono (2004), Detragiache et al. (2006), Baltagi, et.al (2009), 
Law and Habibullah (2009)  and Kablan (2010), these studies come with some challenges. Not 
only is the important issue of comparative studies between regional economic blocs ignored, 
but most of the studies involve a mixture of developed and developing economies which seem 
worrying since differences exist between these economies. Some of these studies include Boyd 
et al. (2001),  Detragiache et al. (2006) and Kablan (2010).  
In addition, not only do these studies used a single measure of FSD, but the methods used in 
these studies usually do not investigate in details what happens at each specific country level.  
Therefore, motivated by these challenges, this thesis employs a number of panel methodologies 
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that address these issues by investigating the critical questions concerning the underdeveloped 
state of the financial sector of the two regional blocs: ECOWAS and SADC. Theories such as 
the one developed by Huybens and Smith (1999) argues that inflation presents a detrimental 
effect on FSD while Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis advocates that simultaneous 
opening of both trade and the financial sector is necessary for the development of the financial 
sector. SSA over the last three decades experienced phenomenal increases in inflation. 
Countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR), Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe are among the worst affected. Also, since the adoption of the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) by the region, many countries have continuously open up trade 
and the financial sectors in attempt to develop  the financial system with little or no success. 
Therefore, specifically, the study focuses on the effects of inflation and openness on the FSD. 
More so, the influence of access to communication infrastructure on FSD is also investigated. 
This is a novelty to previous studies. 
Similarly, existing theories suggest that inflation has an asymmetric effects on FSD as in 
Azariadis and Smith (1996) and Choi et al. (1996). These models argue that the negative effects 
of inflation on financial development is only observed beyond certain level of inflationary rate. 
Hence, it is crucial to understand the dynamic relationship between these policy variables and 
FSD. This will help shape well-designed policy frameworks that will facilitate the process of 
financial development. Thus, the crucial question is, at what level of inflation will its 
detrimental effects on the financial sector be observed in these two blocs? Therefore, this thesis 
investigates this asymmetric effect of inflation on FSD using a novel panel technique developed 
by  González et al. (2005). This is also examined in the context of comparing the same regional 
economic groupings. This is the first study that attempts to provide a comprehensive 
investigation on such threshold effects of inflation on financial sector development  in SSA, in 
particular of regional groupings.  
A comparative study is important and necessary for the following reasons.  
i. Regional blocs are increasingly an important and dominant feature today. More so, they 
are considered as pillars of Africa Economic Community (AEC). For this reason, a comparative 
study is justified since it can reveal the peculiarities in each bloc and the desired policy 




ii. Comparative study is not only capable of exposing the level and the extent to which 
FSD and other controlling factors impact on growth and why, if there are any differences 
between the two regions, but it can also reveal the reasons for the state of the financial systems 
of the two regions. Knowledge of this can provides guideline for policy formulation and 
recommendation. 
iii. Finally, it is particularly insightful to separate and compare regional groups in SSA, 
since member states in each bloc pursue almost the same policy objectives in their attempt to 
achieve similar goals that will lead to meeting the convergence criteria5 set by the bloc. 
Moreover, there is significant income differences between the two regions in favour of SADC. 
This makes comparative studies more informative. 
The choice of ECOWAS and SADC is dictated by the following: (i) the blocs seem to be one 
of the oldest regional blocs in SSA, (ii) they represent about two thirds of SSA, and (iii) 
consistent data exist for most of the countries. The study included twelve countries in each 
regional bloc, as shown in Table B.0.2. 
Also, despite the undeveloped state of the financial system of SSA, there is a rapid growing 
banking industry, which generally accounts about 90% of the total financial sector assets. The 
banking sector plays an important role in the process of financial system development and 
economic growth. As a result, policymakers are formulating the relevant polices required to 
attract more investments into this area. The results of these policies are increased inflows of 
foreign banks into the region. However, many studies such as McKinnon (1993), Gros and 
Steinherr (1995), Bonn et al.(1998), Murinde and Mullinneux (1999) argue that banking market 
liberalisation often leads to banking crisis in the early stages of transition to market economy. 
These crises often give incentives for foreign banks to exploit their ownership advantages as 
local banks become illiquid and less trustworthy. This leads to a significant reduction in the 
value of these domestic banks and creates an opportunity for takeover at low price by mostly 
foreign banks (Murinde & Mullinneux, 1999). The result is increased presence of foreign banks 
in the domestic banking sector in 1980s. 
The increasing presence of foreign banks in the domestic financial system is generating a great 
deal of debate, especially, in the least developed world of SSA. This is because the banking 
                                                          





sector dominates the financial sector and the stability of which is a major concern. Foreign 
banks are believed to lack commitment to the domestic banking system and will leave if there 
are any negative shocks. Foreign banks in this study refer to any bank in the host country whose 
ownership by foreigners is above 50%.  This could come from SSA or outside SSA. According 
to Kirkpatrick et al. (2008), foreign banks presence have increased from less than 10% to more 
than 50%, and is estimated at 100% in Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho  and Swaziland.  Thus, 
since the financial system of the regions is bank based with over 50% foreign bank dominating, 
this could be a curse or blessing to the banking system. For this reason, this thesis specifically 
investigates the effects of foreign banking inflows on banking crisis (financial instability) of 
both regions for the periods 1995 and 2009. This study is motivated by the non-existence of 
studies on this issue in SSA. The study therefore provides recent evidence on foreign banking 
inflows, FSD and economic growth. In doing so, it makes an important contribution to existing 
finance literature. 
1.1.1 Justification of the study 
SSA is one of the least developed regions in the world. According to the World Bank (2009), 
the continent accounts for 28% of the world’s poverty and only 1% of global GDP, 2% of global 
trade and 3% of foreign direct investment (Allen et al., 2011). However, recent development 
indicates that the region is making progress in economic development.  SSA is a resource rich 
region. The economies are diverse with wide variety of natural resources. Thus, given this 
background, it makes SSA one of the unique regions suitable for empirical investigation. 
Several macroeconomic policy measures as well as relentless efforts are being made to raise 
growth and reduce poverty, and establish SSA as a major player in the world economy. To 
work towards this direction, SSA countries adopted market economy and democratic 
governance. These are seen as important steps towards economic growth and development. 
Also, it is argued and commended that the formation of regional blocs will result in pulling 
resources together that will lead to economic growth and the development in the financial 
system, eventually leading to reduction in poverty. Working towards this, SSA countries have 
formed regional economic blocs in an attempt to benefit from its fruits. Therefore, the question 
is, what has been the experience? 
This thesis focuses on SSA (particularly on regional economic groupings), whose economic 




implementation. In line with their development policies, the majority of countries opened up 
the financial sector in the region during the 1980s in response to the economic reforms of 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) as well as Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). It is, 
therefore, important to empirically investigate the role of the financial system development on 
economic growth, as well as what forces are responsible for the low level of development of 
the financial sector after over 30 years of economic and financial sector reforms.  It is evident 
that there is still a huge financial sector development gap in SSA after years of liberalisation.   
Empirical evidence in this area (e.g. Boyd et al., 2001; Aziakpono, 2004; Detragiache, et al., 
2006; Kablan, 2010) is typically based on a broad cross section of countries. However, 
comparatively, little work has been done in terms of SSA. This study contributes to the current 
literature in filling this gap by providing recent evidence. 
This thesis, therefore, provides the first attempt to explore the empirical link between foreign 
banking inflows, financial sector development and economic growth by comparing two 
regionals groups of ECOWAS and SADC. As such, results from this study has implication for 
policy direction and hence could guide policy makers to understand the dynamics of financial 
development in SSA. 
1.1.2 Objectives of the research 
This study has four key objectives shaped around the empirical chapters of this thesis. The first 
objective is to investigate the relationship between FSD, political institutions and economic 
growth. This is done in the context of regional comparison of ECOWAS and SADC. To achieve 
this, the study constructs a composite measure of financial index and applies three estimators, 
Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group and Dynamic fixed effects approaches to determine the 
impact of financial development on economic growth, as well as the impact of financial 
development conditional on political variable. The study examines if new evidence can be 
drawn especially with the comparison. We follow the works of Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(1996) and Allen and Ndikumana (2000) to construct the composite index of the financial 
development measure. 
The second objective is to investigate the reasons for the underdeveloped state of the financial 
system, since it is deemed crucial to economic growth. In particular, the study investigates the 
effects of inflation and both openness to trade and the financial system on financial 




development of the financial sector is also investigated. This is examined in the context of 
comparing ECOWAS and SADC. Even though the composite measure of FSD is used, the 
individual measures are also used in order to determine specific policies suitable for financial 
development 
The third objective of this thesis is to investigate if there are threshold effects of inflation on 
FSD. This is done using the novel technique of Panel Smooth Transition regression technique 
developed by  González et.al. (2005). The technique provides a test that checks if a nonlinear 
relationship exist between inflation and financial development in both regions. This 
investigation is motivated by the existing theories that suggest that the negative effects of 
inflation on FSD are only realized beyond certain threshold level.  This objective also considers 
a comparative study between ECOWAS and SADC. 
Finally, the fourth objective of this thesis is to examine the financial sector stability through 
the stability in banking sector. In particular, it investigates the effects of foreign banking 
inflows on banking crises of the two regions using a cross country analysis. This is the first of 
its kind to be studied in SSA.  
1.1.3 Published work 
Some of the original work presented in the thesis have been presented in conferences and 
published. These include chapters 4 and 5: 
1. Mahawiya, S .2014, "Financial sector development, political institutions and economic 
growth: A comparative study of ECOWAS and SADC. Presented on the 27th of June, 
2014, at the International Association of Applied Econometrics (IAAE), Queen Marry 
University of London, UK. 
2. Mahawiya, S. 2015, "Financial sector development, inflation and openness: A 
comparative panel study of ECOWAS and SADC" ERSA Working Paper Series (Number 
528) 
3. Mahawiya, S. 2015, "Financial sector development and threshold effect of inflation in 
ECOWAS and SADC: A Panel smooth transition regression approach" ERSA Working 




1.1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter one provides the introduction of the thesis 
which includes the background, motivation and objectives of the thesis. 
Chapter two describes and discusses economic and financial sector performance of SSA as well 
as foreign banking inflows. A comparison is made with other developing regions. This chapter 
also includes detailed discussions of the macroeconomic and financial sector performance of 
ECOWAS and SADC. It ends with a brief discussion of governance and political dispensation 
in the region. 
The first essay is presented in chapter 3. It investigates the financial sector development, 
political institutions and economic growth of ECOWAS and SADC through a comparative 
study. This is done using a number of econometric techniques which includes Pooled Mean 
Group, Mean Group and Dynamic fixed effects estimators. The chapter answers the two 
questions: Does financial development propel growth in the two regions? If so, how different 
are the impacts? Is there a complementarity effects between financial development and 
governance on economic growth and development? 
Chapter 4 investigates the role of inflation and openness in determining the state of the financial 
sector of ECOWAS and SADC. In particular, the chapter examines the role of increases in 
inflation and more openness in trade and the financial sector on the financial system. The 
influence of development in communication infrastructure is also measured. This is achieved 
using a number of panel approaches. 
Chapter 5 explores the threshold effects of inflation on financial development. This chapter 
also considers a comparative study between ECOWAS and SADC using the Panel Smooth 
Transition regression technique developed by González et.al. (2005). This technique provides 
a test which supports a nonlinear relationship between inflation and financial development in 
both regions. 
In Chapter 6, the thesis examines the effects of foreign banking inflows on financial sector 
stability through the banking system using member states of ECOWAS and SADC. This is 
done using two econometric approaches of Multivariate logit and System GMM. 
Chapter 7 concludes by making a summary of the empirical findings and suggests policy 





Background of financial sector development and economic performance of 
SSA, ECOWAS and SADC 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the economic and financial sector performance as well as 
foreign banking inflows into SSA over the last few decades in two parts. In particular, the first 
part makes comparison with other developing economies of South East Asia and Pacific, as 
well as Latin America and the Caribbean.  
The second part discusses some of these issues in details in relation to ECOWAS and SADC.  
It compares the macroeconomic performance of the two regions as well as the developments 
in the financial sectors.  Accordingly, the chapter makes available information on the financial 
system development of the two regions for the subsequent chapters to be analyzed. 
2.2 Overview of economic performance of SSA 
Africa is one of the least developed continents in the world, even though the 21st century is 
described as witnessing progress and recovery in economic performance in the region. In terms 
of SSA, recent growth rates from 2005 to 2014 indicate that the region has registered a 
phenomenal increase. This resulted in the region outperforming the rest of the world as 
demonstrated in Table 2.2.1.  Even though growth slowed down in 2009, which may be blamed 
on the effects of the 2008/9 global financial crisis, it picked up in 2010. The region registered 
a positive growth rate of 2%  in 2009 whereas the rest of the other regions grew under 1% with 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Latin America and 
the Caribbean registering negative growth rates.  The region recorded her highest growth rate 
in 2007 at almost 7% which was the highest among other regions.  Table 2.2.1 also indicates 










However, using per capita income at constant 2005 US dollars for the period 1980–2011, the 
economic performance indicates that the region is not only the least among other developing 
regions, but also falls far below the world trends as demonstrated by Figure 2.1. Indeed, the 
Figure shows that whereas Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as East Asia and the 
Pacific are increasing gradually and converging towards the world, SSA seems to show no 
signs of notable improvement. The Figure reveals that in the 1980s, the real per capita income 
of Latin America and the Caribbean was about 2000US$ higher than that of East Asia and the 
Pacific.  This difference, however, was eliminated by 2009. For this same period, SSA in 1980 
had around 900US$ and by 2010 it increased negligibly to about 1000US$.  This poses a huge 
challenge for the region since it leaves it with perverse poverty which is exacerbated by civil 
wars and political unrest in some areas such as Somalia, Central Africa, Mali and Republic of 
Congo.  
Table 2.2.1: Recent growth (%) of SSA and other regions 
Year East Asia & Pacific 
Latin America & 
Caribbean SSA OECD World 
2005 4.5 4.4 5.7 2.6 3.6 
2006 5.2 5.4 6.5 3.0 4.1 
2007 6.2 5.3 6.9 2.6 3.9 
2008 3.0 3.5 5.0 0.2 1.5 
2009 0.5 -1.6 2.0 -3.6 -2.1 
2010 7.0 5.7 5.2 2.9 4.1 
2011 4.0 4.6 4.2 1.7 2.8 
2012 4.3 3.0 4.0 1.2 2.2 
2013 4.2 2.7 4.5 1.4 2.4 
2014 3.6 1.3 4.2 1.7 2.5 




Figure 2.1: Comparison of real GDP per capita between SSA and other regions 
 
Source: Own construct with data from World Development Indicators, 2012 
As a result, relentless efforts are being made in the region by governments, policy makers as 
well as the international community to raise growth, reduce poverty, and to integrate into the 
world economy. Hence, among other things to induce economic growth and development, 
African states have formed multiple regional groupings, and within each bloc may be another 
subgroup. Apart from ECOWAS and SADC, we have East African Community (EAC), 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The subgroups 
include Common Monetary Area (CMA), Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC) and Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU).  
These blocs aimed at pulling resources together for the advancement of the continent. Even 
though their formation may result in loss of economic sovereignty6, it has among its benefits 
the ability to stimulate developments in the financial sector which is link to economic growth. 
This is because the formation of these regional groups will lead to the free flow of capital 
among member states. What is the experience in these regional groupings? The studies 
conducted so far have revealed mixed results.  For instance, the study of Atindehou et al. (2005) 
on ECOWAS suggested a weak causal link. Other studies include Aziakpono (2004) on SACU, 
Allen and Ndikumana (2000) on SADC, and Tachiwou (2009) on West African Monetary 
Union. These studies argued that financial development is important to growth. However, a 
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comparative study between these regional blocs, which is crucial, seems to be ignored. The 
next section gives a summary description and comparison of the state of the SSA’s financial 
system with other regions. 
2.3 Overview of the state of the financial system of SSA and other regions 
The financial system of SSA is relatively underdeveloped even though the formation of 
regional blocs leads to the free flow of goods and services, capital and investment which are 
expected to cause financial markets integration and eventual expansion in the sector. To assess 
the state and the level of the financial system of the region in terms of financial depth, access, 
efficiency and stability, Figure 2.2 was constructed using data from Čihák et al. (2012) based 
on the Global Financial Development Database which presents the financial system of 205 
countries. This data shows the mean value of these indicators for financial system development 
for the period 1960–2010. Figure 2.2a from the graph suggests that financial institutions (FIs) 
of the region are not only much less deep and less efficient, but also less accessible compared 
to other emerging regions of Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia and 
South Asia. Furthermore, overall comparison also reveals that the region is internationally least 
developed and only do better than Europe and Central Asia in terms of financial stability.  
On financial markets development, SSA does better than South Asia and Europe with Central 








                                                          





Figure 2.2: Development in financial institution and markets 
a. Development in the financial institutions                                                        b.  Development in financial Markets 
  
Source: Own construction using information from Cihak et al. (2012).  The figures show mean value of the indicators for the 
period 1960-2010. To show comparison between the proxy variables, the indicators are Winsorized truncating the top 5% 
and bottom 5% of the distribution by Čihák et al. (2012). 
 
Considering other selected measures of financial development, Table 2.3.1 indicates that not 
only is average private credit as a percentage of total economic activities of SSA greater than 
that of Latin America and Caribbean, but also its average bank credit as a percentage of GDP 
for the period 1990–2012 is greater than that of the region. In addition, the Table indicates that 
these two measures of financial development of East Asia and Pacific is about three times that 
of SSA. Furthermore, in terms of monetisation of the economy as indicated by M2/GDP, SSA 
is the least developed. It also shows a high interest rate spread among the three developing 
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Table 2.3.1: Some selected financial development measures of SSA and other regions 
These stylised facts collaborate the assertion by Allen et al. (2011) who estimated that liquid 
liabilities averaged about 30% of GDP for SSA in 2007 compared with that of East Asia, Latin 
America, South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa which exceeds 50%. Private credit 
provision reveals 16.6% of GDP, whereas it is 32.5% to 43.9% to GDP for the other developing 
economies. In addition, according to earlier classification of FSD by Gelbard and Leite (1999) 
on 38 SSA countries, only five countries had relatively developed financial system. These 
countries include South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and Mauritius.  
In the mid-1980s, many countries in SSA initiated financial sector reforms as part of SAP in 
response to economic deterioration that led to bank failures in many parts of the region. One 
of the main objectives of the financial reforms was to remove obstacles that were believed to 
interfere with the financial system developments in the region. The argument was that, the 
removal of these obstacles could induce financial deepening and ensure financial stability. This 
led most SSA governments to shift from state control to more market led systems as a means 
of promoting a stable economic environment. This was particularly relevant to the financial 
sector where it was hoped that this shift would stimulate domestic resources mobilisation and 
increase the capacity of the banking system to support private sector participation in economic 
development.  Hence, a number of measures were taken which includes interest rates 
liberalisation and the removal of credit controls. Therefore, the underdeveloped state of the 
region’s financial system raises a lot of concerns about what is being implemented to achieve 
Region 
Average credit to 
private sector (% of 
GDP)-1990-2012 
Average credit by the 














34.39 55.63 40.05 7.57 
East Asia 
and Pacific 153.69 210.59 168.54 5.01 





progress in in the sector. Even though the financial sector of the region performs relatively poor 
compared to other regions, there have been some recent improvements, which according to 
Allen et al. (2011) is explained by the economic and financial reforms that SSA countries have 
implemented in the recent past. These reforms also led to the attraction of foreign banks into 
the region. This is discussed further in the next section. Chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis give an 
empirical investigation of this in detail.  
2.3.1 Foreign Banking in SSA  
Despite the evidence that the financial system of SSA is considered underdeveloped, the 
reforms led to opening up of the banking system to foreign banks entry. This resulted in the 
recent past two decades witnessing an unprecedented level of increase presence of these banks 
into the financial system in many countries of the region. This has spurred concerns of major 
players in the industry such as the World Bank. According to Van Horen and Claessens (2012), 
not only has cross-border bank flows increased dramatically, but also many banks from both 
advanced and developing countries have moved abroad and established branches. The majority 
of these banks come from industrialised countries and recent development show evidence of 
foreign banks from developing economies expanding across borders into other developing 
countries (Van Horen, 2007). According to Van Horen (2007), these inflows of foreign banks 
seem to be influenced by economic integration, common language and proximity. Also 
importantly, banks from developing countries are more likely to invest in small developing 
countries, with weak institutions, where high-income country banks are unenthusiastic to go. 
The World Bank (2006) considers global economic trends, such as increases in trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), as some of the important answers to these unprecedented 
increases in FDI in the banking sector of the financial system of the region. Other important 
reasons are: to follow international client to take advantage of bank-client relationships 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994), increase profitability (Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2000), and, to diversify 
risk (Van Horen, 2007).  
According to Van Horen and Claessens (2012), in terms of loans, deposits and profits and 
current market shares, foreign banks amount to an average of 20% in OECD countries and 




Van Horen and Claessens (2012)8, Figure 2.3 was constructed which demonstrates inflows of 
foreign banks in terms of different regions. 
Figure 2.3: Regional comparison of foreign bank ownership among total banks 
 
Author’s own construct with data from Claessens and Horen (2012) 
 
The data includes 5377 banks in 137 countries for the period 1995–2009. The figure seems to 
provide evidence that SSA is the preferred destination of foreign banks. It indicates that, the 
region received the highest percentage of foreign bank inflows for the period, reaching about 
54% in 2009. However, the rest of the regions fall below 50% with East Asia and Latin America 
the least.  
In addition,  the total share of foreign banks present in SSA in terms of the number present in 
developing countries are 54%, 50% 46.1% and 47% for the period 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2009,  
respectively, as indicated in Table A.0.1 in the Appendix A. Even though the numbers suggest 
a decline, foreign banks’ presence in the region reveals increasing trends of 31%, 37%, 42% 
and 54% for the same period as shown in the Table.  The Table also suggests that between 
1995 and 2009, foreign banks almost doubled from 94 banks to 181, indicating an increase of 
about 93%.  In most cases, intraregional foreign banking inflows are relatively a noteworthy 
proportion, giving support to recent literature that emphases the role of distance in both foreign 
investment and financial investment. The literature argues that regional investment could be 
more attractive than global9. Nigerian and South African banks created pan-African networks. 
However, this expansion is recent and happened in the mid-2000s (International Monetary 
Fund-IMF, 2015). Moreover, the expansion of these banks echoes the increases in economic 
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integration within Africa more generally, and is contributing to improved competition, 
financial inclusion, and rise to greater economies of scale (IMF, 2015). In addition, these banks 
have been filling the recent gap left by European banks and are becoming the lead arrangers of 
syndicated loans (IMF, 2014).  
The discussion thus suggests how important these banks are in the domestic banking industry 
of SSA and thus the overall financial sector development of the region. However, some 
concerns have been raised about this situation. According to Frankel (1999), since the 1990s, 
international private capital inflows have increased tremendously, prompting an increasing 
financial sector vulnerability and the transmission to financial crisis. Therefore, cautious policy 
approach is required to contain their activities. The next section considers these issues in terms 
of ECOWAS and SADC. 
2.4 SADC  
SADC was formed in April 1980. It is a fifteen-member regional integrated trade group which 
includes, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritius, 
Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The main objectives among other things are to achieve 
sustainable development and economic growth, alleviate poverty and enhance quality of life of 
the people. The Community is not only endowed with huge minerals deposits, precious and 
base metals, but also has fertile land that produces wide range of agriculture products.  
According to Cling (1998), the region does not only roughly account for half of the GDP of 
SSA, but also has four out of the five richest economies in SSA.  South Africa is the most 
industrialised economy in the region. 
2.4.1 Economic Performance of SADC 
Economic performance among SADC members shows wide disparities.  Table 2.4.1 reveals 
that even though the average annual GDP growth rate of SADC is 3.58% for the period 1990 
–2010, which is slightly above the SSA growth rate of 3.42 %, DRC, Madagascar, South 
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe performed poorly below this SSA growth rate. The Table 
indicates that DRC and Zimbabwe have registered negative growth rates of 0.57% and 0.91% 
respectively. Internal conflict in DRC could be responsible for this, whereas that of Zimbabwe 




the highest average growth rate of 6.41%, followed by war-torn Angola with 6.01% which is 
caused by petroleum and diamond exports. 
In terms of average per capita income for the period, SADC (2289.8 US$) is almost three times 
the average per capita income of SSA (819.8US$) with Seychelles (10721.1 US$) out 
performing all member states. However, eight countries that include Madagascar, DRC, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe performed poorly below the 
SSA level, with DRC the lowest (160.9US$). Thus economic performance of the region 
presents wide disparities among the member states. 
Considering recent annual GDP growth rate and per capita income for 2012, again SADC 
performs well above SSA with per capita income over three times that of SSA. Both DRC and 
Zimbabwe recorded huge improvement in their annual growth rates (7.15% and 5.02% 
respectively) but still performed poorly in terms of per capita income. Also, there is noticeable 
improvement in the per capita income of thirteen countries over the average per capita income 
of 1990–2010. The discussion thus far shows that the region has the best and the worst 
economies in SSA. This corroborates Allen and Ndikumana's (2000)10 assertion that the region 
includes both the poorest and the richest African nations with regional and national income 
disparities representing the best and the worst. However, this economic performance was 









                                                          






2.4.2 Inflation in SADC 
In terms of inflation, Table 2.4.2 indicates that inflation was high in the 1990s, as shown by 
the five-year average inflation in the Table. Countries such as Angola, DRC, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe experienced three and four digits inflation which extended to 2000–2004. DRC 
recorded the highest inflation of 6425% in the 1990s, followed by Zimbabwe with 2567% in 
2011. It is clear from the Table that, in general, inflation reduced after the 1990s in many 
countries resulting in the region’s average becoming relatively low without Angola, DRC, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, in general, it seems the region is experiencing convergence 
in inflation, as shown by Figure A.1 in Appendix A. The Figure suggests a downwards trend 
of inflation in all member states which seems to converge. This trend could be suggestive of 
member state trying to meet the region’s inflation convergence criteria which is 3% by 201811. 
                                                          
11 SADC. (2011). Retrieved from SADC Website: www.sadc.int. 
Table 2.4.1: Average annual GDP growth rates (%) and real per capita income for the 
period 1990 to 2010 for SADC. 
Country/Region 
Average annual 
GDP rate % 
(1990-2010) 
Average Per 








Angola 6.01 1572.2 6.83 2685.83 
Botswana 5.18 4608.3 6.10 6934.86 
DRC -0.57 160.9 7.15 164.51 
Lesotho 4.04 656.3 3.96 928.54 
Madagascar 2.32 283.3 3.10 273.44 
Malawi 4.20 214.1 1.89 258.96 
Mauritius 4.86 4458.1 3.17 6711.16 
Mozambique 6.41 257.3 7.40 417.45 
Namibia 4.31 3226.9 4.98 4328.07 
Seychelles 3.68 10721.1 2.90 14301.52 
South Africa 2.55 4946.4 2.55 6003.46 
Swaziland 3.50 2213.4 -1.50 2341.38 
Tanzania 5.11 334.0 6.86 483.48 
Zambia 3.02 622.3 7.32 798.26 
Zimbabwe -0.91 577.4 5.02 428.54 
SADC 3.58 2289.8 4.51 3137.30 
SSA 3.42 819.8 4.23 992.84 




If this low inflationary trend continues, the region stands to improve the financial sector since 
low inflation is theoretically unlikely to be detrimental to financial development. 
HIC=High inflation countries. 
 
2.4.3 Overview of the financial system of SADC 
  
The overall financial sector performance using credit to the private sector as percentage of 
GDP, as well as credit by the banking sector as percentage of GDP, for the period 1990 –2012 
revealed that the average credit of SADC for that period does not only fall below SSA 
standards, but also other developing economies, such as Latin America and the Caribbean as 
well as East Asia and the Pacific (see Table 2.4.3). However, the data reveals that private sector 
as percentage of GDP is 125.28 whiles banking sector as percentage of GDP is 154.07 for 
South Africa suggesting that it is more than twice the SSA average. This is followed by 
Mauritius whose financial sector activities on the average make up more than half of the 
economic activities in the country. Also, even though private credit is about 22% of economic 
activities in Seychelles, credit by banks is over 80% of GDP 
Table 2.4.2: Showing inflation in SADC for the period of 1990 –2011 
 Year  
Country 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010 2011 
Angola 677.7 1478.3 145.6 14.9 14.5 13.5 
Botswana 12.8 8.7 7.9 9.6 6.9 8.5 
DRC 6425.0 309.4 184.4 16.9 16.7 16.6 
Lesotho 13.6 8.6 8.4 7.1 3.6 5.0 
Madagascar 16.8 17.9 9.5 11.6 9.2 9.5 
Malawi 21.1 40.9 17.6 10.9 7.4 7.6 
Mauritius 8.6 6.6 4.9 7.0 2.9 6.5 
Mozambique 46.2 22.9 12.9 8.4 12.7 10.4 
South Africa 12.4 7.3 5.5 6.8 4.3 5.3 
Swaziland 11.1 8.0 8.2 7.7 4.5 6.1 
Seychelles 2.4 1.6 3.9 14.9 -2.4 2.6 
Tanzania 26.7 16.4 4.6 7.3 10.5 10.6 
Namibia - - - 6.6 4.5 5.0 
Zambia 121.7 30.7 21.8 12.8 8.5 6.4 
Zimbabwe 26.5 30.6 197.3 1196.8 2031.0 2567.0 
SADC (Excludes HIC) 18.0 15.4 8.3 10.2 7.4 8.1 




The trend is not very different considering financial sector depth with M2 as percent of GDP12. 
However, the rest of the region performs below 50%. Hence, if Schumpeter is right, then there 
should be measures to improve the financial sector of these economies. Exclusion of South 
Africa from the estimates revealed a noticeable drop of SADC financial sector performance 
from 27.04% to 20.04% for credit to private sector, and from 35.50% to 27.03% of banking 
sector credit for the period. We can conclude with caution that South Africa exerts some 
influence on the financial sector performance in the region. 
To measure the importance of the banking sector, the ratio of deposit money bank asset to 
deposit money bank asset plus central bank asset shows that, apart from DRC and Zambia, the 
rest of the countries are above 60%. This suggests diminishing influence of central banks in 
the financial system and increasing influence of commercial banks. This is a good sign since 
banks are not only able to efficiently mobilise savings and channel to more promising areas, 
but they also have the capacity to monitor how these resources are used.  This process could 
generate economic growth. For SADC, on average it is about 75%. This signifies the 
importance of commercial banking in the region. And since the underlying intuition about the 
banking institutions is that they have the ability to provide the five main financial functions as 
outlined by Levine (1997), efficient organisation could lead to more resources being channeled 








                                                          
12 This variable is used instead of M3 for the analysis in this chapter because there is consistent data for all 
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Angola 9.08 10.74 67.23 24.93 32.85 
Botswana 16.29 31.03 99.20** 33.91 6.52 
DRC 2.66 7.40 44.06 12.69 34.70* 
Lesotho 15.56 -1.43 81.11 36.33 9.01 
Madagascar 11.30 16.33 65.12 21.75 23.22 
Malawi 10.19 20.15 62.53 20.38 21.62 
Mauritius 62.51 81.76 97.48 85.66 7.72 
Mozambique 15.41 11.30 86.96 29.29 8.43 
Namibia 43.84 46.28 95.95 42.45 5.47 
Seychelles 22.14 82.50 77.96 73.88 7.16 
South Africa 125.28 154.07 97.43 63.03 4.15 
Swaziland 18.05 13.40 97.97 23.54 6.57 
Tanzania 10.18 17.90 72.30 24.56 9.75 
Zambia 9.16 42.71 37.69 20.18 15.28 
Zimbabwe 34.21 60.37 67.51 47.63 197.04 
SADC 27.06 35.50 76.48 37.35 25.96 
SADC(Excl SA) 20.04 27.03 75.17 35.51 13.75 
SSA 56.07 72.03 - 39.79 10.83 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 34.39 55.63 - 40.05 7.57 
East Asia and 
Pacific 153.69 210.59 - 168.54 5.01 
Source: Own construct with data from World Development Indicators 2012. This source and financial measures are used in 
this analysis for this chapter since data on these measures are available at source. Ratio of Bank assets to bank assets plus 
central bank asset is obtained from Global development Financial Data Base *only have data for last 5 years, **only have 
data for the last 11 years. 
Also, Table 2.4.3 indicates that interest rate spread, which measures the degree of cost of 
intermediation in a competitive financial system, is relatively high in the region. This indicator 
can also be used to gauge not only the development of the banking sector and the measure of 
the level of efficiency in the sector, but also measures the overall financial sector. It is evident 
that the majority of the countries are below SSA level of 10.83%, which exceeds that of 
developing economies of Latin America and the Caribbean as well as East Asia and the Pacific 
for the period 2012. This indicator shows that the financial sector of South Africa has greater 
competition in the region. Theoretically, interest rate spread should fall as financial sector 
develops.   Thus, the low interest rate of the developed financial sector of South Africa comes 




in the financial system, a model relating FSD to growth and development will be informative 
to policy direction. However, the interest rate spread of Zimbabwe is 197.04%. It reflects the 
impact of the recent inflation trends in the country. Overlooking Zimbabwe reduces SADC 
interest rate spread from 25.96% to 13.75%. Other member states with higher interest rate 
spread include Angola, DRC, Madagascar and Malawi which may be blamed on high bank 
concentration. Bank concentration for the three largest banks in Angola, DRC, Madagascar and 
Malawi are 72%, 58%, 89% and 88% respectively 
2.4.4 Stock market development in SADC 
In terms of stock market development, SSA has relatively little to discuss. This component of 
the financial structure is largely under developed, leaving the region a basically bank-based 
financial system. Nevertheless, some positive developments are observed. SADC has relatively 
the most developed stock markets. There are about seven stock exchanges in the region, with 
South Africa having a highly developed and sophisticated market, ranking 17th in the world in 
terms of market capitalisation (SADC- Finance and Investment Sector Coordinating Unit, 
FISCU, 1998). From Table 2.5.4, it is clear that average stock market capitalisation of listed 
companies as a percentage of GDP indicates that it is almost 173% of economic activity in 
South Africa, with total average market capitalization of 362.096 billion US$ for the period 
1990 –2011.  
Removal of South Africa leaves average stock market performance of SSA to drop 
conspicuously from 107.3% to 24.7%. This reveals the stock market power of South Africa in 
SSA. Namibia performs the least with almost 8% of GDP and average total market 
capitalisation for the period to be 473.15 million US$. The rest of the economies, apart from 
Zimbabwe and Mauritius (39.9%), on average perform poorly during the period indicating 
stock market capitalization of less than 40% of GDP. 
Figure 2.4 shows the performance of the stocks markets over the entire period of 1990 –2012 
in the sub-region. It is evident that South Africa performs well reaching all time highest 
performance ever in 2007 of about 300% of GDP. This was followed by a sharp decline in 
2008 to about 170%. The decline was largely the result of the recent financial crisis of 2008. 
Zimbabwe reached all-time high of almost 500% of economic activity in stock market 
capitalisation in 2006, but experienced a sharp drop to about 100% in 2007 and the lowest ever 




as hyper inflationary effects. However, there is recovery since 2010. Dismal records were 
observed in Zambia, Swaziland and Namibia. Mauritius and Botswana, even though look 
promising, remained below 80% of GDP, with the former performing better.  
Figure 2.4: Stock market developments in SADC 
 
Source: Own construct with data from GFDD, 2012. 
 
2.5 ECOWAS  
In contrast to SADC, ECOWAS was established on 28th May 1975 in Nigeria with 16 countries 
which include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea 
(Conakry), Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone 
and Togo. However, Mauritania has opted out. The objective is to promote economic 
integration in all spheres of economic activity, such as industry, telecommunications, 
commerce, monetary and financial development, energy, agriculture, natural resources, social 
and cultural matters, etc.  The bloc does not only aim at pooling resources of member countries 
to raise living standards and reduce poverty, but it also aims at improving and maintaining 
economic stability, as well as promote relations among member states.  
Like SADC, the region has huge and diverse natural mineral resources which include gold, 
diamond, iron ore, bauxite and uranium. There is also a huge potential for crude oil as 
evidenced by the recent discovery of vast deposits in Ghana. Agricultural products include 
timber, cocoa, coffee, rubber, and so on. Therefore if properly harnessed, they can cause a dent 




2.5.1 Economic Performance of ECOWAS 
In terms of economic performance as shown in Table 2.5.1, average annual economic growth 
rate from 1990 to 2010 is marginally above the SSA growth rate, but average per capita income 
for the same period is lower than that of SSA. This is mainly as a result of poor economic 
performances by Nigeria and Cote d’ Ivoire whose combined GDP is over 50% of the region 
(see Table 2.5.1). Fueled by political instability, Cote d’ Ivoire registered mostly negative 
growth rates. However, Nigeria did not register negative growth rates, but experienced low 
performance13. Seven member states have their growth rates above the ECOWAS rate. These 
includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Mali and Nigeria. 
It is clear that Cape Verde had the highest average growth rate of 6.17% over the period as well 
as the highest per capita income of 1730 US$ at 2005 prices, followed by Burkina Faso with 
growth rate of 5.37% but with real per capita income far below both ECOWAS and SSA level. 
Apart from Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal whose average real per capita 
incomes are above the ECOWAS level, that of the rest of the member states are not only below 
the ECOWAS level, but are also very low and fairly uniform with war devastated Liberia the 
least (151.22US$). One of the reasons assigned to this poor performance is primarily because 
of a sharp decline in the terms of trade (-3.3% in 1999) 14 and political uncertainties in several 
countries, notably Cote d’ Ivoire. In addition, droughts, inappropriate economic policies, and 
other internal and external constraints, have rendered many member countries to endured harsh 
economic conditions leading to poor economic performance. 
Nevertheless, recent estimates of 2012 (column 4) revealed a remarkably improvement in 
annual GDP growth in the region.  They show the average annual GDP of 3.80% rising to 
6.5%, with war-devastated but diamond-supported Sierra Leone registering a double digit 
growth rate of 15.22%. It was the highest in the bloc. On average, twelve member states 
experienced improvement in economic growth in 2012 over the 1990 –2010 rates, with Cote 
d’ Ivoire growing at the rate of 9.50% with the return of political stability, and war-worn Liberia  
growing at the rate 10.82%. There is also evidence from the Table that reveal that the per capita 
income of twelve countries have improved in 2012 with Cape Verde maintaining the lead. With 
the region vastly politically stable, the prospects for good economic performance is clear.  
                                                          








2.5.2 Inflation in ECOWAS 
Unlike SADC, only few countries experienced high and double-digits inflation in ECOWAS 
in the 1990s, as demonstrated by Table 2.5.2. These countries include Ghana, Nigeria and 
Guinea Bissau. These double-digits inflation extend to 2010 and 2011 in Ghana and Nigeria 
respectively. Available data on Guinea also suggests such double-digits from 2005–2011. This 
may suggests that in these countries, monetary policy was out of control. The data also reveals 
that countries that belong to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) have 
relatively low inflation rate during this period. WAEMU includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’ Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo 
The union has a strong periodic reviews of member countries’ macroeconomic policies and 
performance based on the convergence conditions. This may suggest the reason for such a 
relatively low inflation rate among member states. Like SADC, the average ECOWAS inflation 
Table 2.5.1: Average annual GDP growth rates (%) and real per capita income for 
the period 1980 to 2010 for ECOWAS 
Country/Region 
Average 
annual GDP % 
(1990-2010) 
Average Per 
capita GDP (2005 
US $)-1990-2010 
Annual 
GDP  rate 
% (2012) 
 Per capita 
GDP (2005 US 
$)-2012 
Benin 4.45 506.80 5.40 567.91 
Burkina Faso 5.37 351.99 10.03 494.99 
Cape Verde 6.17 1730.10 4.29 2986.67 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1.59 990.54 9.50 957.88 
Gambia 3.60 429.09 6.01 444.23 
Ghana 4.99 461.90 7.91 724.35 
Guinea 3.32 289.18 3.94 308.20 
Guinea Bissau 2.02 456.53 -1.50 423.38 
Liberia 5.89 151.22 10.82 277.94 
Mali 4.72 398.33 -1.19 476.44 
Niger 2.24 267.23 11.20 246.23 
Nigeria 4.79 739.47 6.55 1052.34 
Senegal 3.39 710.85 3.69 799.39 
Sierra Leone 2.26 313.09 15.22 435.41 
Togo 2.25 393.40 5.62 412.79 
ECOWAS 3.80 545.98 6.50 707.21 
SSA 3.42 819.84 4.23 992.84 
Source: Own estimation with data from World Development Indicators 2012. This source and financial measures 





seems fairly low and appears trending downward. This indicates that member states are moving 
towards inflation convergence as shown by Figure A.2 in Appendix A.  
Table 2.5.2: Showing inflation in ECOWAS for the period of 1990-2011 
     Year       
Country 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010 2011 
Benin 9.6 5.9 2.6 4.1 2.1 2.1 
Burkina Faso 5.1 4.0 1.7 4.4 -0.8 2.8 
Cape Verde 6.5 6.3 0.4 3.6 2.1 4.5 
Cote d’ Ivoire 6.7 5.3 2.9 3.1 1.7 4.9 
Gambia 7.7 3.2 9.0 4.3 5.0 4.8 
Ghana 23.0 32.2 22.4 14.5 10.7 8.7 
Mali 3.8 4.5 1.0 4.2 1.1 2.9 
Niger 4.4 4.2 1.6 4.0 0.8 2.9 
Nigeria 35.8 25.4 13.5 10.9 13.7 10.8 
Senegal 6.0 2.9 1.3 2.9 1.3 3.4 
Togo 8.2 6.1 1.7 4.4 1.8 3.6 
Guinea Bissau 44.7 30.2 2.5 3.7 2.5 5.0 
Guinea - - - 22.4 15.5 21.4 
Liberia - - - 10.9 7.3 8.5 
Sierra Leone -   -  - - 16.6 16.2 
ECOWAS Average 13.5 10.8 5.1 6.9 5.4 6.8 
Source: Own construct with data from World Bank African Development Indicators, 2012 
 
2.5.3 Overview of the financial sector 
Unlike SADC, ECOWAS has dual financial systems comprising a formal financial system and 
an informal financial sector. The former comprises the Central Bank, the banking sector and 
non-banking financial institutions. The informal financial system, which is widespread in the 
region, involves mainly unrecorded small mobile and micro financial systems that move from 
door to door of their clients who are mainly unattractive to the formal financial system. They 
are named differently in different countries such as “susu” in Ghana, “esusu” in Nigeria and 
“so” in Benin15. They are not only engaged in mobilizing small savings of small businesses, 
and small farmers dotted across the region but also engage in giving loans which are easily 
accessible and the mainly life line of many small businesses. Individual honesty as well as trust 
of the society for the individual usually becomes collateral. Loans are usually in small amounts 
and for a short period. The informal financial system plays a crucial role in the economies of 
ECOWAS. Hence, as Atindéhou et al. (2005) point out, converting it into formal financial 
institutions is a concern for ECOWAS. With the support of international organisation, several 
                                                          




formal microfinancial structures have been created, including Cre´dit Rural in Guinea, Cre´dit 
mutuel and Banques villageoises Nganda in Senegal, and Caisses villageoises du pays Doyon 
in Mali.   
In terms of formal system, ECOWAS’s financial system is dominated by banks. From Table 
2.5.3, it is evidenced that average private sector credit as a percentage of GDP (15%) is 
extremely low compared to that of SSA (56 %). However, the average private sector credit as 
a percentage of GDP of Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo are above 
ECOWAS average, with Cape Verde performing better in the region. Guinea performs poorly 
during this period with 7.16 % economic activities as a credit to the private sector. In terms of 
credit by the banking sector, as a percent of GDP, the estimates show that the average financial 
sector activity is less than half of economic activity of the bloc (32.92% of GDP). This is far 
below the SSA level of 72.03%. However, it is over 64% of GDP for Cape Verde and 180% in 
Liberia. Again, in terms of this measure, the rest of the member states have very low and 
relatively uniform distribution as demonstrated by Table 2.5.3.  
However, ratio of domestic banking assets to the sum of domestic banking assets and central 
bank assets reveal an average of 61.35% for the region. This indicates the increasing 
importance of the banking sector with Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
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Benin 14.54 11.79 84.03 28.88  
Burkina Faso 13.63 12.59 79.81 22.47 9.28 
Cape Verde 38.73 64.27 69.52 14.55 7.58 
Cote d’ Ivoire 19.15 26.58 79.37 27.56 5.93 
Gambia 9.41 16.20 79.68 27.86 14.01 
Ghana 10.32 26.12 48.06 35.78 3.36 
Guinea 7.16 15.30 30.02 16.40 13.18 
Guinea Bissau 7.66 12.48 45.50 27.42  
Liberia 10.03 180.61 11.52 13.27 12.26 
Mali 16.11 14.28 79.45 25.70  
Niger 8.25 10.79 62.17 14.94  
Nigeria 20.84 21.99 63.80 23.66 7.49 
Senegal 21.49 25.36 76.56 28.59  
Sierra Leone 3.85 31.93 33.46 15.20 12.83 
Togo 20.09 23.45 77.28 31.93  
ECOWAS 14.75 32.92 61.35 23.62  
SSA 56.07 72.03 - 39.79 10.83 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 34.39 55.63 - 40.05 7.57 
East Asia and 
Pacific 153.69 210.59 - 168.54 5.01 
Source: Author’s computations with data from World Development Indicators, 2013 and Global Financial Development 
Database, 2012. 
The average depth of financial system is dissatisfactorily 23.62% with all member states also 
revealing less than 40% of economic activities.  Ghana is the only country performing relatively 
better. Interest rate spread shows some relative efficiency in the region, with Ghana showing 
more competition in the bloc. This could be explained by the liberalisation of the banking sector 
which resulted in inflows of foreign banks. However, Gambia has the highest interest rate 
spread of 14.01%. This may have been caused by bank concentration which increased to 100% 
in 2011. This is the opposite in Ghana. Ghana’s bank concentration fell from 100% in the 1990s 
to about 42% in 2011 as demonstrated by the data from Global Financial Data Base 2012. 
 
2.5.4 Stock market development in ECOWAS 
The sub-region has only three active stock markets namely: the Ghana Stock Exchange, Nigeria 




exchange for WAEMU member states. From Table 2.5.4, the average stock market 
capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of GDP for the period 1990–2011 was 15.72 
for Bourse Regionale des Valeurs Mobilieres (BRVM) (Abidjan). It was the highest in the bloc, 
followed by Nigeria Stock Exchange (14.5%), and Ghana Stock Exchange (13.3%). Clearly, 
stock market activities of the region are disproportionately very low in terms of total economic 
activity in each country. They remain thin and illiquid compared to markets in both developed 
countries as well as other developing countries. 
Nevertheless, from Figure 2.5, it is evidenced that there is improvement from 1990 to 2011 as 
these markets started from less than 10% and followed steady growth path reaching around 
14% for Cote d’ Ivoire, 15% for Ghana, and 17% for Nigeria in 2005. After which, Cote d’ 
Ivoire and Nigeria experienced a sharped increased in performance with all-time high of 42% 
and 52% respectively in 2007. There was, however, a sharp decline of the 2007 performance 
in 2008 (30% for Cote d’ Ivoire and 24% for Nigeria).  It further worsened in 2009. This 
indicates the debilitating effects of the financial turmoil of the period. Even though the three 
markets suffered reduction in their performance, the Figure reveals that Nigeria was heaviest 
hit. 
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In terms of total stock market capitalisation, Nigeria registered the highest average of 18.7307 
billion current US$ during this period,  Cote d’ Ivoire, 2.8468 billion current US dollars, and 
Ghana 1.6481 billion current US$ (See Table 2.5.4). 













Stocks traded, total 




value (% of 
GDP):1990-
2012 
  ECOWAS   
Cote d’ Ivoire 15.72 2846.9 66.1 0.36 
Ghana 13.25 1648.3 49.7 0.44 
Nigeria 14.467 18730.7 2816.2 1.72 
  SADC   
Botswana 21.29 2003.5 65.0 0.81 
Mauritius 39.90 2686.1 156.9 2.27 
Namibia 7.71 4731.5 15.9 0.32 
South Africa 172.46 362,096 150,930 61.22 
Swaziland 9.924 184.9 - - 
Zambia 12.47 1241.4 44.4 0.43 
Zimbabwe 87.33 5906.3 658.7 9.52 
SSA 107.31 - - - 
SSA 24.66 - -   - 
Source: Author’s computations with data from GFDD, 2013 
From the discussion, it is clear that both average and recent GDP rates for ECOWAS exceed 
that of SADC. However, both average and recent per capita income of SADC far exceeds the 
former, with recent estimates showing SADC is about four and halve times ECOWAS, but 
with wide income disparities, whereas incomes are fairly uniform in ECOWAS. In terms of 
financial sector development, the banking sector has the largest share in terms of total financial 
sector assets in a majority of countries in the two regions. Furthermore, even though the two 
blocs are relatively underdeveloped, SADC seems to perform better than ECOWAS. Hence, a 
comparative study focus on investigating the reason for the state of the financial system, as 
well as relating financial development and other growth influencing control variables to 





2.5.5 Other areas of the financial system 
Other aspects of the financial structure such as the bond markets, the insurance markets as well 
as the mortgage markets, which are all very important components of the financial system are 
relatively immature. However, it seems to be picking up in some few countries in the two 
regions.  Countries in SADC include Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa, with South Africa 
having the most developed. In ECOWAS, this seems to be growing in Nigeria and Ghana. 
2.6 Governance and democratic development in ECOWAS and SADC 
Democracy is seen as a set of representative institutions that strive to uphold liberal values. It 
is increasingly perceived that democracy offers a solution to major social and economic 
difficulties. It guarantees political freedoms and multi-party elections which enables voters to 
hold governments more accountable, not only in terms of delivering public services, but also 
in assuring the security of property rights and economic freedom (Limongi & Przeworski, 
1997; Besley & Prat, 2006). The accountability of public officials, transparency in both 
government spending and policy-making, provision of property rights, as well as economic 
freedom lead to economic growth. Hence, democracy allocates resources more efficiently than 
autocratic regimes. Therefore, transition from more autocratic and dictatorial rule to more 
democratic administration will induce economic growth 
Democratic theorists such as Campbell et al. (1960), Fenno (1978) and Fiorina (1981) contend 
that elections under democracy make available to the citizens an opportunity to influence the 
way governments behave. Through voting, a population can either threaten to remove a 
representative or can reward her with a renewed reputation for competency and an additional 
term in office. Hence, in theory, a more democratic system is more likely to produce policy 
outcomes that coincide with citizens' preferences than a less democratic system resulting in 
economic growth. 
Despite this, Gwartney et al.(1996) argues that a country may be liberal in a political sense and 
highly democratic with major civil liberties being protected and still adopt policies that conflict 
with economic freedom which may reverse economic growth. Therefore, democratic 
governance is a necessary condition for economic growth, but not a sufficient condition, unless 




On the other hand, even though autocratic and demagogic regimes are mostly characterised 
and blamed with expropriations, bureaucracy, corruption and nepotism, which increase the cost 
of doing business and eventually lead to the reversal of economic growth, the study argues that 
this is not always the case. Evidence from the development-dictators of Singapore, Korea and 
Thailand indicates that even though a country may be under autocratic administration, some 
remarkable economic growth can still be recorded. Some, such as the World Bank, argue that 
some element of autocracy is needed to induce economic growth. 
Governance and democratic dispensation in SSA have undergone series of metamorphosis. 
From authoritarian rule in the 1960s, to democratic governance in the 1990s. Like any region 
in SSA, SADC and ECOWAS have made tremendous strides towards multiparty democratic 
governance from authoritarian regimes. These regions were characterised with military 
interventions resulting in dictatorial regimes. This is especially the case with ECOWAS. Civil 
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in ECOWAS resulted in destruction and political instability, 
causing unstable macroeconomic environment which led to economic hardship in the 
economies. Other areas were marked by series of coups d’états leading to dictatorship regimes. 
Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gambia, and so on suffered in 1960s 
to the late 1980s. Unlike the development-dictators of South East Asia, these military regimes 
plugged their economies into total anarchy with some of the economies like Ghana recording 
negative growth rates. 
 In SADC, notably countries that were plugged into authoritarian rule include Zaire (DRC) and 
Angola. These countries were engaged in long civil war which resulted in destruction and 
underdevelopment. Currently, the focus is on Zimbabwe, even though the administration is 
under democracy. 
To examine the level of governance, political rights, civil liberties and Freedom Status, we 
constructed Table 2.6.1 using information from Polity IV and Freedom House. The system of 
governance is measured by polity2 from Polity IV. This index measures the degree of 
democracy and autocracy by assigning a positive number to the former and a negative for the 
latter. The values are from -10 to 10 indicating extreme autocracy and extreme democracy. The 
rest of the indices are obtained from Freedom House, which indicates 1 for total political right, 




From Table 2.6.1, it is clear that on average, SADC is more democratic than ECOWAS, as 
indicated by their mean estimates. In terms of political right and civil liberties, on average, the 
former is slightly in favour of SADC, with the latter in favour of ECOWAS. The variation in 
political rights is higher in ECOWAS than in SADC; civil liberty is the same in both regions. 
Finally, overall freedom, which is the average of political right and civil liberty, indicates that 
on average it is the same in both regions. This summary statistics is not surprising since these 
two regions have almost similar transition process to democracy, and were both characterised 
in the 1980s with authoritarian regimes. 
Table 2.6.1: Summary description of governance and democratic development in ECOWAS 
and SADC 
      ECOWAS         SADC     
Variable Obs Mean std.Dev Min Max Obs Mean std.Dev Min Max 
Polity2 384 -0.15 6.02 -9 10 384 0.74 7.03 -10 10 
Political right 384 4.42 1.9 1 7 416 4.3 1.7 1 7 
Civil liberties 384 4.2 1.4 1 7 416 4.3 1.4 2 7 
Freedom status 384 4.3 1.6 1 7 416 4.3 1.51 1.5 7 
Source: Own construction with polity 2 data from Polity IV and political right, civil rights and freedom status from Freedom 
House. 
Although it is widely accepted that the two regions have undergone democratic transition away 
from authoritarian rule of the past and made commendable progress, evidently as shown in 
Table 2.6.1, these regions still face a plethora of democratic deficits that need serious attention. 
Therefore if democratic consolidation is to occur and persist, then efforts should be geared 
towards minimising the wide gap between the minimum and maximum values of the indices. 














Financial sector development, political institutions and economic growth: A 
comparative study of ECOWAS and SADC 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The issue of the link between financial development and economic growth has been a 
fascinating and controversial one. This issue generated a great deal of interest among 
academics and policy makers alike. Ever since the observation was made that the development 
of the financial sector provides remedy for economic growth, a lot of countries, including those 
in SSA, took measures not only to open up the financial system for capital inflows, but also to 
put policy measures in place to develop the sector. Available evidence from the structure of the 
economies of developed countries, such as the United States of America, Britain, France, 
Germany, indicates that the most advanced economies also have an advanced and sophisticated 
financial systems. On the contrary, most economies of underdeveloped countries are 
characterised by less developed and inefficient financial systems. This observation provides 
support for the idea that the financial system is crucial in the growth process. According to 
Levine (1997), the development of the financial markets and institutions is a critical and 
inextricable part of the growth process.  Following McKinnon's (1973) and Shaw’s (1973) 
contributions and generally, the advent of endogenous growth models, the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth over the last thirty years, has raised fresh research 
interest. This chapter is part of these fresh and renewed interest in finance-growth literature. 
There have been a lot of empirical studies on this important issue. While the results of some 
studies reveal that financial development causes economic growth (e.g. King & Levine, 1993; 
Wang, 1999; Beck, 2002; Levine et al., 2000;  Ang 2008; Kar et al., 2011), others argue that 
economic growth causes financial development (e.g. Goldsmith, 1969). Despite a great deal of 
efforts devoted in empirical studies aiming at finding an accurate, precise and definite 
conclusion on this issue, researchers have not agreed on such a definite conclusion. Studies 
thus have mixed results. This mixed empirical evidence makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 




A key reason for such mixed evidence is the use of different measures of financial development 
as well as the application of an inappropriate econometric techniques. Accordingly, Adu et al. 
(2013), who estimated the long run growth effects of financial development in Ghana, argue 
that the growth effect of financial development is sensitive to the choice of proxy. The study 
concluded that whether financial development is good or bad for growth depends on the 
indicator used as a proxy for financial development. This argument was earlier posited in 
Odhiambo (2007) who looked at the case of Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania. Consequently, 
as one of the contributions of this chapter, a composite financial development index is 
constructed using three indicators of financial development to measure broadly financial 
development. These measures include: bank private credit to GDP, liquid liabilities (M3 to 
GDP), and bank assets to the sum of bank assets and central bank assets. 
Even though several empirical studies have been done in this area, most of the research are 
related to developed economies (see Neusser & Kugler, 1998; Rousseau, 1998; Arestis et al., 
2001; Rousseau &  Sylla, 2005; Shan, 2005; Van Nieuwerburgh, 2006; Diekmann & 
Westermann, 2010). Relatively few studies have been done on developing economies and far 
less on SSA. Other studies are a mixture of developed and developing countries (see King & 
Levine, 1993; Rajan & Zingales 1996; Beck et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2000; Calderón & Liu, 
2003; Apergis et al., 2007; Bangake & Eggoh, 2011) 
The studies on SSA are either on a single country analysis (e.g Akinboadi,1998; Ghali, 1999; 
Odhiambo, 2004; Akinboade & Makina, 2006; Abu‐Bader & Abu‐Qarn 2008; Odhiambo, 
2011) or a cross-country analysis (e.g. Odhiambo, 2007) or analysis of a single economic bloc 
(e.g. Allen & Nidkumana, 2000; Agbetsiafa, 2004; Aziakpono, 2004). Thus a comparative 
study of regional groupings, especially in SSA, has been ignored.  
In addition, like any developing region, SSA over the last 20 years, has experienced a wave 
democratization. This results in stability in most parts of the region. According to Besley and 
Prat (2006), democratic development leads to assuring the security of property rights and 
economic freedoms. It is argued that financial development induces economic growth under 
better institutional arrangement and environment. La Porta et al. (1997) also argue on the 
importance of legal system. According to these authors, the legal system play a crucial role in 
determining the financial system and growth relationship and that secure property right, 
contract rights are key for banks and institutions to operate efficiently. This influences growth 




captures this effect in the form of interactive term between financial development and 
governance system since the region has experienced improvement in governance. Therefore, 
the main objectives of this chapter are twofold: (i) to provide comprehensive analysis on the 
impact of financial development on economic growth and, (ii) to determine the 
complementarity effect between financial development and political institutions on economic 
growth. This is done in the context of regional comparison of ECOWAS and SADC in SSA 
for the period 1980–2011.  
Another important contribution of this study is the application of an appropriate econometric 
technique in examining the relationship between the measure of financial development and 
economic growth in the two regions. Even though the sample of countries in both regions may 
be homogenous in terms of income levels and standard of living, heterogeneity may occur in 
terms of geography, history, cultural background, and so on. Previous studies use traditional 
OLS, cross-sectional and panel approaches, without taking into account of the existence of 
heterogeneity among countries in their sample. This may lead to less efficient results. In this 
study we apply the novel technique of Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator developed by  
Pesaran et.al (1999), which is not only able to address this problem, but it can also estimate the 
long run relationship between the variables following a shock. This empirical strategy leads to 
more efficient results. Whiles there have been increasing empirical studies on finance-growth 
relationship, there are limited number of empirical studies that have attempted to apply the 
PMG estimator. In cases where there are, the studies are mostly outside SSA. The estimator 
allows the short-run dynamics to vary across countries, but constrains the long-run slope 
coefficients to be the same across countries.  Furthermore, Mean Group (MG) as well as 
Dynamic fixed estimators (DFE) are also used to facilitate comparison of the results.  
Unlike the PMG, the MG estimator assumes that both the short-run and long run coefficients 
are heterogeneous across panels. Hence, each panel is estimated separately and the resulting 
coefficients are averaged across panels. In contrast, DFE estimator assumes that all the 
coefficients of the short run and long run are same. 
The results from this chapter seem to support financial development inducing growth in both 
sub-regions, with the impact on SADC greater than that on ECOWAS. This outcome seems to 
indicate that ECOWAS is not benefiting much from the relatively underdeveloped financial 
system, thus efforts should be directed at improving it. Interestingly, the influence of financial 




not in SADC. This seems to suggest that the current political system of SADC has limited 
support for financial system development to exert significant positive effects on growth. 
However, the error correction term reveals 13% for ECOWAS and 15% for SADC. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the literature review and 
section 3.3 describes the model and econometric technique. Section 3.4 describes the data used. 
Section 3.5 presents discussion of results whiles the section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The theoretical link between financial development and growth is simply expressed by a linear 
(AK) endogenous growth model developed by Pagano (1993). The model shows that higher 
financial development might drive a higher economic growth16.  Consider a simple endogenous 
model of production function where output Y produce at time t is a function of a single factor 
capital 𝐾𝑡 given as: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐴𝐾𝑡)                   (3.1) 
Where A is marginal productivity of capital or a variable indicating the economy’s general 
efficiency in using the capital stock K 
For simplicity, the model assumes that population is stationary and that the economy produces 
single good that may be consumed or invested. If the single good is invested, it depreciates at 
the rate of 𝜎 per period. Thus gross investment will be given as; 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 −  𝜎)𝐾𝑡                     (3.2) 
For a closed economy, capital market equilibrium requires saving, 𝑆𝑡  to equals investment, 
𝐼𝑡. Assuming the proportion of saving, (1-φ),  is lost through financial intermediation, then we 
have; 
φ𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡                  (3.3) 
From 3.1, the growth rate is obtained at time t+1 as 
                                                          
16 The contribution of the financial sector to economic growth received considerable attention with the advent of 
endogenous growth theory. Greenwood and Smith (1997) as well as Bencivenga et.al (1995) and Murinde (1996) 




 𝑔𝑡+1 = (𝑌𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡⁄ − 1) = (𝐾𝑡+1 𝐾𝑡⁄ − 1)                         (3.4) 
Therefore using equation 3.2 and dropping the time element, the steady-state growth rate, Y 




− 𝜎 = 𝐴φ𝑆𝑡 – 𝜎                 (3.5) 
That is, from equation 3.5, the growth rate, g at time t is a product of marginal productivity of 
capital A, savings rate S and proportion of savings invested φ minus depreciation 𝜎. Hence, 
both saving and productivity of capital affect long-term economic growth positively. Therefore, 
higher level of FSD will cause higher growth if: (i) it causes higher S (ii) it raises A (iii) reduces 
the proportion of saving wasted by inefficient intermediation (1-φ ). 
The new growth theory argues that financial markets and institutions appear endogenously in 
response to market failures and thereby contribute to long run growth. Financial markets and 
institutions mitigate the effects of transaction and information costs of the market, which leads 
to channelling resources to more promising areas that will spur economic growth. Levine 
(1997, 2005) argues that the financial system causes economic growth through five basic 
functions of the financial system which includes: mobilising savings, facilitating risk 
amelioration, acquisition of information on investment and allocating resources, monitoring 
managers and exerting corporate control and, lastly, facilitating exchange of goods and 
services.  
However, there is disagreement about the direction of causality. Some argue that causality is 
from finance to growth which is described as Supply-leading hypothesis. Early proponent of 
the hypothesis was Schumpeter (1939). That is, the development of the financial sector leads 
to growth. McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), and Levine et.al (2000) among others 
support this argument. Others such as Patrick (1966)17 and Goldsmith (1969) argue that 
causation run from growth to finance which is described as Demand-following hypothesis. 
Under this argument, an expanding economy triggers demand for financial services which will 
induce growth in the financial sector. Unlike the above, some causation is bi-directional. That 
is, FSD causes growth and growth causes FSD.  
                                                          




In addition, some researchers argue that there is negative causal link where finance could have 
detrimental effect on economic growth. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) reveal that financial 
repression does not only reduce output of capital, but also lowers savings which impedes 
economic growth and development. According to McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and King 
and Levine (1993), various constraints exerted by governments on the banking system may 
slow FSD, and thus, economic growth. Lucas (1988) disagrees with the existence of a finance-
growth relationship and argues that there is an over emphasis on the role of FSD in the process 
of economic growth. Lucas proposes that financial development may well turn out to be an 
impediment to economic growth when it induces volatility and discourage risk adverse 
investors from investing18.  
There is an extensive amount of empirical literature that have been conducted outside Africa. 
Wang (1999), using seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) model in Taiwan, shows that 
supply-leading is highly related to financial variables, whereas demand-following is related to 
real variables that affect industrial production. And in the same direction, Beck et al. (2000) 
show a significant link between financial development on both real per capita GDP growth and 
total factor productivity of 63 countries using cross-country regression. 
Xu (2000), using 41 countries and multivariate VAR, rejects the argument that finance follows 
economic growth, and that domestic investment is the main channel through which finance 
affects economic growth. Conversely, Shan et al. (2001), using 9 OECD countries including 
China, posit a reverse causality, that is, a bidirectional causality in others and no evidence of 
causality from financial development to economic growth. However, Deidda and Fattouh 
(2008), using 119 countries, find no significant relationship between financial depth and 
economic growth in low income group in their sample, although the opposite holds for high 
income group. Ang (2008) estimated six equations on Malaysia. His study supports finance-
led growth through the promotion of both private saving and private investment. The studies 
of Ang and McKibbin (2007) and Mirdala (2011) support positive relationship.  
With the studies on Africa, Odhiambo (2007) show that causality between FSD and economic 
growth is sensitive to the measure of proxy for financial development using South Africa, 
Tanzania and Kenya. But using information of Egypt, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) apply 
Granger causality test, cointegration and VEC modeling; the study reveals a strong support for 
                                                          




the view that FSD and economic growth are mutually causal. In a recent study on Tanzania, 
Odhiambo (2011) used ARDL- bound testing procedure; the study reveals a distinct 
unidirectional causal flow from economic growth to financial depth in Tanzania for both short 
and long run. However, there was bi-directional causality from foreign capital flows to 
economic growth. The study therefore concludes that financial development in Tanzania 
follows growth. 
In terms of cross-country studies in SSA, Spears (1992), Levine (1998) and Levine et al. 
(2000), show that finance causes economic growth. Trabelsi (2002), looking at 69 developing 
countries using cross-sectional and pooled–cross sectional time series, argues that FSD seems 
to affect growth only with cross-sectional estimates. However, Ghirmay (2004) contends that 
there is a mixed result in finance-growth nexus using 13 SSA and VAR model: 11 countries 
show finance and growth are cointegrated; VECM suggests evidence of FSD causing economic 
growth in 8 countries; economic growth causing finance in 9 countries.  
Considering studies on regional groupings of Africa, the study of Allen and Ndikumana (2000) 
on SADC supports a positive relationship between finance and growth. The result was more 
evident in regression that used five year average of the data. This suggests that the relationship 
between finance and growth is a long run phenomenon. Collaborating the results of Allen and 
Ndikumana (2000), Aziakpono (2004) on SACU using SURE technique confirms finance-led 
growth. This is also the case with Abu‐Bader and Abu‐Qarn's (2008) study on six Middle East 
and North African (MENA) countries. However, in more recent study, Kar et al. (2011) employ 
different proxies for FSD on MENA countries. Using SURE and Granger causality, they find 
no clear consensus on the direction of causality between finance and economic growth for all 
proxies of FSD.  Also, the study of Atindéhou et al. (2005) on ECOWAS reveals that the results 
of a few countries indicate a weak causal relationship between finance and economic growth 
on one side, and economic growth and finance on the other side. The study thus suggests that 
ECOWAS members should focus their policies on the development of the financial sector 
which will lead to growth.  
More on ECOWAS, Esso (2010) shows that there is a long-run relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in six countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In addition, the study shows that finance induces growth and 
development in Ghana and Mali, while growth causes finance in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire 




Gregory and Hansen approach to cointegration with structural change and the procedure for 
non-causality test of Toda and Yamamoto, for the period 1960–2005 using ratio of credit to 
private sector to GDP.  
In a more recent study, Fowowe (2011) shows bi-directional causality between financial 
development and economic growth in 17 countries of SSA using panel cointegration and 
causality test. The results show robustness with alternative measures for financial development. 
In the same year, Hassan et al. (2011), using Panel regression and variance decomposition, 
argues that a positive relationship exists between financial development and economic growth 
in developing countries. They also show that short run multivariate provides mixed results: 
one-way causality for poor region and two-way causality for domestic credit/GDP in most 
regions. Other recent work includes Bangake and Eggoh (2011). Their study uses panel unit 
root test, cointegration, dynamic OLS, causality test, VECM as well as the Engel and Granger 
approach. The results suggest strong support for bidirectional causality in low and middle 
income countries in the long run, but no short run effect for the 71 countries involving both 
developed and developing. 
For a summary of cross-country and panel studies on regional groupings and SSA itself see 
Table 3.2.1. Table 3.2.1 provides results of relatively recent research. It indicates the name of 
author/s, year of publication, financial variable used, method and summary of findings. The 
table is by no means exhaustive. In general, the empirical results on the relationship between 
financial and economic growth are rather mixed. There is evidence of a long-run relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in SSA countries. However, the direction 
of causality is unclear. While some studies found evidence of bidirectional causality between 
finance and growth in Africa, there is no consensus on the direction of causality for all 
measurements as shown by Table 3.2.1. However, according to Murinde (2012), in general, 
the weight of the evidence is in favour of the argument that financial institutions and markets 
matter for growth, even when controlling for some key factors. For a more comprehensive and 
influential survey of literature on this issue, Murrnde (2012) has prudently compiled recent 
studies that seek to broaden the understanding on the relationship between finance and 
growth19. 
 
                                                          




Table 3.2.1: Showing recent panel studies on SSA and regional groupings 
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From the studies discussed above, some issues are highlighted. Firstly, there seems to be no 
consensus. Hence, one can conclude with caution that finance is significant in explaining 
growth. Secondly, it is evidenced that the effect results from the type of proxy used for FSD. 
For this reason, this study estimates a composite financial index that includes three variables. 
Thirdly, comparative studies of regional blocs and groupings, which are increasingly important 
and a dominant feature today, seem to be ignored in SSA. In addition, institutions that are 
expected to influence the impact of finance on growth also seem to be ignored in the studies of 
SSA. Therefore, the influences of institutions in the form of democratic development on 
financial development are captured in this study. More importantly, since there are 
heterogeneity among member countries in each region, a feature which was ignored in the 
previous studies, the novel feature of this chapter is the application of Pooled Mean Group 
estimation technique that addressed this issue. Even though Favarra (2003) used this approach, 
the study involves both developed and developing economies. More importantly, the study 
used single measure of financial development. The focus of this chapter is, thus, to investigate 
whether there is any effect of financial development on growth and development as well as its 
effects through the development in governance in the two regional groups of ECOWAS and 
SADC. 
3.3 Method and Model specification 
Following the literature discussed above and more specifically the work of  Levine et al. (2000), 
we postulate a standard static panel growth model in a semi-log form by extending equation 
3.5 to include other growth determining variables as: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼+𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜑𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡              (3.6) 
Where i is individual country at time t and i=1 …N; t=1… T.   𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. As in many 
studies (e.g. Abu-Bader & Abu Qarn, 2008; Demetriade & James, 2011; Adu et al., 2013; 
Menyah et al., 2014) 𝑦𝑡,𝑖 measures the level of growth and development. This is log of real 
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𝐹𝑗  and ?̅? are FSD indicators and sample mean of 𝐹𝑗 respectively, n is the number of FSD 
indicators. Equation 3.7 is required because the measures of FSD face definitional problems. 
As one of the contribution of this study, this composite financial development index is 
constructed to measure broadly the financial system development. This is being informed by 
Levine's (1997) five key functional explanation of the financial market demonstrated earlier in 
Chapter 1. A good measure of FSD should reflect the different functions of the financial 
system. This is in line with the argument of Aziakpono (2004) who suggested that if the 
functional definition is accepted, then a single indicator cannot adequately measure FSD. 
Moreover, since financial development is a multi-dimensional concept, it is important to 
construct such an index. 
Thus, equation 3.7 is estimated following Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) and Allen and 
Ndikumana (2000). We include three indicators commonly used in the literature: bank private 
credit to GDP, liquid liabilities (M3 to GDP), and domestic money bank assets to the sum of 
domestic money bank assets and central bank assets (See for example, Levine, 1997; Levine 
& Zervos, 1998; Levine et al. 2000; Aziakpono, 2004). These measures capture broadly the 
different aspects of financial development process rather than a single indicator of financial 
development. This is an advantage of the use of a composite measure of financial development 
over the single measure. Even though, Allen and Ndikumana (2000) applied constructed 
composite measure for the study on SADC, the data used was from 1970 to 1996. This study 
extends the construction from 1980 to 2011. Moreover, Allen and Ndikumana (2000) used 
different proxies for financial development without considering flow-stock problem in the data. 
In this study, the flow-stock problem is addressed.  
The reasons for the selection of these variables are done in section 3.3.2. Even though we used 
the composite measure, the study also considered each individual indicator as a robustness 
check and also determined specific policy relevant to growth. 
𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is log of control variables which includes policy variables of trade openness and 
government expenditure. The others are human capital, inflation and 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 which represents 
polity2 as an institutional variable that measures the governance system. It is not logged 




Trade openness is an important driver of growth (Hausmann et al., 2005). It measures 
international trade policy and is expected to have ambiguous effect on economic growth. Some 
recent studies support ambiguous or insignificant effect of openness on economic growth 
(Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001). This is the ratio of the sum of exports and import to GDP. Exports 
could exert a positive impact on growth if it results in increases in foreign exchange reserves 
as well as exchange of ideas and specialisation. Imports will also do the same if it is mainly 
capital goods and importation of foreign technology, otherwise the effect could be negative. 
However, since this measure is a ratio of the sum of exports and import to GDP, the net effect 
could be observed through empirical analysis.  
The expectation of inflation is negative. This is an indication of macroeconomic stability. 
Higher inflation may retard growth. However, recent studies suggest nonlinearity and 
thresholds in the inflation-growth relationship such as, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and 
Seleteng et al. (2012). These studies suggest that statistically significant effect is only observed 
after certain point where inflation is high. 
Government expenditure as a share of GDP is also expected to have ambiguous effects on 
economic growth since it depends on the nature of spending. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
contend that productive expenditure in the form of expenditure on education, infrastructure and 
other forms of productive capital promotes growth, whereas non-productive expenditure may 
impair growth. In addition, government expenditure may have crowding-out effect, which may 
reverse growth.  
Growth theory suggests a positive relationship between growth and human capital (Garcia et 
al., 2012). This is mostly controlled by the level of schooling. Unfortunately, there is no 
consistent data for this variable for the two sub-regions, hence we used life expectancy 
following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
Finally, better institutional environment affect growth positively (Acemoglu et al., 2005). The 
study proxy this with measures of political environment (𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡). The debate as to whether 
political democracy, political and civil liberties contribute to economic growth in developing 
countries continues to be evasive (Nelson & Singh, 1998). 
Democracy is increasingly perceived to offer answers to major social and economic problems. 




However, clientelism and identity politics may encourage voters to support a corrupt politician, 
especially if such politician is one of their own. This may interfere with the process of economic 
growth (Nelson & Singh, 1998). Furthermore, political freedom, civil liberties and democratic 
governments in developing countries are likely to lead to corruption and bribery among 
politicians, as well as promotion of rent seeking and bureaucracy, which will retard economic 
growth. 
On the other hand, autocratic regimes may follow from revolutions or coups d’état. This is 
usually characterised by expropriation, bureaucracy, corruption and nepotism, which may 
increase the cost of doing business and, more so, create uncertainty about property rights. With 
this caveat, these processes impair economic growth.  However, authoritarian regimes may 
provide high-quality governance which may provide incentives for economic growth, such as 
in the case with Singapore, Thailand and South Korea. 
We expect an ambiguous impact of more open and democratic regimes on the process of 
economic growth. Existing evidence on the links between democracy and economic growth 
does not provide a clear cut support of the idea that more democracy causes more economic 
growth. Some early studies, such as those by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988), 
found statistically significant effects of measures of political freedom on growth. However, 
some studies have provided ambiguous results such as Helliwell (1994) and Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993).  
Finally, to capture this notion that finance may influence economic growth through an efficient 
institutional environment, we assume a linear relationship between finance and the institutional 
variable. An interaction term between the two is included in equation 3.6 which results in our 
final model in equation 3.8: The effects of the variable is largely expected to complement 
financial development to induce growth and development. More democratic practices will 
provide the protection of human rights as well as security for the business environment. This 
will complement the financial system to induce growth positively. However, since the measure 
has an ambiguous effect on growth, the interactive term could have positive or negative effect 
on growth. According to Gerring et al. (2005), economies with authoritarian political systems 
are predicted to grow as quickly as democratic regimes, may be even quicker. Therefore a 
negative coefficient of the interactive term could mean more autocracy is better. It could also 




well meddling with discussions by the free press could result in the negative coefficient of the 
interactive term. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 𝛼+𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜔𝑖(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑖,𝑡           (3.8) 
 
Equation 3.8 is estimated using Pooled Mean Group Estimator (PMG) proposed by Pesaran, et 
al. (1999). This technique is not only suitable for large panel data set with large time dimension, 
but also considers the heterogeneity in the panel. The time period of the study is greater than 
the number of countries i.e. (T > N). For small T, PMG, Mean Group estimators (MG) and 
Dynamic fixed effect (DFE) will be subjected to the familiar downward bias on the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable in autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model (Pesaran 
et.al., 1999). The MG procedure is average of regression coefficient across countries. It is the 
least restrictive and, hence, potentially inefficient. It has no restrictions on the coefficients 
across countries. In contrast, the DFE constraints all slope coefficients and error variances to 
be the same, but allows intercepts to be different across countries. This is similar to the dynamic 
system GMM procedure. These render the results to vary quite substantially across 
methodologies. The PMG is, therefore, an intermediate estimator between MG and DFE 
estimators. 
 
These estimators make different assumptions about the homogeneity of the short-run and long-
run coefficients. According to Pesaran and Smith (1995), the MG estimator assumes that both 
the short-run dynamics and lon-grun coefficients are heterogeneous across panels. Hence, each 
panel is estimated separately and the resulting coefficients are averaged across panels.  
However, the PMG estimator allows the short-run dynamics to vary across countries, but 
constrains the long-run slope coefficients to be the same across countries. This gives it 
advantage over the MG estimator as efficiency gains are obtained from lack of biasness caused 
by outliers (Pesaran et al., 1999). Finally, DFE estimator assumes all coefficients of the short 
run and long run are same. 
 
There are several advantages to the choice of this approach. Firstly, it is well suited for the 
analysis of dynamic panel. Secondly, it accommodates both long run and heterogeneous 
dynamic adjustment process. This is done by allowing short run heterogeneous dynamics, but 
imposing a long run homogeneous relationship for countries in the sample. This is not possible 




procedure can produce inconsistent and misleading coefficients of the long-run coefficients 
unless they are truly identical. Moreover, the problem becomes severe if the time period is 
greater than the number of countries i.e. (T > N). Thirdly, PMG is less sensitive to outliers and 
has the advantage of allowing the short-run dynamics to be data determined for each country 
while taking into consideration the number of time-series observation available (Pesaran et al., 
1999). As such, the use of PMG is appropriate for this study. 
Hence, following Pesaran et al. (1999), we have the unrestricted specification of the ARDL 
model for the dependent variable, 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡,𝑖, as ARDL (p, q, q…q) with p and q the lag order; 
∆𝑦𝑡,𝑖 = ∅𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖







Δ𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡                                  (3.9) 
Where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑡,𝑖 is a scalar and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is (𝑘 × 1) vector of regressors for group 
i. 𝜇𝑖 is the fixed effects and ∅𝑖 is scalar coefficients for the lagged dependent variable. 𝛽𝑖′ is 
(𝑘 × 1) vector of coefficients of the explanatory variables. 𝜆𝑖𝑗 are scalar coefficients of the 
lagged first-difference of the dependent variables; and 𝛿𝑖𝑗∗  are (𝑘 × 1) coefficients vectors on 
the first-differences of the explanatory variables and their lagged values. The disturbance terms 
are assumed to be independently distributed across i and t with mean zero and variances 𝜎2 >
0. The assumption of independently distributed across t is not very restrictive and can be 
satisfied in most application by increasing the distributed lag orders on 𝑦𝑡,𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 (Pesaran 
et.al, 1999) 20 





= 1                               (3.10) 
lie outside the unit circle. This assumption therefore ensures that ∅𝑖 < 0. It implies that a long-
run relationship exists between 𝑦𝑡,𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 , which can be defined by: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = −(𝛽𝑖′/∅𝑖)𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 ,   and 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is a stationary process21                                  (3.11) 
                                                          
20 See Pesaran et.al (1999) for more details. 
21 Pesaran et.al (1999) provide a general framework for testing this assumption irrespective of whether 𝑥𝑖𝑡  are 




We defined 𝜃𝑖 = −𝛽𝑖′/∅𝑖 and is (𝑘 × 1) vector of long-run coefficients. This implies 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                      (3.12) 
 
Hence, equation 3.9 can be written as: 
 







Δ𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                          (3.13) 
Where 𝜗𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑡𝜃𝑖  is the error correction term and ∅𝑖 is the error correction coefficient 
measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium following a shock. This 
parameter is expected to be negative and significant, implying that variables return to a long-
run equilibrium path upon disturbances. Hence, a statistically significant and negative value of 
∅𝑖 is treated as evidence of cointegration between 𝑦𝑡,𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. 
The PMG is an intermediate estimator that restricts the long run coefficients to be equal over 
cross-section, but allows short-run coefficients, intercepts and error variances to vary across 
countries. The homogeneity of the long run parameters is tested empirically using Hausman's 
(1978) Test against alternative of MG estimator. Pesaran et al. (1999) indicate that the PMG 
estimator is consistent and more efficient than the MG estimator under the homogeneity 
hypothesis. However, the study reports the result of MG and DFE to facilitate comparison and 
robustness checks with PMG.   
Suppose the maximum fixed lag of every variable is one, the ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1…) model is: 
𝑦𝑡,𝑖 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿10𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝑖,𝑡                                               (3.14) 
 
and the error correction equation which is ARDL (1, 0,0…) is  
 





  ,         𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖+𝛿11𝑖
1−𝜆𝑖




We conduct selection of the lag order using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The long run coefficients are 𝜃1𝑖 which are of primary interest. 
3.3.1 Panel unit root test  
We start with panel unit root test of the series. This is done to determine the order of integration 
of the series. This is because the PMG estimator provides consistent estimators, irrespective of 
whether the series are in levels I(0) or integrated of order one I(1); but not integrated of order 
two, I(2). According to Pesaran et al. (1999), for lon-grun relationship to exist, then ∅𝑖 ≠ 0 . 
According to Kim et al. (2010), PMG estimation of ARDL provides consistent estimates, 
irrespective of whether the series are I(1) or I(0) if there is a existence of a unique vector 
defining the long run relationship among the variables. We tested this and the series satisfied 
this condition. 
Univariate unit root tests are imprecise, because the power of these tests is poor and provide 
little reliable information. It has been proven that using panel unit root tests can increase the 
low power based on individual test (Maddala & Wu, 1999).  
 A number of panel unit roots are being proposed, however, the study uses Im et al.'s (2003)- 
IPS and  Levin et al.'s (2002)-LLC, which are generally based on the following AR (1) 
specifications: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖+ 𝜆𝑖𝑡+ 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡              (3.16) 
Where t is the time trend,  𝛿𝑖 is the country specific fixed effects, 𝜇 is the error term and 𝜌𝑖 is 
the autoregressive coefficient and if |𝜌𝑖| = 1, then there is unit root in 𝑦𝑖𝑡. The LLC test assumes 
parameter homogeneity (𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌) and hence suffers from heterogeneity bias as opposed to the 
IPS, which allows for individual unit root processes. Therefore, IPS is the preferred test. 
However, LLC test is also performed. The null hypothesis states the presence of unit root in all 
the series and is the same for the two tests. However, the alternative differs. For the LLC, there 
is stationarity in all variables. In IPS, there is unit root in some of the series. 
The IPS test is based on an augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) regressions which are then 
averaged for each region of each variable. Therefore, the ADF equation is given by for variable 
y; 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑  𝛾𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘




The moments, mean (E) and the variance (var) of the average 𝑡̅, are obtained in IPS (2003) and 





                 (3.18)
       
 Where N is the same as in equation 3.6 
 
3.3.2 Measures of financial development 
Bank-based measures of FSD are used. This is because stock market-based financial structures 
are not developed in SSA, except South Africa, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Nigeria, Swaziland, Namibia and Zambia. We followed the work of  Loayza and Beck et al. 
(2000) and Levine et al. (2000) in choosing these indicators. Firstly, we used bank private 
credit to GDP (bankprcr) as an indicator of financial development. This is credit extended to 
the private sector by commercial banks and other FIs.  It does not only isolate credit to the 
private sector, but also excludes credit to government (Levine et al., 2000). It generates 
increases in investment and productivity to a much larger extent than credits to the public 
sector, since loans are given under more stringent conditions motivated by profits drives
 
 
(Levine & Zervos, 1998). Hence, this measure is a good proxy for FSD. 
The second indicator is the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank 
assets and central bank assets (dmba). This proxy shows the influence of the commercial 
banking sector in the economy. It indicates the degree to which the commercial banks and 
central bank allocate society’s savings. As commercial banks are more likely to perform all the 
functions of the financial system, the measure becomes a good proxy of the financial system, 
especially when the proportion is greater.  
The final indicator is M3/GDP which proxies for financial depth. This is preferred to M2/GDP 
because it is argued by  Eita and Jordaan (2010) that M2/GDP might reflect more monetisation 
rather than an increase in bank deposits. M3/GDP provides more direct information on the 
extent of financial intermediation. This measure captures the overall size of the financial sector 
and its ability to provide financial intermediation. Even though the above proxies are selected 




controversial and that no proxy exists without shortcomings. These selected proxies are no 
exception.  
Credit by nonbank financial sector is also important since it supplements the credit needs of 
the real sector.  It is basically composed of credit from microfinance institutions. However 
there is no consistent data on this variable. Therefore this variable is not considered. 
3.3.3 Data 
We used annual data obtained from World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators, 2012, and 
Global Financial Development Database, 2012. The study considered the period 1980-2011. 
Financial variables are obtained from the latter and the rests from the former. Financial 
variables are stock variables whereas GDP measures are flow. Most studies ignored this 
problem. Global Financial Development Database solves this flow-stock problem by deflating 
these variables with the relevant consumer price indices22. This gives rich and better measures 
of these indicators.  
We capture institutions with political measure of polity2 obtained from Polity IV. This measure 
describes the political system by the level of autocracy and democracy by assigning negative 
to the former and positive for the latter. It is time-series ranging from -10 to +10 indicating 
total autocracy to total democracy respectively. This measure is chosen because: (i) democratic 
dispensation seems to be improving in the region, and (ii) the measure is available for a wide 
range of countries for a long time period. Therefore, unlike other measures, such as the rule of 
law, are available for short span and hence are not suitable for the study. (iii) Furthermore, it 
is broader in definition than other institutional variables like corruption index that measures 
only corruption. More so long data on countries in SSA is not readily available for other 
institutional measures from any alternative source. Political right is obtained from Freedom 
House.Table B.0.1 gives detailed description and sources of the data used in this chapter. Table 
B.0.2 shows the countries covered. 
 
                                                          
22 This is done using this formula: 𝐹𝑗 =
(0.5)[𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ +𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑒)𝑖, 𝑡−1⁄ ]
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑎)𝑖𝑡⁄
, where 𝐹𝑗 is the financial variable, 





3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics is indicated on Table 3.3.1. The mean real income per capita is 
particularly very low for ECOWAS compare to SADC. The disaggregated form of FSD 
indicator shows that the two sub regions perform poorly, except dmba where it is about 77% 
of total banking assets of SADC, and 68% for ECOWAS. In both blocs, even though average 
bank private credit (bankprcr) is the lowest, countries in SADC perform relatively better than 
countries in ECOWAS. It is 15.02 % of economic activities in ECOWAS, and 18.30% in 
SADC. In terms of government spending and trade openness, the average figures indicate 
SADC as having not only more government spending, but also more open to international trade 
than ECOWAS. Governance system, pol, indicates that on average, SADC is slightly more 
democratic than ECOWAS. The descriptive statistics, therefore, reveal that on average, SADC 
performs better than ECOWAS. The mean composite measure of FSD seems to be the same in 
the two regions; however, both minimum and maximum of this variable is in favour of SADC. 
Table 3.3.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used 
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
Both IPS and LLC unit root tests results are reported on Table 3.4.1. All variables, except 
inflation, government expenditure and life expectancy, are stationary upon first difference for 
both sub-regions. They are, hence, integrated of order one i.e I(1). The test shows that trade 
openness is I(0) under LLC for regions at 5% significance level in ECOWAS. Even though 
under SADC, this variable is weakly significant at 10%, under IPS in SADC, we assumed that 
the variable is non-stationary and we proceeded to difference, which became stationary at 1% 
significance levels. Also dmba is I(0) in SADC. The test result indicates that the series are a 
                     
    ECOWAS        SADC    
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
rgdppc 384 603.5 396.05 230.09 2886.2 352 1568.43 1856.6 118.64 6592 
findex 384 99.96 32.66 25.74 237.64 352 100.03 27.7 39.8 251.9 
govexp 384 14.05 5.77 4.8 54.52 352 17.4 7.95 2.04 42.2 
openness 384 65.4 22.31 6.32 131.49 352 84.4 45.4 13.9 209 
Inflation  384 10.7 17.13 -14.94 122.88 352 145.2 1311.8 -9.6 23773.1 
Life expectancy 384 53.1 6.4 39.4 74.2 352 54.3 7.6 39.6 73.3 
pol 384 -0.15 6.02 -9 10 352 0.81 7.1 -10 10 
m3 384 25.9 13.6 0.41 84.63 352 30.1 19.3 3.3 112.8 
Dmba 384 68.07 22.41 4.52 99.7 352 76.5 23 16.5 100 




mixture of both I(1) and I(0). Based on this, the results of PMG, MG and DFE are reported 











Table 3.4.1: Panel unit root result for the two sub-regions 
   
 






                
IPS            LLC 
Variable Level First diff Level First diff Level First diff Level First diff 
rgdppc 2.6224 -13.3326*** 2.3465 -12.2083*** 1.9916 -9.2577*** -0.6281 -8.446 *** 
 (0.9956) (0.000) (0.9905) (0.000) (0.9768) (0.000) ( 0.265) (0.000) 
findex -0.0835 -14.4868*** -0.6872 -15.5133*** 0.5615 -14.41***   -0.8109 -15.01*** 
 ( 0.4667) (0.000) (0.2460) (0.000) (0.7128) (0.000) (0.2087) (0.000) 
findexins 1.5339 -14.5699*** -0.8300 -15.0181*** 1.5343 -13.196*** -0.7318 -13.79*** 
 ( 0.9375) (0.000) (0.2033) (0.000) (0.9375) (0.000) (0.2322) (0.000) 
m3 0.4399  -12.412*** 0.1946 -11.9246*** -0.5375 -12.99 *** -1.0531 -12.93*** 
 ( 0.6700) (0.000) (0.5771) (0.000) (0.2954) (0.000) (0.146) (0.000) 
dmba -0.0573 -14.4755*** -0.5235 -15.2456*** -2.6132*** - -2.4837 - 
 (0.4771) (0.000) (0.3003) (0.000) (0.0045)  (0.0065)  
banrprcr -0.7665 - 9.702*** -1.4698* -9.2491*** 1.1845 -11.91*** -0.2189 -12.28*** 
 (0.2217) (0.000) (0.0708) (0.000) (0.8819) (0.000) (0.4134) (0.000) 
m3ins 1.3654 -14.7646*** -1.0334 -15.6199*** 0.6479 -13.079*** -1.1887 -13.52*** 
 (0.9139) (0.000) (0.1507) (0.000) (0.7415) (0.000) (0.1173) (0.000) 
dmbains 1.5396 -14.1733*** -1.0833 -15.4247*** 0.2315 -13.801*** -2.191** - 
 (0.9382) (0.000) (0.1393) (0.000) (0.5915) (0.000) (0.0142)  
bankprcrins 2.5529 -13.4368*** 0.4211 -13.8998*** 2.3758 -12.135*** 1.0429 -12.87*** 
 (0.9947) (0.000) (0.6632) (0.000) (0.9912) (0.000) (0.8515) (0.000) 
traop -1.1321 -17.811 *** -2.1566** - -1.5139* -13.73*** -2.227** - 
 (0.1288) (0.000) (0.0155) - (0.0650) (0.000) (0.013)  
Inflation -21.550*** - -8.417 *** - -18.603*** - -3.93*** - 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
gov -2.7883*** - -3.687*** - -3.4189*** - -3.39*** - 
 (0.0026)  (0.0001)  ( 0.0003)  (0.0003)  
lifeexp -1.8279** - -3.213*** - -23.59*** - -21.87*** - 
 ( 0.0338) - (0.0007)  (0.000)  (0.1417) (0.000) 
pol 0.7252 -15.0478*** -1.6484* -17.2408*** 0.0775 -9.4077*** -1.2014 -13.00*** 
 (0.7658) (0.000) ( 0.0496) (0.000) (0.5309) (0.000) (0.1148) (0.000) 





The search for lag order using Aikake information criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian criteria 
(SBIC) suggest a maximum of lag one. This indicates that ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,) is the 
most appropriate form by both tests.  Table 3.4.2 displays the results on specification test and 
the estimation of the long run parameters linking economic growth and financial development 
and other conditioning variables by PMG, MG and DFE estimators. The specification test 
reveals that, indeed, the link between economic growth and financial development and other 
control factors are adequately modelled by the PMG approach as indicated by the Hausman 
test, which shows rejection of MG estimator for ECOWAS and SADC. This indicates that, in 
both regions, the long run coefficients are equal over cross-section. In addition, the 
convergence parameter (ecm) to the long-run equilibrium following a shock is not only 
negative and less than unity in absolute value, but statistically significant in both regions. This 
is in line with equation 3.10 and 3.11. We can, therefore, infer that that there is a long run 
relationship among the variables considered. We rely on this for the existence of cointegration, 
since test on panel cointegration do not provide overwhelming indication on long run 
relationship. 
Even though the results of PMG, MG and DFE are also reported, we emphasise the results 
from the PMG estimator, since it is the right model. More so the PMG results in gain in 
efficiency and consistency over the other estimators when the long run homogeneity restriction 
holds. In addition, adjustments in the short run are predicted to vary across countries.  
3.4.1 Results of growth and composite measure of financial development  
Under these estimators, only the long run parameters are often the main interest. This is 
reported in Table 3.4.2. The Table shows evidence that financial development induces 
economic growth in both regions in the long run, suggesting that the impact on SADC is greater 
than the effects on ECOWAS demonstrated by the PMG. The coefficients are not only positive, 
but strongly significant at 1%. For instance, given that there is an increase of 10% in FSD, the 
estimates suggest that growth will increase by about 1% in ECOWAS and 1.5% in SADC in 
the long run. The results show that financial sector is an important growth determinant. Indeed, 
comparatively, the financial sector of ECOWAS is relatively underdeveloped in relation to 
SADC. This indicates that ECOWAS is not benefiting much from the current relatively 
underdeveloped financial system compare to SADC as shown by the results of PMG. In 
addition, the FSD variable is a broadly bank-based measure. Therefore, the relatively small 




medium scaled indigenous businesses dotted all over the region are less attractive to the 
banking industry, and that these banks cherry-pick successful and multinational business. 
Cherry-picking represses the expansion of these small and medium scaled indigenous 
businesses, deterring their contribution to economic growth. 
On the contrary, the efficient financial system of South Africa, especially the banking industry, 
has its extension into many countries of SADC.  Specifically, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Namibia, Tanzania and so on. This may contribute the difference in the effect of the financial 
sector on growth in the region. Moreover, financial and economic policies of South Africa are 
reflected in these countries.  
MG and DFE reveal statistical insignificant results in SADC even though the coefficients are 
all positive, and but with mixed results for ECOWAS. The results seem to suggest that the huge 
income differences between the two regions in favour of SADC could partly be explained by 
the relatively big positive impact of the financial system on economic growth and development 
in SADC. These findings are in line with existing studies on SSA (e.g. Spears, 1992; Levine, 
1998; Levine et al., 2000; Allen & Ndikumana, 2000; Atindéhou et al., 2005; Esso, 2010; 
Hassan et al., 2011).  
The study argues that South Africa, which has the most advanced financial sector, could be 
driving this significant positive effect of financial development on economic growth in SADC. 
To determine the validity of this claim, we re-estimated the baseline equation without this 
country. The result is reported in Appendix B in Table B.0.3. The Table seems to suggest that, 
without South Africa, the financial sector of the region still induces economic growth. Not only 
is the coefficient positive, but it is statistically significant at 1% level. The study thus concludes 
that the financial sector of South Africa is not driving this significant positive relationship 
between financial development and growth of the region within the period under discussion. 
The reason for this could be the measure of financial variables used. These are broadly bank 
based measures. Given that the banking sector is relatively developed in many countries of the 
region, the result is valid. 
The speed of adjustment or (ecm) or convergence parameter to the long-run equilibrium 
following a shock is not only negative and less than unity in absolute value, but also statistically 
significant, in both regions for the three estimators. The PMG estimates indicate about 13% 




disturbances or shocks, it will take only 13 % to revert back to the equilibrium in ECOWAS 
and 15% in SADC. From this perspective, economies in SADC will be on relatively faster 
trajectory towards their long-run steady-state growth than ECOWAS. However, MG estimates 
suggest much faster adjustment to the long run equilibrium than PMG and DFE which is due 
to imposition of homogeneity assumption. It indicates about 47% for ECOWAS and 33% in 
SADC, as shown in Table 3.4.2. The low value of the error correction term is common with 
developing regions (Elbadawi et al., 2012). 
The study also estimated the individual convergence parameter of the two regions to examine 
the rate of reversion to equilibrium at individual country level, following any deviation from 
the equilibrium path upon any shock. The estimates of ECOWAS reveal that the ecm of seven 
countries are not only negative, but statistically significant. This is indicated in Appendix B, 
Table B.0.4. The countries include Niger (4.2%), Cape Verde (12.7%), Cote d’ Ivoire (13.2%), 
Mali (17.6%), Togo (16%), Ghana (35.8%) and Nigeria (54.7%). These estimates indicate that 
following a shock in the region, Nigeria will revert to her long run equilibrium path at the 
relatively faster rate of 54.7% per year, follow by Ghana at 35.8%. However, it will take Niger 
4.2% per year, the slowest in the region. Comparing to SADC, six countries that include 
Botswana (4%), Tanzania (5.4%), Madagascar (12.8%), Zimbabwe (51.3%), Malawi (53.4%) 
and South Africa (71.2%) have statistically significant negative coefficients, as shown in Table 
B.0.5. This demonstrates that the South Africa economy, which is the biggest in the region, 
will revert to the long run equilibrium relatively faster, following disturbance in the region, at 
a rate of 71.2% per year. This is no surprise as the country is the only industrialised economy 
in the region. Malawi, which has the next highest estimate of the error correction, will revert 
at a rate of 53.4%, follow by Zimbabwe at 51.3%. The slowest economy in the region is 
Botswana. The estimates also show that countries like Lesotho and Mozambique might explode 
upon disturbance. This is shown in Table B.0.5.  
On the impact of finance conditional on political structures and institutions on economic 
growth, even though the results indicate positive complementarity effects on growth for 
ECOWAS, only the coefficient of PMG and DFE are statistically significant. Since this 
variable was not logged, it indicates that a 1% increase in the development of governance will 
complement the financial sector to increase growth by 0.04% in ECOWAS, using the PMG 
results. Hence, simultaneous development in both indicators is necessary for economic 




only the PMG estimator in the long run which is contrary to the expectation. This indicates that 
political institution does complement financial sector to impact on growth positively in SADC. 
The DFE estimator corroborates this result but statistically insignificant. Although MG 
indicates positive results, but they are all statistically insignificant. 
Hence, the current political structures and democratic dispensation has a limited support for 
the financial sector to impact on economic growth positively on SADC.  This may imply that 
more improvement in the governance system requires the support of suitable policies which 
are precondition for such institution to complement the financial system to effect growth 
positively.  This study argues that may be political and civil freedom make it harder for 
government to make tough, but necessary decision that might provide support for the financial 
sector to influence growth positively. Hence, policies that aim to reform the political 
institutions and make it more efficient and attractive to the financial sector in the way of 
















Table 3.4.2: Results of long run PMG, MG and DFE with composite measure as financial 
development indicator 
ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 
    ECOWAS     SADC   
Variables PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE 
findex 0.108*** -0.259* 0.000447 0.153*** 0.679 0.00514 
 (0.0414) (0.143) (0.186) (0.0518) (9.721) (0.539) 
findexins 0.00037*** 0.00015 0.000908** -0.00016** 0.0168 -0.000116 
 (0.0000568) (0.000278) (0.000404) (0.0000697) (0.0128) (0.000740) 
inflation -0.0543 0.246 0.851 -0.295*** 7.490 -1.528 
 (0.0676) (0.296) (0.545) (0.0402) (7.332) (1.131) 
pol -0.0378*** -0.0138 -0.0843** 0.0224*** -1.682 0.0954 
 (0.00682) (0.0180) (0.0400) (0.00728) (1.325) (0.0924) 
traop 0.112*** 0.343 0.608** 0.242*** -16.26 1.370* 
 (0.0244) (0.210) (0.279) (0.0402) (17.35) (0.812) 
gov -0.125*** -0.207 -0.174 0.0956** -7.684 0.00263 
 (0.0314) (0.140) (0.167) (0.0375) (8.116) (0.771) 
lifeexp 2.949*** 2.747** 1.727* -0.199*** -22.73 3.709* 
 (0.433) (1.186) (0.999) (0.0695) (25.20) (2.180) 
ecm -0.134*** -0.473*** -0.0543*** -0.150* -0.33*** -0.0181* 
 (0.0483) (0.0792) (0.0209) (0.0796) (0.102) (0.00986) 
Constant -0.799*** -0.423 -0.145 0.899* -0.529 -0.237 
 (0.280) (1.103) (0.202) (0.493) (1.989) (0.146) 
Hausman 
Test   11.89 0.03    3.35 0.00  
  (0.100) (1.000)   (0.764) (1.000) 
Obs   372     372 . 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Where rgdppc =log of real GDP per capita, findex=log of composite measure of FSD, gov = log of government 
expenditure, traop=log of international trade openness, findexins = interaction term between findex and polity2 and 
lnlifeexp=log of life expectancy and ecm = error correction term. 
 
Despite the outcome of the interactive term between financial development and political 
institutions on growth in the two regions, the results seem to suggest that political institution 
operating independently induces growth in SADC, but reverse growth in ECOWAS. The 
results of SADC are in line with a prior expectation, since more improvement in governance 
and its institutions are likely to allocate resources more efficiently than autocratic regimes. This 
is because increases in good governance results in accountability, transparency in both 
government spending and policy-making, provision of property rights, as well as economic 
freedom, which lead to economic growth. This could be the case in SADC. However, the 
negative effects of governance on growth in ECOWAS is corroborated by studies such as 
Helliwell (1992) and Sekmen and Ozkan (2012), who also obtained an inverse relationship 
between the two variables.  This means more democratic dispensation interferes with growth 




al. (1996). According to Gwartney et al. (1996), a country may be liberal in a political sense, 
and highly democratic with major civil liberties being protected, and still adopt policies that 
conflict with economic freedom, which may result in the reversal of economic growth. Another 
possibility is that, free press as well public debate, which are some of the important pillars of 
governance, might expose actions of the government or the private sector activities that might 
lead to restrained developments in the region. Also political pluralism and civil freedom most 
of the time make it harder for government to make tough, but essential decision that might 
propel economic growth. Even though, this is in sharp contrast to the scholarly view in political 
science that argues economic development requires some form of democratic governance 
(Huntington, 2006), the examples of the so-called development dictators of South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan validate this argument. In addition, the results may also be due to 
instances where there have been episodes of growth acceleration in some countries with limited 
political openness and democratic development 
Therefore, both financial development and institutions matter for the real sector in these regions 
to some extent. Even though, the alternatives estimators collaborate this result, only DFE is 
statistically significant in ECOWAS. Hence, to propel economic growth and development, 
democratic dispensation and freedom are a necessary, but not actually sufficient condition in 
this region. 
Thus, the study argues that the income difference between the two regions could be minimised 
or eliminated in ECOWAS through not only improving the political structures and 
dispensation, supported by feasible economic policies, but also through more efforts made to 
develop the financial sector. In the same way, SADC could also strengthen her political 
structures and dispensation by removing obstacles that interferes with the FSD coupled with 
good policies, so as to experience significant positive complementarity effect between finance 
and economic growth. 
On the effects of other control variables, it seems clear that the two regions benefit from trade 
policy. The coefficient of traop does not only conform to the expected positive relationship 
with growth, but is also statistically significant at 1% levels for the two regions in the long run. 
This is indicated by the PMG and supported by the DFE. However, the impact in SADC is over 
twice the impact on ECOWAS. For instance, if trade policy results in more openness by 10% 
in the two regions, it will result in only 1.12% economic growth in ECOWAS, and 2.42% in 




foreign exchange reserves, as well as exchange of ideas, specialisation and imports of foreign 
technology. This therefore supports the idea that more openness leads to more economic 
growth. This finding is in line with the findings of other studies such as Nicholas et al. (2003) 
and Bangake and Eggoh (2011). 
The PMG estimates reveal that inflation has negative effects on growth in both regions, but is 
statistically insignificant in ECOWAS. According to the results, if inflation increases by 10% 
in the long run, economic growth will suffer reduction by less than proportionately to about 
3% in SADC. This is in line with many studies such as Barro (1995, 2013) and Bittencourt et 
al. (2015) whose findings suggest that permanent increases in the rate of inflation has 
significant negative effects on the long run real growth rates.  However, according to Beck et.al 
(2000), a statistically insignificant coefficient of inflation on growth is not surprising, since it 
is realised in many studies. Recent studies such as Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Seleteng 
et.al (2012) confirm nonlinearity and thresholds in inflation-growth relationship, indicating that 
statistically significant negative effects occur beyond certain threshold levels. This could be 
the case in ECOWAS. 
On the impact of government expenditure on growth, the results indicate different impacts for 
the two regions. Whereas long run increases in government expenditure by 1% reverses 
economic growth by 0.13% in ECOWAS, thus collaborating the findings of many earlier 
studies such as Barro (1991) and Bangake and Eggoh (2011), on the contrary, it will propel 
growth in SADC by 0.1%. This may imply that government expenditure in ECOWAS could 
be unproductive such as increases expenditure on recurrent expenditure. This may the opposite 
in SADC. 
Finally, an increase in human capital development measured by life expectancy by 1% will 
cause economic growth in ECOWAS to increase by 2.9% (2.7% by MG and 1.7% by DFE). 
The PMG estimator indicates this reverses economic growth in SADC, which seems counter-
productive. The DFE estimator, though, reveals the opposite. Since the study measured this 
indicator with life expectancy, we investigated this further by considering the visual 
relationship between the two variables. The outcome seems to suggest that Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa reveal reverse relationship between the two measures in the late 
1980s. This is shown in Figure B.1 in Appendix B. The study believes that this could be the 
result of increasing prevalence of Human immune deficiency virus infection and acquired 




human capital. Therefore, the baseline model was re-estimated excluding, especially South 
Africa. This is because of prevalence of tuberculosis in addition to HIV/AIDS. The results 
indicate that the relationship is significantly positive as shown in Table B.0.3 in the Appendix 
B. Hence, the statistical positive effects of human capital development in the two regions is 
line with many studies (e.g. Mavrotas and Son, 2006; Apergis et al., 2007; Kagochi et al., 
2013). From this perspective, member states of the bloc should channel efforts to developing 
human capital in order to propel economic growth.  
The comparative analysis thus far hints at a why huge income disparity exists between the two 
sub-regions, with SADC in the better position. Since this study shows that each bloc has some 
peculiarities as well as different institutional environment, it suggests that studies that 
considered the whole SSA may result in bias and wrong policy implications. 
3.4.2 Results of growth and the ratio of domestic money bank assets to the sum of 
domestic money bank asset and Central Bank assets 
Even though the focus of the study is on the composite financial index, the study also reports 
the results of the individual components variable which could serve as checks. This could also 
have implications for specific policies on the particular measures. The study reports on PMG 
estimates shown in Tables 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. For SADC, the Hausman test shows that the 
PMG estimators cannot be rejected for all three financial indicators. However, for ECOWAS, 
this is rejected with liquid liabilities at 1%. Table 3.4.3 reports the long run estimates using the 
ratio of domestic money bank assets to the sum of domestic money bank assets and Central 
Bank assets (dmba) as indicator for financial development. The results indicate that in both 
region, the indicator and its interaction with governance variable induce economic growth and 
development. This validates the effects of the composite measure of the financial development 
on growth. This is because the effects of this measure on growth favours SADC as indicated 
by PMG. Since the MG is rejected by the Hausman test, it indicates bias in the coefficients. 
This may also be due to the relatively small number countries in each region. 
Furthermore, inflation is insignificant for all three estimates in ECOWAS, but is statistically 
significant in SADC under DFE. This indicates it reverses growth in the region. The result here 
is no different from the earlier result of the composite measure of financial development. 
Governance variable alone reveals significant negative relationship with growth under PMG 




Trade openness and human capital development both indicate significant positive effects on 
growth in ECOWAS under all specifications. This suggests that more trade openness and 
developments in human capital in ECOWAS will induce increases in economic growth. 
Although trade openness is positive under this financial variable in SADC, it is not statistically 
significant for all estimators. Human capital, in contrast, suggests significant positive effects 
on growth under PMG and DFE. In addition, in both regions, government expenditure is not 
significant under PMG and DFE. Only the MG estimates indicate that more expenditure of the 
government reverses growth in both regions. Finally, the estimates suggest that following a 
shock, ECOWAS will be on a relatively faster reversion to equilibrium path than SADC. This 
is shown by the PMG estimates of the error correction terms for each region. 
       
Table 3.4.3: Results of long run PMG, MG and DFE with dmba as a measure of financial 
development indicator 
   ECOWAS   SADC  
  PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE 
dmba 0.163*** 0.226 0.370*** 0.728* 119.0 -0.302 
 (0.0340) (0.212) (0.0800) (0.404) (110.8) (0.307) 
dmbains 0.000907*** 0.000390 0.000689** 0.00563** 0.114 0.00216*** 
 (0.000116) (0.000627) (0.000308) (0.00258) (0.125) (0.000577) 
inflation -0.0961 0.195 0.405 -0.229 1.187 -0.779*** 
 (0.0602) (0.290) (0.345) (0.208) (1.929) (0.228) 
pol -0.0477*** -0.0409 -0.0502** -0.384** -11.78 -0.0769** 
 (0.00742) (0.0573) (0.0224) (0.185) (12.13) (0.0313) 
traop 0.159*** 0.388* 0.449*** 0.640 1.069 0.420 
 (0.0214) (0.207) (0.135) (0.429) (1.503) (0.293) 
gov -0.0347 -0.219** -0.0923 0.331 -1.793* -0.0463 
 (0.0216) (0.0895) (0.0993) (0.204) (1.062) (0.227) 
lifeexp 2.803*** 2.804*** 1.065* 2.272* 9.344 1.969** 
 (0.289) (0.873) (0.564) (1.267) (5.850) (0.931) 
ecm -0.171*** -0.491*** -0.0848*** -0.0247** -0.33*** -0.0367*** 
 (0.0655) (0.0831) (0.0196) (0.0124) (0.0951) (0.00999) 
Constant -1.031*** -1.286 -0.0907 -0.214* -12.64 -0.0490 
  (0.378) (1.106) (0.196) (0.114) (9.427) (0.134) 
Hausman Test  2.97   6.06  
  0.812   0.4163  
Observation 372 372 372 372 372 372 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
       
       
3.4.3 Results of growth and the domestic bank credit to the private sector 
Under this measure of financial development, all estimates suggest that the measure is not 
statistically significant in ECOWAS. In contrast, the PMG, which is the estimator of interest, 




The interaction term indicates that more development in the governance system will 
complement the financial sector to induce economic growth in both region. This is indicated 
by the PMG and DFE in ECOWAS and PMG in SADC. From this perspective, simultaneous 
increase in financial development and governance system will cause growth in both regions, 
with SADC benefiting more than ECOWAS. 
As in the previous discussion, both the PMG and DFE estimators indicate that increases in 
inflation has no effect on growth in ECOWAS, but can reverse growth in SADC. Both 
estimates reveal statistically significant negative effect of the variable on growth and 
development in SADC. Table also demonstrates that governance alone does not induce growth 
in ECOWAS. This validates the earlier assertion concerning the composite measure of financial 
development that a country may be liberal in a political sense, and highly democratic but still 
adopt policies that conflict with economic freedom, which may result in the reversal of 
economic growth. However, in SADC, this is not statistically significant. Furthermore, 
increases in government expenditure is shown by the PMG estimates to reverse growth in 
ECOWAS but not in SADC. All models reveal that this fiscal policy variable is not significant 
            
Table 3.4.4: Results of long run PMG, MG and DFE with bank credit (%GDP) as a measure 
of financial development indicator 
   ECOWAS   SADC  
  PMG MG DFE PMG  MG  DFE  
bankprcr -0.00857 8.450 0.0909 0.149* 10.01 0.199 
 (0.0228) (8.371) (0.0666) (0.0826) (9.002) (0.226) 
bankprcrins 0.000789*** -0.0404 0.00170*** 0.00117*** -0.0908 0.00116 
 (0.000110) (0.0419) (0.000614) (0.000217) (0.143) (0.00105) 
inflation -0.0381 6.904 0.562 -0.411*** 0.442 -0.977** 
 (0.0904) (6.533) (0.396) (0.0861) (0.985) (0.415) 
pol -0.00577** 0.159 -0.0218* -0.00200 0.205 0.0474 
 (0.00270) (0.187) (0.0115) (0.00583) (0.291) (0.0304) 
traop 0.147*** -7.917 0.472*** 0.704*** -0.551 0.713 
 (0.0308) (8.273) (0.180) (0.142) (0.794) (0.498) 
gov -0.149*** 8.961 -0.115 0.0512 -4.945 0.0526 
 (0.0411) (9.100) (0.119) (0.0498) (5.116) (0.318) 
lifeexp 5.418*** -85.61 1.782** 0.776*** 73.99 2.576* 
 (0.512) (87.01) (0.728) (0.259) (83.56) (1.457) 
ecm -0.131*** -0.451*** -0.0739*** -0.101*** -0.335*** -0.0266*** 
 (0.0434) (0.101) (0.0221) (0.0345) (0.0972) (0.0101) 
Constant -2.025*** -1.537 -0.197 0.0247 0.859 -0.180 
  (0.669) (1.270) (0.206) (0.0191) (1.604) (0.132) 
Hausman Test  5.61   6.21  
  0.3464   0.5156  
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




in SADC. The PMG and DFE estimates also indicate significant positive effects of human 
capital on growth in the two regions. The effects of this measure in ECOWAS is line with the 
composite measure of financial development. 
Again, more trade openness fosters economic growth in the two regions, with the effects 
favouring SADC. This in line with expectation as this will not only bring in new technology, 
but also capital that will raise growth. Finally, the speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium 
upon shocks indicates that ECOWAS is likely to revert to the equilibrium path before SADC. 
This is shown by the PMG estimates, which indicates about 13% for ECOWAS and 10% for 
SADC, as shown in Table 3.4.4.  
3.4.4 Results of growth and liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
Finally, the long run estimates of liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP is reported in Table 
3.4.5. The Table shows that the measure is not significant under PMG and MG, although there 
is a significant negative effect on growth in ECOWAS with DFE. Conversely, the measure 
reveals strong statistically significant positive effects on growth in SADC. This is revealed by 
the PMG estimates. Interestingly, better governance supports this measure of financial 
development to induce growth in ECOWAS, but this is not the case in SADC, as all estimators 
indicate insignificant coefficients. This suggests that only financial depth can impact positively 
on economic growth in ECOWAS if there is simultaneously development in both measures. 
This is because the financial variable alone indicates a negative effects on growth.  
Based on the discussion on the effects of the individual measure of financial development as 
well as the composite measure on growth, one could argue that the effects of institutions and 
its interactive term on economic growth in SADC is unclear.  
Inflation is not significant even though it reveals negative effects under PMG and DFE in 
ECOWAS. SADC reveals mixed results with the three estimates. The effects of governance 
institution and government spending corroborate the earlier result of impacting negative on 
growth in ECOWAS. Even though governance reveals significant negative effects on growth 
in SADC as in the case of the other alternative measures of FSD, government expenditure 
strongly induces growth in the region. Therefore one could argue that the positive results of 
governance variable in SADC under the model with the composite measure of financial 




expenditure on growth is in line with the model with composite measure of financial 
development in the PMG estimates.  
Furthermore, more trade openness is good for growth in ECOWAS, but it can reverse growth 
in SADC under PMG. It is also clear that more development of human capital will induce 
growth in ECOWAS, but this is not significant in SADC. Lastly, the data indicates that the 
error correction term of PMG is not significant in SADC. 
From the results above, some observations can be highlighted on the role of financial 
development on economic growth and development and the complementarity between 
governance and financial development in the two regions. It is clear that the development of 
the financial system robustly induces economic growth in SADC in the long run. Both the 
composite measure constructed as well as all the components measure are important for growth 
in the region. Comparing ECOWAS with SADC, although the composite measure of financial 
development is a significant determinant of growth, only one measure of the components 
              
Table 3.4.5: Results of long run PMG, MG and DFE with Liquid liabilities (M3/GDP) as a 
financial development indicator  
   ECOWAS   SADC  
  PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE 
m3 -0.0213 -2.700 -0.371* 0.650*** 0.346 -0.145 
 (0.0696) (2.562) (0.214) (0.164) (0.407) (0.321) 
m3ins 0.000343** 0.0112 0.00161*** -0.000348 0.00178 0.000730 
 (0.000172) (0.0110) (0.000592) (0.000611) (0.00199) (0.00135) 
inflation -0.0963 0.219 -0.0686 0.184*** -0.632** -1.371** 
 (0.141) (0.271) (0.590) (0.0616) (0.270) (0.691) 
pol -0.00880 -0.190 -0.0324* -0.0465*** 0.0458 0.0499 
 (0.00615) (0.182) (0.0182) (0.0135) (0.0755) (0.0595) 
traop 0.133*** 1.285 0.715** -0.414*** -0.0629 1.335* 
 (0.0430) (0.920) (0.287) (0.140) (0.262) (0.788) 
gov -0.226*** -1.145 -0.225 0.552*** -0.406* -0.0754 
 (0.0683) (1.010) (0.182) (0.130) (0.236) (0.433) 
lifeexp 7.687*** 17.72 2.677** 0.820 -1.321 3.077 
 (0.900) (15.32) (1.132) (0.627) (1.583) (2.064) 
ecm -0.0747** -0.454*** -0.0528*** 0.0157 -0.354*** -0.0203** 
 (0.0295) (0.0909) (0.0194) (0.0171) (0.0950) (0.0103) 
Constant -1.817** -0.659 -0.291 -0.00435 3.434* -0.201 
  (0.710) (1.295) (0.194) (0.0277) (1.894) (0.129) 
Hausman Test  27.99   6.47  
  0.0001   0.3728  
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      




induces growth, as summarised in Table 3.4.6. This may be the concern raised that the single 
measures are unable to adequately cover the key functions of the financial system. Thus, the 
comparative analysis between the two regions indicate that although financial development is 
important in these regions, its positive effects is more pronounce in SADC than in ECOWAS. 
This begs the question, if the financial system of the two regions is important for economic 











Table 3.4.6 also highlights that the relatively underdeveloped financial system of ECOWAS 
will have a robust positive impact on growth if there is more development in institutions. All 
measures do not only reveal positive effects on growth, but they are also all statistically 
significant. This implies that development in institutions supports the development of the 
financial sector of ECOWAS to influence growth positively. However, in SADC, the results 
are mixed.  Additionally, it is clear that while more trade openness is good for growth in the 
two regions, government expenditure reverses growth in ECOWAS, but promotes growth in 
SADC. Finally, human capital development is one of the key indicators of growth in the two 
regional blocs.  
3.5 Robustness and Sensitivity analysis 
This section performs and discusses sensitivity analysis to ascertain the main results of this 
chapter. Even though three different estimators are used in the baseline estimates, as mentioned 
in section 3.3, to facilitate robustness checks, the study replaced the governance variable, pol, 
in the baseline model with political rights variable taken from the Freedom House. This 
political variable measures on a one-to-seven scale. One is the highest degree of freedom and 
Table 3.4.6: Showing summary of the result 
  ECOWAS   SADC   
Variable PMG   PMG   
findex +  +   
individual financial 
measure + (only one) + (all) 
interactive term + (all)               + - (mixed) 
inflation not sig  - (not all sig) 
pol - (all)  - (all) 
traop + (all) +  
gov -  +  
lifeeexp + (all) +   




seven the lowest. Thus, the coefficient is expected to be negative. The results of the composite 
measure of financial development are presented in Table B.0.6 in the Appendix. 
The results are broadly in line with the baseline results. In both regions, the Hausman Test 
indicates that the PMG estimator cannot be rejected. As in the baseline model, all estimators 
reveal that financial development induces growth in SADC, with only the coefficient under the 
PMG, which is the estimator of interest, statistically significant again at 1%. However, with 
ECOWAS, even though the PMG reveals a positive coefficient in all estimators, it is only the 
DFE that indicates that the variable is statistically significant 5% level. The interactive term 
between financial development and political right indicates a negative coefficient under the 
PMG and DFE models in ECOWAS. This implies that simultaneous development of the 
financial system and political right are necessary for growth. This outcome corroborates the 
baseline results. However, all complementarity in SADC are not statistically significant. Again, 
inflation is not significant under all models in ECOWAS, but only significant under PMG in 
SADC. 
The coefficients of the political variable for the two regions confirm to the baseline results. In 
the baseline model, this variable retards growth under PMG and DFE in ECOWAS, and 
promotes growth in SADC under PMG alone. This outcome is the same under the sensitivity 
analysis reported in Table B.0.6. The signs of the coefficients of the other control variables are 
largely in line with the baseline model. However, the error correction terms for the two regions 
are relatively low compare to that of the baseline model. In conclusion, even though some slight 
differences are noted, to a larger extent, these findings reflect the outcome of the baseline 
model. This implies that the findings are robust to alternative measures of governance. 
3.6. Summary and Conclusion 
The impact of FSD on economic growth is expected to be positive. However, the results of 
empirical studies on this important issue continue to be inconclusive. One of the reasons for 
the inconclusive results is due to the use of different measures of FSD. Most studies used single 
measures of FSD, which cannot adequately measure the development of the financial sector. 
Others come with methodological issues, especially studies on panel of countries. The panel 
studies usually ignore the important issue of heterogeneity in the panel of countries. In the light 
of these observations, we constructed a composite measure of financial development and 




well as its effects through political and democratic development on economic growth between 
ECOWAS and SADC. 
The study employed a combination of methodologies, PMG, MG and DFE, to investigate the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. Specifically, PMG is 
capable of addressing the issue of heterogeneity among countries in each region. The results 
support the existence of long run finance-led growth in both regions. In particular, the impact 
of FSD on growth in SADC is bigger than the effects on growth in ECOWAS. Furthermore, 
the impact of financial development through institutional development supports robust positive 
complementarity effects on growth for ECOWAS, but not in SADC. This suggests that 
democratic development may require the support of other enabling policies to provide support 
to FSD to influence growth positively in SADC.  
Despite the interactive term between financial development and political institutions on growth 
in the two regions, the results seem to suggest that political institution alone is a driver of 
growth in SADC, but it can reverse growth in ECOWAS. We argue along with  Gwartney et 
al. (1996) that while ECOWAS may be relatively liberal in a political sense and relatively 
democratic with major civil liberties being protected, it may adopts policies that can conflict 
with economic freedom, which leads to reverse economic growth in the region. Hence, 
democracy is an important factor but not a sufficient condition. 
Furthermore, the speed of adjustment to long run path upon any shocks suggests 13% and 15% 
for ECOWAS and SADC respectively. This hints that economies in the latter region will be on 
a relatively faster reversion towards their long-run steady-state growth than the former.  
On the impact of the individual financial indicators on economic growth, all measures of 
financial development are not significant in ECOWAS, except the development of financial 
depth. However, the interaction terms between the three measures of financial development 
and the political development indicator reveal statistically significant positive coefficients. 
This, therefore, implies that good governance should be a precondition for private credit, liquid 
liabilities and ratio of domestic bank assets to the sum of domestic bank assets and central bank 
asset to be effective in promoting economic growth in the regions. This argument, however, 
does not stand for SADC. The study indicated that all measures of financial development are 
important indicators needed to induce economic growth in the region. Unlike the interaction 




interaction term between bank credit and the political variable, as well as the interaction term  
between the political measure and bank assets as a ratio of the sum of bank asset and central 
bank assets, all indicate statistically significant positive coefficients. This implies that 
simultaneous increases in the two measures is necessary for economic growth in SADC. 
Even though the application of the different econometric approaches is to serve as a robustness 
check, the results from the main model are also substantiated by replacing the governance 
variable with political rights. The results largely corroborated and confirmed the baseline 
results. 
On the impact of control variables, the study reveals that, in the long run, government trade 
policies support economic growth in both regions. However, government spending supports 
economic growth in SADC but impairs growth in ECOWAS. Furthermore, the effects of 



















Financial sector development, inflation and openness: A comparative panel 
study of ECOWAS and SADC 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The late 1980s witnessed several countries in SSA moving towards economic and financial 
sector reforms, following the adoption of the SAP as well ERP, which were supported by the 
IMF and the World Bank. The poor economic performance of SSA countries was blamed on 
the repressive post-independent economic and financial system. The main focus of the reforms 
was to replace the protective economic policies with more market oriented reforms, which were 
deemed not only necessary to induced economic growth, but also needed to propel financial 
system development. Inadequate financial sector development was argued to be among other 
central reasons answerable for the slow growth process in the region. This is because a well-
developed and efficient financial system results in mobilising and channelling resources not 
only to productive areas, but also to areas that are more risky albeit promising and productive 
and could have been left unattended without the financial sector. These processes could induce 
economic growth. 
The argument above is supported by theory and many empirical studies. For instance, the 
endogenous AK model developed by Pagano (1993) and Murinde (1996) recognised a positive 
effect of financial development on economic growth. In terms of empirical evidence, even 
though ambiguity exists on the effects of FSD on growth, the general view points to financial 
development inducing economic growth. Collaborating this assertion, Demetriades and 
Andrianova (2003), Goodhart (2004), Baltagi et al. (2009), noted that the effects of financial 
development on the long run economic growth is now widely agreed to constitute a potential 
important channel. Among the many empirical studies that support finance-led economic 
growth include Allen and Ndikumana (2000), Beck et al.(2003), Ghirmay (2004), Ang and 
McKibbin (2007), Esso (2010), Kar et al. (2011) and Odhiambo (2011). More importantly, 
Chapter 3 of this research also revealed evidence of the existence of financial sector robustly 
inducing economic growth in ECOWAS and SADC. Therefore if the financial system is indeed 
important in the growth process, why are some countries having underdeveloped financial 




is shifting towards providing answers to the question. Hence, this is the core aim of this chapter-
providing answers to the question. 
Most SSA countries are among the countries with the least developed financial system. In an 
attempt to speed up progress in the financial sector, following the economic and financial sector 
reforms, most of the countries in the region moved away from the repressive economic and 
financial sector regimes. This led to the dismantling of credit controls and reduced or removed 
obligatory reserve requirements of banking system. Also, not only were state owned banks 
privatised, but interest rates were liberalised. Furthermore, bank entry requirements as well as 
capital account restrictions were relaxed in the hope of triggering development in the financial 
sector.  
Currently, these efforts are ongoing. The growing foreign bank presence in the region since 
1995 is testimony to the increasing openness of the financial sector. The percentage of foreign 
banks in the domestic banking system increased from around 32 % to about 55 % in 2009. This 
foreign banking presence is higher than other developing regions23. Despite the relentless 
efforts and bold measures taken to induce growth in the financial sector, SSA countries, except 
South Africa, are not as successful in achieving development in the sector as other developing 
economies and regions. According to Mishkin (2007), despite the benefits of the financial 
development, the sector’s development does not occur in underdeveloped economies because 
their financial system face plethora of impediments to solving asymmetric information 
problem. The financial institution is not only much less deep and less efficient, but also less 
accessible compared to other regions, as shown in the discussions in Chapter 2.  
Although most of the countries in SSA took the steps mentioned above towards developing 
their financial sector through policy reforms, aggregate indicators of financial development 
have, on average, either stagnated or dropped, leaving a financial sector development gap in 
the region. 
As such, the underdeveloped state of SSA financial system raises a number of issues and 
questions as to what is going wrong with the financial sector policies, and what could be done 
to improve it. Is the financial sector insensitive to these policy measures or is it echoing policy 
failures? What factors have repressed or are stagnating its development to this point, and how 
                                                          





can they be overcome? Thus, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to 
empirically analyse the role of inflation in explaining the state of financial development. 
Secondly, it aims to investigate the role of access to communication as well as examine if Rajan 
and Zingales (2003)’ hypothesis, which stipulates that simultaneous opening of both trade and 
financial openness are key for financial development to take place, is supported. This is done 
by comparing ECOWAS and SADC in SSA.  
Although research in this area has seen some progress, to our knowledge there is no study 
conducted that provides an exclusive comparison of regional groupings, especially in SSA on 
the factors associated with FSD. Thus, this is the first of its kind to be studied.  Moreover, this 
study is novel in that it extends the empirical model to include the effects of communication 
infrastructure on financial development. In addition, even though dynamic panel approach is 
used for the regions as whole, the effects of the factors on financial development on each 
country level is also determined in details using SURE approach. Hence, this study is dissimilar 
to earlier studies such as Boyd et al (2001), Chinn and Ito (2006), Detragiache et al. (2006), 
Baltagi et.al (2009), Law and Habibullah (2009) and Kablan (2010). 
Finally, even though these earlier studies help our understanding in this area, they have some 
shortcomings which include (i) the use of single measure of financial development which may 
not be able be adequate to capture the functions of the financial system, and (ii) most of the 
studies are based on advanced economies like the Group of seven (G-7) and the OECD, or an 
amalgamation of advanced and developing economies, such as Chinn and Ito (2006), Baltagi 
et.al (2009), Law and Habibullah (2009). The results are generalised and may be deceptive. 
Since differences exist between developed and developing economies, the differences may well 
be the reasons for the financial sector development gap in SSA. This is policies are mostly 
curved out from such findings. 
This chapter therefore fills in this gap by using a constructed composite measure of financial 
development comprising of three financial indicators as explained in Chapter 3. Accordingly, 
the analytical focus on these countries helps to deepen the understanding of appropriate factors 
responsible for the development of the financial sector of these two regions, especially SSA 
and other developing regions. 
Using a number of methodologies, which include Least square dummy variable approach 




(PCSE) approach, the study provides evidence that, in both regions, inflation reverses financial 
development with the effects more perverse in ECOWAS. In addition, the study indicates that 
even though more simultaneous opening of the financial sector and trade leads to more 
financial development in SADC; trade openness alone can still trigger growth in the sector, but 
more financial openness in the form of capital account openness alone is detrimental to 
financial development in the region. This evidence provides partial support to the Rajan and 
Zingales hypothesis. However, in ECOWAS, the hypothesis is rejected. In addition, access to 
communication infrastructure is an important factor that strongly promotes financial 
development in the two regions with SADC benefiting more than ECOWAS. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents both theoretical and 
empirical literature review on the link between finance and factors responsible for its 
development. In section 4.3, the method and model specification are presented. In section 4.4, 
the data used in the study is discussed. Section 4.5 presents discussion of the results, and section 
4.6 provides the summary, conclusion and policy recommendations of the study. 
4.2 Literature Review 
The question of what determines FSD theoretically is a subject of growing research. Some of 
the literature includes Finance-Inflation theory (macroeconomic variables) and Rajan and 
Zingales Interest Group theory of financial development. 
4.2.1 Finance-Inflation theory:  
A number of studies explain the mechanism under which predictable increases in inflation rate 
interfere with financial sector ability to efficiently allocate resources. Specifically, the link 
developed by Huybens and Smith (1998) and Huybens and Smith (1999) emphasis the 
importance of information asymmetries in the credit market. According to this model, increases 
in the rate of inflation adversely affect credit market friction, which affects FSD negatively and 
hence long-run real activity. The bases of these arguments are that there is informational 
friction whose severity is endogenous. Given this informational friction, an increase in inflation 
rate causes the rate of real returns on assets to fall. This worsens the credit market friction and 
leads to credit rationing. Low real returns on assets are disincentive for agent to lend, but 
incentive to borrow. This results in credit reduction as well as increases in low quality 
borrowers into the pool of credit seekers. The pool of low quality borrowers is swamped, 




Hence, as inflation rises, financial sector makes fewer loans, which causes inefficient resources 
allocation and reduced intermediation.  
4.2.2 Rajan and Zingales Interest Group Argument of financial development 
According to this argument, interest groups, particularly industrial and financial incumbent, 
stand to lose from financial sector development, since this will create opportunity and chances 
for new firms to be established. Basically, under financial sector expansion, competition is 
established which tends to erode the rents of the incumbent. Significantly, the model posits that 
trade openness without financial openness is unlikely to yield desirable financial development. 
This is because it may lead to large industrial incumbents to access cheap funds to stifle 
competition, which will cause financial repression.  In the same way, financial openness alone 
may not induce FSD, since it will only allow the largest firms to access such foreign funds.   
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that financial liberalisation alone may give access to the 
largest incumbent firms to acquire foreign funds, which they may not need. However, it may 
also prevent small and promising domestic firms’ access to such foreign funds. Hence, 
domestic financial sector may view its profitability threatened by this process. It will, therefore, 
call for liberalisation which will be opposed by industrial incumbents in order to prevent 
competition. Accordingly, cross border capital flows alone are not a sufficient condition to 
induce FSD and are unlikely to reconcile the interest of both groups to push for financial 
development. Hence, Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose that simultaneous opening of both 
capital accounts and international trade is a sufficient condition to curtail the incumbent’s 
hostility to financial development. Thus, there will be FSD if there is simultaneous opening of 
both capital accounts and international trade. 
Some contemporary empirical literature on this matter confirm a significant negative 
relationship between financial development and inflation. These literature include Haslag and 
Koo (1999) using cross-sectional approach; Boyd et al. (2001) using cross-sectional and panel 
data of 65 countries; BenNaceur and Ghazouani (2005); Zoli (2007) on emerging European 
countries; Andrianaivo and Yartey (2010) on African countries; Bittencourt (2011) using both 
time series and dynamic panel analysis on Brazil. In contrast to these literature, Aziakpono's 
(2004) study concludes that the level of income and exchange rate are the most important 
determinants of financial intermediation in the Southern Africa Custom Union. Detragiache et 




effects on FSD, better contract enforcement and information on borrowers have a positive 
effects on FSD. A more recent study by Kablan (2010), however, shows that inflation and 
foreign bank penetration have negative effects on FSD24, corroborating earlier results by 
Detragiache et al. (2006). Even though these studies broaden our understanding on the 
inflation-finance relationship, only the study by Aziakpono (2004) is directed at examining 
regional bloc of Southern Africa Custom Union. Additionally, these studies mostly depend on 
a single measure of financial development, which may not capture the financial development 
adequately. 
With regards to finance-openness relationship, Baltagi et.al (2009), using data from developed 
and developing economies and dynamic panel approach, provide evidence that show that both 
openness are statistical significant determinants of banking sector development. However, the 
study provides partial support for Rajan and Zingales’s hypothesis. Also, using dynamic panel 
approach on 27 economies including G-7, Law and Habibullah (2009) argue that trade 
openness is prominent in promoting capital market development and financial sector 
liberalisation promotes banking sector development. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) and Huang 
and Temple (2005) all indicate that trade openness induces financial development. Levine 
(2001), however, indicates that financial liberalisation on international portfolio flows not only 
induces stock market liquidity, but also attract  foreign banking inflows, which tends to enhance 
efficiency in the domestic banking system. In addition, Chinn and Ito (2006), using a panel of 
108 countries over the periods 1980 to 2000, argue that higher level of financial openness spurs 
equity market development, only if a threshold level of legal development has been attained. 
Lastly, Klein and Olivei (2008) indicate that capital accounts liberalisation has robust impact 
on growth through financial system deepening in industrialised economies. However, there was 
little evidence of such relationship for countries outside the OECD states. 
Other studies focus on institutional effects on finance. Djankov et al.’s (2007) study, for 
example, found that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing 
institution are associated with higher private credit to GDP. Also, Yartey (2008) concludes that 
law and order, political risk and bureaucracy quality are important determinants of stock market 
development for a panel of 42 countries. However, Girma and Shortland (2008) reveal that the 
degree of democracy and political stability are important factors in determining the speed of 
FSD. Their result was corroborated by the findings of Roe and Siegel (2011). Additionally, 
                                                          




financial backwardness was significantly rooted in severe political unstable economies. Hence, 
current political instability explains the level of FSD more than historical legal origin. In 
contrast, Toroyan, and Anayiotos (2009) show that institutional factors in SSA affect financial 
depth and access to financial services more than asset equality and profitability. But the study 
of Cherif and Gazdar (2010) on Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries shows that 
institutional quality is more relevant for banking sector than for stock market development.  
These empirical studies indicate that no study has attempted to exclusively analyse a 
comparative study on FSD between two regional groupings, especially in SSA. Moreover, as 
the prevailing studies only considered a single measure of FSD, the results may be misleading. 
Also, the studies are focused on either developed countries or mixture of developed and 
developing countries. They do not provide information on SSA, especially on the regional 
groupings. This is necessary since these blocs adopt almost similar policies which may lead to 
dissimilar response of FSD to the set of controls variables used in each region. This study fills 
in this gap by not only considering a comparative study, but also using a composite measure of 
FSD which captures the functions of the financial system. In addition, it uses individual 
measures for policy implication.  
4.3 Method and Model specification 
We start by specifying a static empirical model which takes the form of the semi-log below. In 
addition, following Baltagi et.al (2009), we use lagged values of regressors to avoid 
simultaneity. Thus,   
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡         (4.1)                     
Where i is individual country at time t and i=1 …N; t=1… T.   𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙 is 
inflation, 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 is real GDP per capita and 𝑔𝑜𝑣 is government spending. 𝑝𝑜𝑙 represents type 
of governance measured by Polity2, whereas 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑝 and 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑝 indicate financial and trade 
openness respectively. Communication infrastructure is proxied by access to mobile phones 
and telephone lines per thousand people and is represented by 𝑐𝑜𝑚. To measure the effects of 
the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis, the interaction term between financial and trade openness 
is included which is 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑝. Also, it is contended that trade openness can influence financial 
development through better institutional environment. We provide institutions with governance 




included. Finally,  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a composite measure of FSD computed, using equation 3.7 and 
the same measures of financial development discussed under section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3.  Even 
though we used the composite measure, the study also considered each individual indicator in 
order to determine specific policy relevant to FSD 
As a macroeconomic stability variable inflation is expected to have reversed relationship with 
financial development, as discussed in section 4.2.1. The level of economic development as 
measured by real GDP per capita is a conditioning variable expected to induce development in 
the financial sector as incomes increase. 
Government fiscal policy indicator is represented by gov. It shows macroeconomic stability 
and accounts the influence on financial development. In most developing economies, 
government debt, which composes mainly securities, represents relatively large proportion of 
government expenditure.  It is usually measured by stock of domestic government debt or 
interest payment on government debt. However, there is no consistent data on this variable. It 
results in transfer of resources from the private sector to central government securities. Hence, 
this process impairs FSD as resources which would have been mobilised by the financial sector 
are instead diverted to the central government. However, if government securities pay 
competitive interest rates, it may offer the financial sector an attractive instrument to manage 
their liquidity as well as a relatively safe investment. Hence, the effect is ambiguous.  
Autocratic regimes follow from revolutions and are usually characterised by expropriation and 
corruption. This may increase the cost of doing business and, more so, uncertainty about 
property rights. With this caveat, these processes impair FSD. However, good governance is 
expected to stimulate FSD. Hence, pol captures this effect in the model. This variable is 
described in Section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3. 
Access to mobile and telephone lines are expected to induce financial development. This 
promotes FSD by facilitating information flows among suppliers and demanders of financial 
services. This may reduce information asymmetry in the financial system and subsequently 
lead to efficient operation of the market.  
Lastly, financial openness measure and trade policy measure are expected to complement each 
other in order to promote financial development as envisaged by the Rajan and Zingales 
hypothesis. The variable alone is expected to promote FSD as more financial openness results 




financial development is also important, however, there is no consistent data on this variable. 
Hence, it was not included in the model. This may be shortcoming of the study. The problem 
is more serious in ECOWAS. 
Trade policy variable is the sum of imports and exports to GDP. More trade is expected to 
induce financial development. This because of inflows of goods and investment. As in Ito 
(2006) and Baltagi et.al (2009), the study used the “de jure” financial openness index of Chinn 
and Ito data.  This is an index of capital accounts openness (KAOPEN). It is constructed from 
four binary dummy variables that codify restrictions on cross-border financial flows. Even 
though this measure is accused of sometime overstating the measure of openness, it is broadly 
available for many countries in SSA for a long time period25. More so, data on countries in 
SSA is not readily available from any alternative source for a long period.  
To obtain a dynamic panel model and also allow for any possible partial adjustment, we 
introduced the lagged dependent variable into equation 4.1 to arrive at our final model as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡       
                                                                     (4.2) 
The significance of the inclusion of the past history of the dependent variable does not only 
capture the dynamics in the model, but also the possible omitted variables. 
Given the nature of our dataset, this paper uses a number of panel data techniques to estimate 
the regression model of equation 4.2 which includes: Fixed effects (FE) or Random effect (RE), 
Feasible generalised least squares (FGLS), Panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and 
Seeming unrelated regression (SURE). These techniques are applied in order that they can 
represent robustness checks. The techniques are appropriate since T > N. According to Beck 
and Katz (1995), this approach provides estimates of sampling variability which are more 
accurate, even under the presence of complicated panel error structure, than other approaches, 
such as pooled GLS26.  Another preferred estimator for the dynamic model is the system 
Generalised Method Moments proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). However, this 
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approach is suitable for short panels (T< N), which is not the case in this study, since N=12 
and T=32. 
4.3.1 The Fixed Effect estimator 
Consider the following dynamic panel model; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖+ 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡             (4.3) 
i = 1, 2. ……N 
t = 1, 2……..T 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the measure of financial development, 𝛼𝑖 are random individual-specific effects, 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 are the regressors as in equation 4.1 or 4.2 and 𝑖𝑡 are the errors. 
The effects of 𝛼𝑖 gives the distinction between the Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects 
(RE). In the FE estimator, 𝛼𝑖 is permitted to correlate with   𝑥𝑖𝑡. However, in RE model, 𝛼𝑖 is 
purely random and implying it is uncorrelated with  𝑥𝑖𝑡 which leads to a strong assumption. 
The FE estimator implies that: 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽  assuming  𝐸( 𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0.  
The advantage of the FE modelling is that consistent estimates of the regressors can be obtained 
if the regressors are time-varying and even endogenous to some extent (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010). 
Therefore, let the error 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡, then we have error component model with 𝛾𝑡 the 
unobserved time effect as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                            (4.4) 
 
Including the lagged dependent variables along with FE introduces a basic problem of 
correlation between the regressor and the error term. This generates a bias in the estimate 
known as the Nickell bias27. However, since T > N, the Nickell bias goes to zero as T increases 
and is a problem with fixed T. To determine which model is suitable, the study used the 
Hausman test which supported the use of FE rather than RE. However, in some cases, for the 
                                                          




individual financial development measures, the RE modelling is the appropriate approach. 
Since T > N we use Least squares dummy variable technique. 
4.3.2 Feasible Generalised Least Squares 
In the pooled feasible generalised least squares, it is necessary to specify a model for serial 
correlation, heteroscedascity and model of contemporaneous correlation in the errors. Once 
heteroscedascity is present, the data cannot be pooled. This approach is preferred since in many 
cases the variance-covariance matrix is unknown. Hence, we cannot use Pooled generalised 
least squares (GLS) as it assumes known variance-covariance. 
Thus, this model deals with model error complications by specifying a model of 
heteroscedascity, model of contemporaneous correlation and model of serial correlation in 
equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. Hence we have: 
  E( 𝑖𝑡2 ) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡                        (4.5) 
  E( 𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑡) = 𝜎𝑖𝑗                      (4.6) 
  εit = ρi εit−1 + vit                    (4.7) 
The advantage of this model is that 𝜌 which is coefficient of the first order correlation is 
allowed to vary across the panel. Furthermore, the model captures short run dynamics as well 
as controls for simultaneity bias. 
4.3.3 Seemingly Unrelated regression technique 
The Seemingly Unrelated regression technique (SURE), according to Zellner (1962), takes the 
system of ‘seemingly unrelated regression equations’ as a single large equation to be estimated. 
Hence, by postulating a separate dynamic regressions for each individual country, we have: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡−1 + 1𝑡        
                     . 
                     . 
                     . 
𝑦𝑁𝑇 = 𝛾𝑁𝑦𝑁𝑇−1 + 𝛽𝑁𝑥𝑁𝑇−1 + 𝑁𝑇                 (4.8) 
 
i=1, 2 ……………………..…N  




The equations are simplified by stacking into a single model. Let 𝑌𝑡 = [𝑦𝑖𝑡 … , 𝑦𝑁𝑡]′, 𝑋𝑡 =
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑥1𝑡 … , 𝑥𝑁𝑇),  a blog diagonal matrix with 𝑥1𝑡 … , 𝑥𝑁𝑇 on its diagonal, 𝑈𝑡 = [ 1𝑡 … , 𝑁𝑇] 
, 𝛽 = [𝛽1 … , 𝛽𝑁]′and 𝛾 = [𝛾1 … , 𝛾𝑁]′  , . Then our final SURE model is given 4.9: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛾𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑡                            (4.9) 
The idea is to estimate each equation in the bloc. The main advantage of SURE over estimates 
using equation by equation under ordinary least squares is that there is gain in efficiency if 
there is contemporaneous correlation among the equations. 
The underlying assumption of the Zellner (1962) method is that the equations are related 
through the non-zero covariances associated with the error term. Thus, while it is assumed that, 
statistically, the errors for each country taken separately conform to the standard linear 
regression model,
 
each country’s errors may also correlate with the contemporaneous errors of 
the other countries (Judge et al., 1988). There is reason to believe that common factors may 
influence macroeconomic and financial data from the SADC and ECOWAS countries,
 
therefore increasing the chances of the presence of contemporaneous correlation in the model. 
This cross-sectional dependency may arise because of several reasons including spatial 
correlation, economic distance, and spill over effects and common unobserved shocks. To 
determine the existence of such contemporaneous correlation, the study used the Breuch-Pagan 
(LM) test. 
4.3.4 Data description 
We used annual data obtained from World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators, 2012, and 
Global Financial Development Database, 2012, limited to 1980-2011. Financial variables are 
obtained from the latter and the rest from the former. Financial liberalisation index is obtained 
from Chinn-Ito Financial Index. Both ECOWAS and SADC include 12 states as shown in 
Table B.0.2. The sources and description of the data is given in Table C.0.1 in the Appendix 
C. 
4.4 Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis start with a diagnostic test in order to get the right specifications. 
4.4.1 Diagnostic tests 
Before employing panel based approach, the study tested for serial correlation as well as 




to determine the appropriate modelling. The result is reported in Table 4.4.1. Table 4.4.1 shows 
that the presence of heteroscedascity is confirmed by the Likelihood ratio test and the existence 
of first order autocorrelation cannot be ignored as suggested by the test of serial correlation in 
both regions.  
 
The Breuch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional dependence from the Table supports the 
existence of contemporaneous correlation in both regions. Based on the FE model, it shows 1% 
significance level. The correlation matrix of the errors in SADC and ECOWAS are shown on 
Tables C.0.7 and C.0.8 in the Appendix respectively. Each country’s errors correlate with the 
contemporaneous errors of other countries. This suggests that any random shock to one country 
would also impact on the other countries in the regional bloc, since financial and 
macroeconomic data from the same regional bloc are likely to be influenced by common 
factors. This supports the application of Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression technique 
which results in gain in efficiency in the estimates as opposed to estimates of equation by 
equation using OLS. As the method can only estimate for a maximum of 10 countries, we 
dropped, Lesotho and Zambia in SADC, and Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau in ECOWAS. 
Additionally, the Hausman test confirmed that the dynamic relationship between the measure 
of financial development, inflation, openness, communication, government spending, and other 
conditioning variables for the two sub-regions is adequately modelled by the FE model rather 
than the RE approach, as shown in Table 4.4.1. In addition, the F-tests for the FE model for 
both sub-regions indicate heterogeneity and that the coefficients are different from zero. To 
control for spatial effect and error complications, dynamic FGLS as well as PCSE are also 
estimated. These tests are based on the dynamic panel regression of 4.2. 
Table 4.4.1: Diagnostic test 
Tests SADC                         ECOWAS               
1. Serial 
correlation test F( 1, 11) = 32.64, Pr > F = 0.0016 F(1,  11) = 42.745,      Pr> F = 0.0000 
2.Hetroscedascity                   LR   𝜒2 (9)  =    141.01                          LR   𝜒2 (9)  =   194.13 
     (Ass: homosk )Pr >  =    0.0000                                Pr >  𝜒2=    0.0000 
3. Breuch-Pagan  
    LM     test                                          𝜒2 (45) = 246.828, (Pr = 0.000)     𝜒2(45) =  353.823 ,    (Pr = 0.0000) 
4. FE model F(7, 301) = 7.19,(Pr >F =  0.0000) F(11,  341) = 3.17,  (Pr >F =  0.0004) 
 
5 Hausman test        𝜒2 =     20.04 Pr > 𝜒2  = 0.0289   𝜒2  =   25.09       Pr >  𝜒2 =   0.0029 




4.4.2 Estimated results of composite measure of financial development as a dependent 
variable 
Table 4.4.2 reports the main results of the composite measure of financial development for the 
two regions. All the panel approaches used indicate that the main variable of interest, inflation, 
has detrimental effect on financial development of the two regions. This is not only in line with 
theory, but lends support to earlier studies such as Boyd et al. (2001), BenNaceur and 
Ghazouani (2005), Andrianaivo and Yartey (2009), and Bittencourt (2011). Among some of 
the studies on SSA that this result corroborates include Aziakpono (2004) on South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho (SACU countries), Kablan (2010) and, more 
recently, the work of David et al. (2014). These studies confirm that increases in inflation 
reverse FSD. 
The result shows that given a 10% increase in inflation in the two regions, the LSDV approach 
indicates 0.44% and 2.1% reduction in financial development in SADC and ECOWAS, 
respectively. This suggests that the effect is much felt in the latter bloc. What this means is that 
increases in the rate of inflation adversely affect credit market friction, which affects FSD 
negatively. This is because an increase in inflation rate causes the rate of real returns on assets 
to fall, which worsens the credit market friction and leads to credit rationing. Hence, the 
financial sector makes only fewer loans, causing inefficient resources allocation and reduced 
intermediation in the two regions. The relatively small negative effects of inflation on the 
financial sector of SADC could be explained by the fact that its financial sector is relatively 
more developed than ECOWAS. For this reason, the weak financial sector of ECOWAS is 
more susceptible to inflation shocks than SADC. Furthermore, the South African financial 
system, which is well developed in the region and ranks very high in the world, has its 
footprints all over the bloc especially the banking industry28. And given her strong monetary 
policy with inflation targeting frame, it is not surprising that the impact of inflation is not as 
strong as in ECOWAS, since these policies usually reflects in countries such as Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana. Therefore the absence of a major regional economic player 
like South Africa in ECOWAS could be the reason. 
To determine the robustness of the reversed effects of inflation on financial development in the 
two regions, we re-estimated the LSDV regression by adding the conditioning variables one 
after the other, as shown in Tables C.0.2 and C.0.3 in the Appendix for SADC and ECOWAS 
                                                          




respectively. The results seem to confirm that inflation robustly reduces financial development 
in both regions. Furthermore, to examine if this negative relationship was driven by Zimbabwe 
as well as DRC in SADC, since Zimbabwe in recent times experienced phenomenal increases 
in inflation and DRC during the civil conflicts in that country, we re-estimated the baseline 
regression by dropping one country after the other and also dropping the two at the same time. 
The results suggest a robust negative relationship between inflation and financial development 
in SADC, as shown by Table C.0.4 in the Appendix. Overall, the results indicate that the costs 
of inflation on financial development are genuine and not explained by a sort of omitted 
variable bias. 
In terms of history of financial development captured by the summary of the lagged of the 
financial development measure, the results show this significantly promote current financial 
development at 1%, which is in line with a prior expectation. However, the level of 
development measured by real GDP per capita indicates mixed results. Whereas all regressions 
in SADC suggest a negative relationship, the LSDV, which is our main model, indicates that 
the relationship is statistically insignificant. However, the LSDV technique reveals real GDP 
per capita to have statistically positive effects on financial development in ECOWAS. This is 
contrary to the FGLS results as shown by Table 4.4.2. 
Government spending in both regions suggests a negative effect on financial development 
(except FGLS in ECOWAS), but only statistically significant in SADC for all methods. It 
shows that a 10% increase in government spending in SADC will cause about 0.4% drop in 
financial development, as indicated by the LSDV method, but about 0.3% drop from the FGLS 
and PCSE approaches. This finding may lead us to conclude that government expenditure may 
serve as a channel that diverts resources away from the financial sector of SADC to the 
government. In this way, government expenditure interferes with the financial sector activities 
negatively. On average, the summary statistics indicate that government expenditure in SADC 
is as high as 18% against 14% of ECOWAS. This may be the reason. 
In both regions, not only is the political environment variable statistically insignificant, as 
shown by the standard errors but also its interaction with trade openness is also insignificant. 
This is contrary to our expectations. This seems to suggest that the current governance system 
for the period under study may be weak and does not support financial development or 




The results reveal that trade openness alone reveals statistically significant positive effects on 
financial development for all methods in SADC, whereas financial openness enters with 
statistically significant negative effects. This suggests that more trade openness alone induces 
financial development in the bloc. This rejects the suggestion by Rajan and Zingales that trade 
openness without financial openness is unlikely to cause financial development. This result 
corroborates the findings of Kim et al. (2010). However, the same cannot be said about 
financial openness, as more financial openness reverses financial development. This evidence 
seems to supports Rajan and Zingales’ assertion that cross border capital flows alone are 
unlikely to convince both interest groups to push for financial development. Importantly, the 
complementary term between trade and financial openness indicates statistically significant 
positive effects on financial development for all three regressions, indicating that 
simultaneously opening of trade and financial sectors holds the key to financial development 
of SADC. Hence, the evidence seems to give partial support to the hypothesis in SADC. Studies 
that found this results include Baltagi et al. (2009). 
Comparing with ECOWAS, even though all three regressions indicate that openness measures 
promote financial development separately, they are not statistically significant. Furthermore, 
the interaction term between these measures is negative, indicating that relatively closed 
economies may gain from more trade openness or financial openness. However, it is 
statistically insignificant.  The evidence therefore suggests that the hypothesis may be rejected 






Lastly, more access to mobile and telephones is an important factor that induces financial sector 
development in the two regions as indicated in the Table. All regressions in the two blocs do 
not only indicate a positive coefficient, but also they are statistically significant. Given that 
there is a 10% increases in access to mobile and telephone in both regional blocs, it will provoke 
over 0.2% and over 0.1% financial development for SADC and ECOWAS, respectively, for 
the three regressions. This therefore suggests that SADC’s financial system stands to benefit 
more from additional access to mobile and telephones than ECOWAS. This is in line with our 
expectations as more access to these facilities will make it easier to access information in the 
financial system. The analysis, thus far, seems to suggest that the relatively more developed 
Table 4.4.2:  Results of composite financial findex 
  SADC   ECOWAS  
Variables FE (LSDV) FGLS PCSE FE (LSDV) FGLS PCSE 
 Composite measure of FSD Composite measure of FSD 
findext-1 0.811*** 0.824*** 0.825*** 0.799*** 0.823*** 0.835*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0254) (0.0350) (0.0412) (0.0252) (0.0331) 
rgdppc -0.00177 -0.0227*** -0.0297*** 0.231*** -0.0308** -0.0232 
 (0.0306) (0.00539) (0.00852) (0.0712) (0.0122) (0.0184) 
inflation -0.0438*** -0.0467*** -0.0400*** -0.213* -0.0910* -0.104 
 (0.00831) (0.0103) (0.0136) (0.108) (0.0471) (0.0671) 
gov -0.0418*** -0.0260** -0.0305** -0.0115 0.00367 -0.0127 
 (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0154) (0.0210) (0.0126) (0.0211) 
pol 0.00248 0.00116 0.00167 -0.00334 0.000216 0.000368 
 (0.00279) (0.00139) (0.00245) (0.00416) (0.00275) (0.00410) 
traop 0.0705** 0.0346*** 0.0432* 0.0102 0.00398 0.00937 
 (0.0308) (0.0129) (0.0221) (0.0404) (0.0261) (0.0446) 
finop -0.0667** -0.0240* -0.0364* 0.0291 0.0218 0.0244 
 (0.0220) (0.0126) (0.0191) (0.0343) (0.0254) (0.0407) 
fintraop 0.000654** 0.000265** 0.000422** -0.000314 -0.000431 -0.000495 
 (0.000225) (0.000131) (0.000197) (0.000523) (0.000384) (0.000622) 
com 0.0254*** 0.0202*** 0.0236*** 0.0118** 0.0160*** 0.0156*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00334) (0.00507) (0.00510) (0.00430) (0.00591) 
trapol -3.24e-05 -6.60e-06 -1.30e-05 8.29e-05 3.66e-05 2.80e-05 
 (0.00018) (0.000012) (0.00019) (5.42e-05) (4.28e-05) (5.94e-05) 
Constant 0.619** 0.831*** 0.840*** -0.540* 0.949*** 0.864*** 
 (0.279) (0.124) (0.175) (0.270) (0.152) (0.239) 
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.852  0.993 0.881  0.989 
      N  12 12  12 12 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Where rgdppc = real GDP per capita, gov = government expenditure (%GDP), pol = polity2, traop = international 
trade openness, finop = capital flows or financial openness, fintraop = interaction term between trade and financial 
openness, com = access to mobile and telephones per 1000 people and trapol =the interaction term between trade 




financial sector of SADC could be explained by many factors influencing it as opposed to 
ECOWAS. 
4.4.3 Estimated results of Liquid liabilities (M3/GDP) as a dependent variable  
On the individual components of financial development measure, we report the results from 
Tables 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5. Table 4.4.3 reports the results of liquid liabilities as percentage 
of GDP. It shows that the RE model is indeed the appropriate model as reported by the 
Hausman test. In both blocs, the history of the financial development has a statistically 
significant positive coefficient on financial depth. This is in line with our expectations. 
 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Real GDP per capita, which is a proxy for economic development, reveals positive coefficient, 
but only statistically significant in ECOWAS for all regression. This means as incomes of this 
Table 4.4.3: Results of Liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
  SADC  ECOWAS 
Variables RE(AR (1)) FGLS PCSE RE (AR (1)) FGLS PCSE 
  
Liquid liabilities as a percentage of 
GDP 
Liquid liabilities as a percentage of 
GDP 
M3t-1 0.931*** 0.929*** 0.932*** 0.836*** 0.846*** 0.849*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0137) (0.0202) (0.0249) (0.0241) (0.0410) 
rgdppc 0.0149 0.00886 0.00964 0.0613* 0.0448** 0.0564* 
 (0.0114) (0.00660) (0.00915) (0.0316) (0.0197) (0.0333) 
inflation -0.0414** -0.0505*** -0.0402** -0.293*** -0.214*** -0.278** 
 (0.0165) (0.0119) (0.0170) (0.106) (0.0507) (0.117) 
gov -0.0325 -0.0328*** -0.0276 -0.0392 -0.0319 -0.0726 
 (0.0217) (0.0127) (0.0197) (0.0347) (0.0205) (0.0474) 
pol -0.00169 -0.000855 0.000334 0.0105* 0.011*** 0.0172** 
 (0.00329) (0.00170) (0.00241) (0.00634) (0.00361) (0.00678) 
traop 0.0784** 0.0583*** 0.0691** 0.00864 -0.0372 -0.0244 
 (0.0315) (0.0204) (0.0347) (0.0628) (0.0354) (0.0733) 
finop -0.0935*** -0.0596*** -0.0795** 0.0595 0.0728** 0.0885 
 (0.0284) (0.0212) (0.0345) (0.0569) (0.0352) (0.0645) 
fintraop 0.000727** 0.000450** 0.000637** -0.000816 -0.0011** -0.00128 
 (0.000305) (0.000202) (0.000313) (0.00086) (0.00053) (0.00099) 
com 0.0104 0.0107*** 0.0128*** 0.00971 0.012*** 0.00726 
 (0.00658) (0.00338) (0.00491) (0.00785) (0.00450) (0.00954) 
trapol 0.00032 0.00028* 0.000159 -0.000101 -0.0001*** -0.0002** 
 (2.87e-05) (1.53e-05) (2.07e-05) (8.83e-05) (5.03e-05) (9.16e-05) 
Constant -0.171 -0.0249 -0.120 0.223 0.452*** 0.443 
 (0.135) (0.0884) (0.139) (0.285) (0.160) (0.329) 
Hausman test  11.99   15.57  
  (0.213)   (0.1128)  
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared   0.978   0.970 




region increase, more financial services are demanded, which can lead to the expansion of the 
financial sector. This is in line with the expectations and it corroborates existing studies (see, 
Boyd et al., 2001; Law & Habibullah, 2009; Law & Azman, 2012). Like the composite measure 
of financial development, inflation present detrimental effects on financial depth of the two 
regions with the effects in ECOWAS over five times that of SADC as indicated by all models. 
In the same direction, government expenditure reveals a negative effects on financial depth of 
both regions, but only statistically significant in SADC with the FGLS regression.  
However, governance system is not statistically significant in SADC. On the contrary, it is an 
important determinant of financial depth in ECOWAS. The coefficient is not only positive, but 
statistically significant under all regressions. This is intuitive because a more democratic 
governance results in protection of private property, and hence an incentive to the financial 
sector to grow. However, the complementarity between trade and governance system reveals 
that more democratic governance results in trade openness to promote financial depth in 
SADC, but this is statistically significant under only the FGLS regression. In contrast, this 
complementarity term is negatively related to financial depth in ECOWAS, indicating that less 
democratic governance complement trade to promote financial development. This argument 
may be intuitive since democracy is a necessary condition, but not as sufficient condition to 
promote FSD, as evidenced by development dictators of South Asia. 
Additionally, more trade openness alone promotes financial depth, but financial openness alone 
retards the development in all regressions in SADC. The complementarity term reveals that 
more financial and trade openness are important determinants of financial depth in SADC. This 
finding corroborates the findings of the composite measure and, therefore, gives a partial 
support for the Rajan and Zingales assertion. On the contrary, in ECOWAS, the 
complementarity term indicates a negative coefficient, which suggests that relatively closed 
economies stand to benefits from opening up trade or their financial sector; however, it is only 
the FGLS regression that shows the coefficient is significant. It also indicates that financial 
openness alone induces financial development of the region.  
Finally, access to communication shows positive coefficients in all regressions, but only 
statistically significant in FGLS and PCSE in SADC. In ECOWAS, it is only the FGLS that 
reveals that the variable is significant at 1%. The magnitude of the impact is almost similar in 




4.4.4 Estimated results of ratio of domestic money bank assets to the sum of domestic 
money bank assets and Central Bank assets as a dependent variable 
Table 4.4.4 reports the results of the ratio of bank assets to the sum of bank assets and central 
bank assets as a measure of financial development. It indicates that the relationship under 
investigation is adequately modelled by the FE representation as confirmed by the Hausman 
test. Hence, we implement the LSDV approach. The results show that even though the 
coefficient of finance-inflation relationship is negative in SADC for the three methods, which 
is in line with the earlier results, the coefficient under PCSE approach is statistically 
insignificant. This important finding reiterates the detrimental effect of inflation on financial 
development of the region. On the contrary, in ECOWAS inflation-finance coefficient for the 
three models does not only reveals mixed results, but are all statistically insignificant. This is 
not surprising because theories such as those proposed by Azariadis and Smith (1996)  and 
Choi et al. (1996) argue that a threshold effect between inflation and finance exists. Under these 
theories, certain level of inflation is desirable for FSD and above which its effects will results 
in their detrimental impact on FSD. This may be the case when this type of measure of financial 
development is used. 
More and better governance system promotes financial development as indicated by the FGLS 
and PCSE approaches in SADC, but this contracts financial development in ECOWAS. 
However, for the interaction term between governance and trade openness, the LSDV approach 
confirms a statistically significant positive effect on financial development in ECOWAS. This 
is opposite in SADC, as indicated by FGLS method. 
The Table also indicates that even though there is partial support for Rajan and Zingales’ 
hypothesis in SADC, thus confirming the earlier assertion of composite results, only the results 
in FGLS is significant. However, this is again rejected in ECOWAS. Finally, more access to 








Table 4.4.4:  Results of ratio of domestic money bank assets to the sum of domestic money 
bank assets and central bank assets 
    SADC     ECOWAS   
Variables FE(LSDV) FGLS PCSE FE(LSDV) FGLS PCSE 
  
Bank assets to the sum of bank assets 
and central bank assets 
Bank assets to the sum of bank assets and 
central bank assets 
dmbat-1 0.615*** 0.897*** 0.850*** 0.782*** 0.906*** 0.898*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0205) (0.0385) (0.0349) (0.0193) (0.0329) 
rgdppc -0.0652 -0.00204 -0.00869 0.172** -0.0211** -0.0166 
 (0.0485) (0.00467) (0.0140) (0.0793) (0.00951) (0.0310) 
inflation -0.026*** -0.0249* -0.0175 0.0423 -0.0208 -0.0306 
 (0.00585) (0.0130) (0.0197) (0.0937) (0.0448) (0.0885) 
gov 0.0236 0.00792 0.0237 0.0115 0.00287 -0.00252 
 (0.0249) (0.00845) (0.0247) (0.0331) (0.0112) (0.0264) 
pol 0.00648 0.00551*** 0.00807* -0.0126** -0.00143 0.000476 
 (0.00375) (0.00131) (0.00433) (0.00575) (0.00232) (0.00550) 
traop 0.0565 0.0222*** 0.0315 0.0388 0.0215 0.0292 
 (0.0396) (0.00795) (0.0313) (0.0528) (0.0243) (0.0509) 
finop -0.0342 -0.0208*** -0.0453 0.0302 0.0155 0.0355 
 (0.0240) (0.00681) (0.0342) (0.0456) (0.0221) (0.0448) 
fintraop 0.000381 0.000170** 0.000359 0.000154 -0.000106 -0.000355 
 (0.000216) (6.99e-05) (0.000313) (0.000677) (0.000327) (0.000649) 
com 0.0221* 0.00531* 0.0121 0.0173** 0.00908*** 0.0110** 
 (0.0117) (0.00295) (0.00905) (0.00698) (0.00336) (0.00520) 
trapol -0002.31 -0.0003*** -0.000479 0.000264*** 0.000365 0.000161 
 (3.13e-05) (1.05e-05) (3.10e-05) (9.05e-05) (3.30e-05) (7.94e-05) 
Constant 1.661** 0.319*** 0.441*** -0.380 0.427*** 0.401 
 (0.618) (0.0686) (0.170) (0.437) (0.117) (0.260) 
Hausman test  77.86   20.57  
  (0.0000)   (0.0147)  
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.909  0.992 0.903  0.981 
       N  12 12  12 12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.4.5 Estimated results of bank private credits (percentage of GDP) as a dependent 
variable 
Table 4.4.5 reports bank private credit as a percentage of total economic activities of the two 
regions. The diagnostic test indicates that the FE is the appropriate model in both regions. 
However, in ECOWAS random effect approach was rejected at 10% level of significance. 
Hence, we report the results of both approaches, which give almost similar results. 
From Table 4.4.5, like the earlier discussions, inflation presents detrimental effects on private 
credit as a percentage of GDP in both regions with the effects in ECOWAS the much more. 




expenditure and financial development in SADC, whereas its coefficients in all models in 
ECOWAS are not significant.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that whereas individually, trade openness is statistically 
insignificant, financial openness reverses financial development in SADC. However, 
simultaneous opening of trade and financial sector raises financial development as evidenced 
by the three models. Hence, this confirms full support for Rajan and Zingales hypothesis in 
terms of private credit as a percentage of total economic activities of the region. However, this 
hypothesis is rejected in ECOWAS. Finally, access to communication infrastructure robustly 
promotes private credit as a measure of financial development in SADC at 1% significance 
levels, but is only statistically significant at 10% in ECOWAS under the LSDV approach. 
In conclusion, it can be observed that, the individual measures of financial development 
indicate mixed response to the set of controls in the models. This validates the idea of the use 





4.4.6 Estimated results using SURE for composite measure of financial development as 
a dependent variable 
As mentioned above, the presence of cross-section dependence as evidence by the Breusch-
Pagan (LM) test cannot be overlooked. In light of this, we present the SURE estimates in Tables 
C.0.5 and C.0.6 in the Appendix for SADC and ECOWAS respectively. Table C.0.5 provides 
disaggregated analysis of individual countries. It provides strong evidence that inflation 
reverses financial development in four countries, which include Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe and DRC, with Mauritius highly affected (-0.307). Others include South Africa and 
Swaziland, but their coefficients are statistically insignificant. This lends support to the fact 
that South Africa and Swaziland belong to the Common Monetary Area (CMA) under which 
South Africa’s monetary policy continue to influence and reflect in the group. In countries such 
as Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania and Mozambique, inflation presents positive impact on 
financial sector development, but with the coefficient in Botswana being statistically 
Table 4.4.5: Results of Bank private credits as a percentage of GDP 
    SADC     ECOWAS     
Variables FE(LSDV) FGLS PCSE FE(LSDV) RE(AR 1) FGLS PCSE 
  
Bank private credits as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
Bank private credits as a percentage 
 of GDP 
 
Bankprcrt-1 0.819*** 0.906*** 0.902*** 0.845*** 0.875*** 0.875*** 0.871*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0158) (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0235) 
rgdppc -0.0307 0.0195 0.00522 0.342*** 0.0642* 0.0741*** 0.0650* 
 (0.0464) (0.0123) (0.0212) (0.100) (0.0386) (0.0256) (0.0353) 
inflation -0.0729*** -0.0648*** -0.0524 -0.294*** -0.380*** -0.364*** -0.373*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0187) (0.0345) (0.112) (0.108) (0.0717) (0.112) 
gov -0.0952*** -0.0174 -0.00843 0.0215 0.0162 0.0128 -0.000366 
 (0.0234) (0.0190) (0.0413) (0.0408) (0.0423) (0.0243) (0.0394) 
pol 0.000639 0.00292 0.00594 -0.00625 -0.00403 -0.000959 0.000172 
 (0.00552) (0.00256) (0.00555) (0.00655) (0.00728) (0.00437) (0.00641) 
traop 0.0515 0.0103 0.0747 0.0246 0.0630 0.0332 0.0134 
 (0.0645) (0.0215) (0.0520) (0.0630) (0.0728) (0.0437) (0.0778) 
finop -0.0884** -0.0617*** -0.113*** -0.0356 -0.0677 -0.0339 1.93e-05 
 (0.0329) (0.0191) (0.0429) (0.0545) (0.0656) (0.0402) (0.0701) 
fintraop 0.000889** 0.000562*** 0.00109** 0.000317 0.000760 0.000269 -0.000345 
 (0.000334) (0.000196) (0.000445) (0.000810) (0.000989) (0.000615) (0.00107) 
com 0.0550*** 0.0368*** 0.0424*** 0.0142* 0.0147 0.00589 0.0138 
 (0.0141) (0.00592) (0.0131) (0.00824) (0.00960) (0.00745) (0.0102) 
trapol -0.000629* -0.000248 -0.0006 0.00089 0.000754 0.000422 0.000386 
 (3.41e-05) (2.16e-05) (4.53e-05) (9.86e-05) (0.000103) (6.71e-05) (8.98e-05) 
Constant 0.527 0.00490 -0.227 -1.921*** -0.395 -0.308 -0.135 
 (0.353) (0.0972) (0.214) (0.604) (0.341) (0.209) (0.354) 
Hausman test 20.98    14.87  
  (0.0212)    (0.0946)  
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.970  0.946 0.938   0.959 
      N  12 12  12 12 12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




significant. The reason for this insignificant effect of inflation on FSD could be threshold 
effects of inflation on financial development. 
Comparing with countries in ECOWAS, the results show that the negative effects of inflation 
on financial development are found to be statistically significant in five countries. These 
countries are Cape Verde, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo with Niger experiencing the 
biggest effect of 0.97. This indicates that a 10% increase inflation will results in almost a 10% 
fall in the development of the financial sector. Others that reveal negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficients include Cote d’ Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana and Mali. The study, 
therefore, argue that the disaggregated analysis gives support to the reason why the impact of 
inflation in ECOWAS is greater than in SADC using LSDV, FGLS and PCSE. 
On trade and financial openness and their interaction term, the result seems to suggest partial 
support for Rajan and Zingales’ hypothesis in four countries in SADC, which includes Malawi, 
Mauritius, Tanzania and DRC. However, trade and financial openness alone promotes financial 
development in Botswana and Zimbabwe respectively, leading to a rejection of the hypothesis. 
Hence, in SADC, there is no country that provides full support for the hypothesis. However, in 
ECOWAS, only Cote d’ Ivoire seems to provide evidence of full support for the hypothesis. 
The results indicate that more opening of the financial sector alone will reverse financial 
development. On the contrary, simultaneous opening of trade and financial sector will promote 
financial development. This is in line with the theory.  Other countries in the region that provide 
partial support for the hypothesis include Benin, Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria and Togo. 
Furthermore, communication access accelerates financial development in five out of the ten 
countries in SADC which includes Botswana, Madagascar, Swaziland, Tanzania and DRC. In 
Malawi and Mozambique, a positive relationship is presented, but the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, an inverse relationship is established. 
Comparing with ECOWAS, 60% of the countries reveal statistically significant positive 
relationship between communication infrastructure and financial development, which includes 
Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, Niger, Senegal and Togo.  
The system of governance and its interaction with trade openness also reveal mixed results in 
the two regions. Whereas governance system promotes financial development in Madagascar, 




(i.e pol and traop) indicates a reversed relationship with finance in Botswana, Madagascar and 
Mauritius, but positive effects in countries like Malawi, South Africa and DRC. For ECOWAS, 
the system of governance promotes finance in Cape Verde and the Gambia, but retards financial 
development in Cote d’ Ivoire, Mali and Togo. However, the interactive term is negative in 
Cape Verde and the Gambia, but positive in Mali and Togo. 
Finally, as expected, the lagged dependent variable promotes financial development in seven 
countries of the two regions, whereas the measure of economic development promotes financial 
development in only six countries in SADC and five countries in ECOWAS. Government 
spending presents mixed results in the two regions. In SADC, it reverses financial development 
in seven countries, only the results of one country is statistically significant (i.e. Tanzania). The 
financial sector of Mozambique benefits from more government expenditure. Unlike SADC, 
the effects of government spending on financial development is negative in six countries with 
the coefficient of Gambia and Ghana statistically significant. This is not surprising, since in 
these countries, especially Ghana, government keep issuing treasury bills and Eurobond which 
channel resources away from the financial sector. Like SADC, only one country’s financial 
system in ECOWAS, that is Cote d’ Ivoire, seems to benefit from more government 
expenditure.  
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, the study provided an empirical analysis of a comparative study between 
ECOWAS and SADC on the role of inflation in explaining the state of financial development 
of the two regions. Furthermore, the study investigated the role of access to communication 
infrastructure on financial development and examined whether the Rajan and Zingales 
hypothesis, which posits that simultaneous opening of both trade and financial sector is the key 
for financial development, is supported in the two regions. Using dynamic panel approaches 
and a composite measure of financial development, the findings provided evidence that, in both 
regions, inflation robustly reversed financial development with the effects in ECOWAS more.  
In addition, the study indicated that even though more simultaneous opening of the financial 
sector and trade lead to more financial development in SADC, trade openness alone can still 
induce development in the sector. However, more financial openness alone is detrimental to 
financial development of the region. This provides partial support for the hypothesis. In 




Furthermore, the communication variable, which is in the form of access to mobile and 
telephones per thousand people, indicated statistically strong positive effects on financial 
development in both regions. The results indicated that the financial system of both regions 
will expand more from increased access to mobile and telephones, with SADC benefiting more 
than ECOWAS.  
Other conditioning variables include government expenditure. More government expenditure 
reverses financial development in SADC, but not in ECOWAS. Governance system and its 
interaction term were all statistically insignificant.  The study, therefore, argues that the main 
factors explaining financial development in SADC are inflation, trade and financial openness 
and their complementarity term, government spending, and access to mobile and telephones. 
However, in ECOWAS, inflation, access to mobile and telephones and measure of economic 
development are the main factors influencing the development of the financial system. 
On disaggregated country-level analysis using SURE, the results presented mixed evidence. 
The evidence showed support to the dynamic panel approach, which posits that inflation is a 
credible threat to financial development in many countries of the two regions. Furthermore, 
whereas access to communication induces financial development in many countries of the two 
regions, many countries revealed partial support for the Rajan and Zingales theory, with Cote 











Financial sector development and threshold effect of inflation in ECOWAS 
and SADC: A Panel smooth transition regression approach 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The basic aim of financial sector policies is to induce growth and stability in the sector. This is 
a grave concern in SSA and many other developing regions after series of financial sector 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. To cause development in the financial sector, financial sector 
policies mostly aim at inducing competition that will promote efficiency and subsequent 
expansion of the sector. However, despite measures being taken both in the past and present, 
the financial sector of SSA is still relatively under developed, revealing FSD deficit. From this 
perspective, this chapter argues that these policies are essential, but need the support of other 
enabling macroeconomic conditions to induce commendable development in the sector. 
Further investigations are thus required, particularly, on the optimal level of macroeconomic 
policy variable of inflation, which is essential for promoting financial development. 
Existing models, such as by Huybens and Smith (1998), indicate that macroeconomic policy 
variable of inflation has a detrimental effect on the financial sector’s ability to operate 
efficiently. This is because it interferes with the development process of the sector. The models 
postulate that, increases in the rate of inflation erode returns on investment, which adversely 
affect credit market friction. This, in turn, impacts on FSD negatively and hence, long-run real 
activity. Studies such as those conducted by Boyd et al. (2001), BenNaceur and Ghazouani 
(2005), Detragiache et al. (2006) and Kablan 2010) as well as Chapter 4 of this study, and many 
others provide empirical evidence in supported of this theory.   
However, other theories argue that there is existence of threshold effects of inflation on FSD, 
as in Azariadis and Smith (1996) and Choi et al. (1996). These theories propose that some 
amount of inflation is desirable for FSD up to certain threshold level. Beyond this threshold 
level will witness the detrimental effects of inflation on the sector’s development. Hence, it is 
important, especially for policy makers to understand the dynamic relationship between 
inflation and FSD in order to make sound and achievable policies that will increase 
development in the sector. Consequently, exploring further the link between inflation and 




should aim at low rates of inflation so as to avoid the detrimental effect of this variable in the 
process of financial development. The question to ask then is ‘What is the optimal level of 
inflation that is required and suitable for FSD?’ 
The main objective of this chapter is to determine this optimal level (threshold level) of 
inflation suitable for FSD. This is done by considering a comparative study between ECOWAS 
and SADC which is crucial since it reveals the peculiarities in each bloc and the extent by 
which this macroeconomic policy variable is beneficial for FSD in each bloc and why if there 
are any differences between the two regions. Moreover, it is observed in Chapter 4 that inflation 
presents detrimental effects on financial development in both regions. 
Existing empirical studies on threshold effects of inflation on FSD is relatively limited and few, 
if not nothing exists, especially on SSA. However, some progress is being made. Some of the 
few studies include Boyd et al. (2001). This study determined the optimal level of inflation 
suitable for financial development for combination of developed and developing countries. 
Even though the study deepens our understanding on the behavior of inflation on financial 
development, it had the following weaknesses. The study imposed an a prior threshold of 
inflation instead of endogenously estimating it. In addition, no formal test is done to establish 
whether there exists such threshold effect in the data between inflation and financial 
development. Other studies like that of Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Rousseau and 
Yilmazkuday (2009) and Jude (2010) did not examine the threshold of inflation directly on 
FSD but an indirect effect of inflation on finance-economic growth relationship. Furthermore, 
these studies only used single measures of financial development instead of composite measure 
that captures broadly the basic functional forms of the financial sector. Finally, the data used 
in these studies are usually made up of developed and developing economies. For instance, 
Boyd et al. (2001) used 97 countries of both developed and developing economies, whereas 
Rousseau and Watchtel (2002) as well as Jude (2010) used 84 and 71 respectively. The findings 
are generalised for both developed and developing economies and may be deceptive. 
Based on the above gap in the literature, this chapter makes three main contributions. Firstly, 
the study used a composite measure of FSD that is constructed using three measures of financial 
development indicators. Secondly, although the previous studies provide some evidence that 
inflation has some threshold effects on FSD, they are based on non-linear models that are not 
adequate to model non-linearities properly as in some cases the threshold value is imposed such 




conducted as in Boyd et al. (2001) and Abbey (2013). Hence, in this chapter, the study 
contributes to the inflation-financial development literature by not only testing for the existence 
of thresholds effects of inflation on financial development but use a more robust and novel 
Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) approach recently developed by González et al. 
(2005) that endogenously estimates the threshold value of inflation. Even though PSTR has 
been used in some studies such as inflation-growth nexus, as in Bessec and Fouquau (2008), 
Omay and Kan (2010), Ibarra and Trupkin (2011) and Seleteng et al. (2012), its application in 
inflation-finance relationship directly is not given attention and has yet to be analyzed. Lastly, 
the study is conducted on the direct effects of inflation threshold on financial development in 
the context of comparing regional blocs in SSA. 
To our knowledge this is the first study conducted that: (i) provides an exclusive comparison 
of regional groupings in (especially in SSA) to determine the thresholds effects of inflation on 
financial development that is appropriate to induce FSD; (ii) apply the novel technique of PSTR 
to panel data that endogenously determines the threshold level of inflation on FSD in the two 
regions. Hence, this study is dissimilar to earlier studies like Boyd et al. (2001), Khan and 
Ssnhadji 2001), Aziakpono (2004) and Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009). The PSTR 
approach has an advantage of estimating the threshold value rather than imposing it by a prior. 
In addition, it allows for speed of transition from one regime to another depending on the 
threshold variable. 
As a preview of the results, the PSTR approach does not only confirm a single threshold of 
17.9% and 14.5% of inflation for ECOWAS and SADC respectively, but also reveals 
statistically significant negative effects of inflation on financial development for inflation rates 
above the thresholds. These results suggest that countries in ECOWAS and SADC can prevent 
inflation from interfering with the efficient operation of the financial system in the two regions 
if only they can obtain and maintain inflation rates below their respective inflation thresholds. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the literature review. 
Section 5.3 contains the methods and model specification which gives description of PSTR. 
The data used is described in Section 5.4. The analysis and discussion of results are done in 






5.2 Literature Review 
Existing theories on the threshold effect of inflation on financial development propose that a   
negative relationship between financial development and inflation is only noticed when 
inflation rate exceeds certain threshold, thereby suggesting a nonlinearity between finance and 
inflation (Azariadis and Smith, 1996).  The models developed by Azariadis and Smith (1996)  
and Choi et al. (1996) argue that when inflation is suitably low, credit market frictions may be 
“nonbinding” which renders inflation incapable of distorting the flow of information in the 
financial market. With this, the effects of increases in inflation is powerless in impeding 
financial sector’s ability to allocate resources efficiently. The models explain that under this 
low inflation condition, coupled with sufficiently high real rates of returns on savings, adverse 
selection in the credit markets is not binding. This implies that credit rationing is not required 
to induce lenders to lend rather than borrow. This thus suggests that increases in inflation 
induces agents to substitute cash for investment in physical or human capital or both which 
will stimulate long run growth. 
Moreover, the theories posit that when inflation increases excessively, real rates of returns on 
assets will be pushed down, resulting in credit market frictions becoming binding. If increases 
in inflation exceed this threshold level or critical value, subsequent increases in inflation will 
cause credit rationing to intensify. This is capable of distorting information flows and, as a 
consequence, harm the efficient workings of the financial system. The transmission mechanism 
implies that lower rates of returns caused by increases in inflation will induce severity of 
adverse selection, which will necessitate widespread credit rationing in the economy. Hence, 
this effects result in reduction in financial system expansion. Thus, an important conclusion of 
these models is that threshold effects exist between inflation and financial development. 
The theories further predict a second threshold effects of inflation on finance. They contend 
that if inflation exceeds this critical value, perfect foresight dynamics are related with 
endogenous oscillations in all variables, causing inflation to be highly correlated with inflation 
variability and assets return volatility29. In addition, a third threshold effect is confirmed by 
other models30. When inflation reaches this critical value all the harm to financial system 
                                                          
29 See Boyd et al. (2001) for more details. 




development has already been done and further increases in inflation have no extra impact for 
financial development or growth. 
On a broader empirical literature relating inflation to financial development, contemporary 
empirical literature has mostly recorded a significant negative relationship. These studies 
include Haslag and Koo (1999), BenNaceur and Ghazouani (2005), Detragiache et al. (2006), 
Zoli (2007) and Kablan (2010). Studies on SSA include Aziakpono (2004) on Southern Africa 
Custom Union (SACU), McDonald and Schumacher (2007) and Andrianaivo and Yartey 
(2010).  All these studies documented evidence that increases in inflation reverse FSD. 
Empirical literature on threshold effects of inflation has largely been devoted to explaining 
inflation-growth nexus and finance-growth nexus. Relatively few studies are directed to the 
determination of the direct effect on inflation-finance relationship. Studies that attempted to 
find the threshold effects of inflation on growth include Vaona and Schiavo (2007), Omay and 
Kan (2010), López-Villavicencio and, Mignon (2011), Ibarra and Trupkin (2011) and Seleteng 
et al. (2012). These studies argue that the debilitating effects of inflation on economic growth 
is only observed after certain threshold level.  
On the nascent empirical literature directed at finding the threshold effects of inflation on 
finance-growth relationship, studies are usually a broad mixture of both developing and 
developed economies. These studies attempt to estimate the threshold value of inflation suitable 
for the financial sector to induce economic growth. Among such studies include the study of 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002). Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) used five-year averages of 
measures of financial development (M3 and M3 less M1 and total credit to GDP), inflation, 
and economic growth rates of 84 countries for the period 1960 to 1995. The study concluded 
that there is an inflation threshold for the finance-growth relationship that lies between 13% 
and 25%. This implies that, above these thresholds, the financial sector is powerless in inducing 
economic growth in these countries. In a similar way as the study of Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2002), Lee and Wong (2005) obtained single threshold value of 7.25% in Taiwan and double 
thresholds of 2.5% and 9.66% in Japan. The study employed a threshold autoregression (TAR) 
model 
Further studies in this area include Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) and Jude (2010). 
Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) posit that higher levels of financial development, combined 




countries. However, financial development looses much of its explanatory power in the 
presence of high-inflation. The study found double threshold of inflation between 4% and 19%. 
Jude (2010) used PSTR on data of 71 panel of countries that include both developed and 
developing countries for the period 1960–2004. The conclusion of the study is that there is a 
double threshold of inflation of 9.5 % and 24 % for finance-growth relationship beyond which 
the finance-growth coefficients are negatives. These findings are in line with the existing 
theory. The implication is that when inflation rates are high, financial intermediation becomes 
more difficult, since this high inflation exacerbates information asymmetry and, consequently, 
render the FSD powerless to induce economic growth, if not retard it. Also in line with the 
studies of Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) and Jude (2010), Huang et al. (2010) applied 
Caner and Hansen's (2004) instrumental-variable threshold regression approach and found 
7.3% and 7.7% respectively for policy variables alone and for full sample. The study used 
private credit as a measure of FSD and followed Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) in using the 
period-averaged inflation as a candidate threshold variable. The study used the dataset of 
Levine et al. (2000). 
Even though the above empirical studies broaden our understanding on the threshold effects of 
inflation on financial development, these studies focused mainly on specific threshold value 
beyond which financial sector loses its growth inducing power on economic growth. Thus, 
these group of studies failed to inform us about the asymmetric effects of inflation directly on 
FSD 
Studies that directly estimated the threshold effects of inflation on financial development as 
mentioned earlier are relatively few. No study is specifically done on SSA in this area. The 
available studies attempted to determine at what threshold level does increase in inflation 
reverse FSD.  Among the few known studies is the work of Boyd et al. (2001). This study 
obtained a double digit inflation threshold of 15% for FSD for a number of developing and 
developed countries. The study indicates that the relationship between finance and inflation is 
nonlinear for the 97 countries in their sample for the period 1960–1995. However, as indicated, 
the main weakness of the study is the imposition of threshold by a prior and also lack of test 
of existence of nonlinearity. This study presented results on three different measures of FSD, 
which include liquid liabilities, bank assets and private credit.  Also in the same year, Khan 
and Senhadji (2001) used a sample of large cross-country and found evidence of the existence 




measure of financial depth used. The measures are domestic credit to the private sector, 
summation of domestic credit and stock market capitalization and summation of the second 
indicator with private and public sector bonds market capitalization31. However, this study is 
made up of 168 countries that included both developed and developing economies. Hence, 
generalization of the threshold value for both developed and developing economies may be 
misleading, since there are significant differences between these groups of countries.  
Finally, on a single country analysis, Abbey (2013) argues that inflation threshold rates 
between 11-16% per annum is observed in the inflation-finance relationship in Ghana. The 
study used the cointegration approach and the Granger causality testing procedure coupled with 
Conditional Least Squares technique to address the relationship between inflation and FSD. 
The study thus recommended price stability for inflation rates between 11-16% in support of 
financial development in Ghana. The study relied on ratio of private sector credit to GDP and 
the market capitalization ratio separately as measures of FSD. 
From the ongoing discussion on the empirical literature, we can thus highlight the following 
observations or gaps from the above literature: (i) that no study has been conducted on the 
direct effects of inflation threshold on financial development in the context of comparing 
regional blocs; (ii) some studies that attempted to examine the threshold effect directly on 
financial development imposed the threshold value by an a prior which can either be too low 
or too high. (iv) all the studies discussed used a single measure of financial development which 
are unlikely to capture broadly the financial sector.  Therefore, the main contributions of this 
paper is not only to examine the direct effects of inflation threshold on financial development 
in the context of regional comparison of ECOWAS and SADC in SSA, but also to create a 
composite measure of FSD and apply a novel PSTR that has the advantage of endogenously 
determining the threshold value.  
5.3 Method and Model specification 
To capture the threshold effect of inflation on financial development, we follow the approach 
of González et al. (2005) by specifying the PSTR model.  The advantage of this model is that 
it can estimate the threshold parameter endogenously. This approach allows the relationship 
between financial development and inflation to depend on the level of the threshold variable. 
The PSTR is a fixed effect model with exogenous regressors and caters for heterogeneity 
                                                          




problem in the model. According to González et al. (2005), the model permits parameter 
heterogeneity by assuming that the regression coefficients are continuous function of an 
observable variable through a bounded function of this variable, called transition function, and 
fluctuates between regimes. 
The PSTR has some advantages over other earlier approaches such as the Panel Threshold 
Regression (PTR) of Hansen (1999) that also estimates the threshold effect. According to 
Hansen (1996, 1999), the PTR model divides the observations into two or more regimes and 
these regimes are separated by different regression slopes. PTR approach requires that different 
groups of observations can clearly be distinguished from each other based on the value of the 
threshold variable with sharp or discontinuous ‘borders’ or thresholds separating each group. 
In practice, this is more restrictive and may not always be feasible. Hence, an advantage of 
PSTR is the generalization of the PTR model that relaxes this restriction of the approach. In 
particular, PSTR allows the regression coefficients to change gradually when moving from one 
group to another. This permits smooth transition from one regime to another which is not 
possible in the Hansen (1999) approach. 
A simple two-regime PSTR model with a single transition function is specified in equation 5.1 
but can be generalized to allow for more than two different transition functions as in equation 
5.2: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿) +  𝑖𝑡                (5.1) 
 





;  𝛾, 𝛿) + 𝑖𝑡                          (5.2)  
The dependant variable  𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a scalar and represents indicator of financial development 
(findex), which is a composite measure constructed in Chapter 3. Individual country is 
represented i at time t and i=1 ………N; t=1……….. T.   𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
is a k-dimensional vector of regressors. We modeled finance-inflation relationship using 
inflation rate (inflation), ratio of government expenditure to GDP (gov), financial openness 
(finop), trade openness (traop) and real GDP per capita (rgdppc) defined by 𝑥𝑖𝑡 following 
studies by Boyd et al. (2001) and Baltagi et al. (2009). The study extend this model to include 
communication infrastructure as defined in Chapter 4. An important issue, namely endogeneity 
problem that may lead to biased coefficients is addressed considering lags of the variables as 




The  𝛼𝑖 is fixed country effects and  𝑞𝑖𝑡 is the threshold variable which is the rate of inflation. 
The threshold parameter is 𝛿 and j = 1…r.  γ is slope parameter and  denotes the smoothness 
of the transition from one regime to the other. The transition function is  𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿),  which 
is a continuous function of the observable variable 𝑞𝑖𝑡. It is a normalized to be bounded between 
0 and 1, and these extreme values are associated with 𝛽0 and 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. In general, the value of 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 determines the value of 𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿).  More precisely, the coefficient of inflation is equal to 
𝛽0 if it is smaller than 𝛿 and 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 if it is larger than 𝛿. In this study, the coefficient 𝛽0 can 
be positive or negative. If it is positive, it can be statistically significant or may be insignificant. 
If 𝛽0 < 0, we expect it to be statistically insignificant. 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 is expected to be negative and 
statistically significant. 
The transition function 𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿), follows a logistic function or exponential function. Thus, 
following the work of Granger and Terasvirta (1993) for time series Smooth Transition 
Autoregressive (STAR) models, González et al. (2005) consider the following logistic 
specification function: 




,  𝛾 > 0,  𝛿1 ≤ 𝛿2 ≤ ⋯ 𝛿𝑚          (5.3) 
 
Where 𝛿 = (𝛿1 … … 𝛿𝑚)′ is a vector of m-dimensional location parameters and the restrictions 
𝛾 > 0 and  𝛿1 ≤ 𝛿2 ≤ ⋯ 𝛿𝑚 are imposed for identification purposes. According to González 
et al. (2005), it is usually sufficient in practice to consider m = 1 or m =2 as these values   allow 
for commonly encountered types of variation in the parameters. If m = 1, the model implies 
two regimes with low and high values of 𝑞𝑖𝑡. 
 
In general, if the transition variable 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is different from inflation, the sensitivity of finance to 
inflation for ith country at time t is defined as follows from equation 5.1: 
 
        𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿)            ∀𝑖, ∀𝑡                (5.4) 
 
By definition of the transition function  𝛽0 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛽0 + 𝛽1, if 𝛽1 > 0 or 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≤  𝛽0, 
if  𝛽1 < 0, since 0 ≤ 𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿) ≤ 1, ∀𝑞𝑖𝑡.  
Another advantage of the PSTR model is that the inflation-finance coefficient may be different 




5.4, these parameters do not directly correspond to the direct impact of inflation on finance.  
Parameter 𝛽0 refers to the direct effects of inflation on finance if the transition function 
𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿)  tends towards 0. On the contrary, the sum of 𝛽0 + 𝛽1equals’ inflation-finance 
coefficient only if the transition function 𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿) tends to 1. In between these two 
extremes, there are infinite number of inflation-finance coefficients which are weighted 
average of the parameters 𝛽0 and  𝛽1. It is therefore important to observe that in the PSTR 
model, it is generally difficult to interpret directly the values of these parameters as in Logit 
and Probit models. It is generally preferable to interpret the signs of the coefficients as either 
an increase or decrease depending on the value of the transition variable. Therefore a 
negative/positive sign of the parameter 𝛽𝑗 means that an increase in the transition variable 
involves a decrease/increase of the inflation-finance coefficient32. 
 
Following the procedure described by González et al. (2005), we test linearity against the PSTR 
model and determine the number of r transition functions. This is important since PSTR is not 
identified if the data-generating process is linear. We follow Colletaz and Hurlin (2006) and 
used three tests: Wald Test, Fischer Test and Likelihood Test. Once the PSTR model is 
established, the next stage is to identify the number of transition functions. A sequential 
methodological test is used. For linearity test, the null hypothesis is: 𝐻0: 𝛾 = 0 or 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0. 
However, in these cases the test is non-standard since the PSTR contains unidentified nuisance 
parameters under the null hypothesis and a possible answer is to replace the transition function 
𝜑(𝑞𝑖𝑡;  𝛾, 𝛿) by its first-order Taylor expansion around 𝛾 = 0 in equation 5.1 which leads to the 
following reparameterized auxiliary regression in equation 5.5: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1
′𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑚
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑖𝑡
′                (5.5) 
𝛽1
′…..𝛽𝑚′  are multiples of 𝛾, 𝑖𝑡′  is 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑚𝛽1′𝑥𝑖𝑡 and  𝑍𝑚 is the remainder of the Taylor 
expansion. Hence, in this way testing the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛾 = 0 in equation 5.1 is equivalent 
to testing 𝐻0: 𝛽1′ =…..= 𝛽𝑚′   = 0 in equation 5.5. 
 
A similar approach is adopted to test the number of transition functions in the model if linearity 
test is rejected. Hence, we test the null of no remaining non-linearity in the transition function. 
Suppose we want to test whether there is one transition function (𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1) against at least 
two transition functions (𝐻0: 𝑟 = 2 ), thus we have:  
                                                          





𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜑1(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(1)
;  𝛾1, 𝛿1) + 𝛽2 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜑2(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(2)
;  𝛾2, 𝛿2) +  𝑖𝑡           (5.6) 
 
The null hypothesis of no remaining heterogeneity can be formulated around 𝛾2 = 0 in equation 
5.6. Again this testing problem is complicated by the presence of nuisance parameter under the 
null hypothesis and this is avoided by replacing the transition function 𝜑2(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(2)
;  𝛾2, 𝛿2) by 
Taylor expansion around 𝛾2 = 0 in equation 5.7 leading to the auxiliary regression below: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1
′𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜑1(𝑞𝑖𝑡
1 ;   𝛾1, 𝛿1 ) + 𝛽21
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡
(2)




′             (5.7)  
Where 𝛾1 and  𝛿1 are estimates under the null hypothesis. The testing of null hypothesis of no 
remaining non-linearity is defined as 𝐻0: 𝛽21′  =…=𝛽2𝑚′ = 0 in equation 5.7. In summary, the 
testing procedure is as follows: Given PSTR model we test the null hypothesis that the model 
is linear. We proceed to two-regime PSTR if the null is rejected. With two-regime PSTR model, 
we test the null of no remaining non-linearity in the model and if it is rejected we move to test 
three-regime model. The testing continues until we cannot reject the null of no remaining non-
linearity. To avoid excessive large models, at each step in the sequential procedure, the 
significance level must be reduced by a constant factor 0 <  𝜏 < 1 and we consider 𝜏 = 0.5 
following González et al. (2005). 
Also, the time series properties of the variables used were considered since in PSTR model the 
variables should be stationary.  This was done using Im et al. (2003) and Levin et al. (2002) 
approaches as shown in Chapter 3 section 3.3.1. 
5.3.1 Data 
The data is obtained from the World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators (2012) and Global 
Financial Development Database (2012) and limited it to the periods 1980–2011. These are 
annual series.  Financial variables are obtained from the latter and the rest of the data from the 
former. The study used the “de jure” financial openness measure obtained from Chinn and Ito 




As recommended by Hansen (1999), the study used balanced panel. Data is available for only 
twelve countries in each bloc33. However, PSTR is sensitive to extreme observations. As 
Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ghana all experienced high 
inflationary periods, the study excluded these countries from the calculation in order to avoid 
extreme observations which can potentially distort the regression results. In addition, 
considering that the number of countries in each region are relatively few, inclusion of the 
outliers have leverage on the results significantly. Furthermore, the results will not be reflective 
of the sample. 
The data indicates that Ghana has experienced high inflation rates, ranging from double to three 
digits, throughout the sample period 1980–2011. Year 2011 is the exception with mean of 30.1 
and maximum of 122.9. These figures are conspicuously larger than the mean and maximum 
(8.9 and 80.8 respectively) for the eleven countries in ECOWAS as shown in Table 5.3.1. For 
the mean of DRC and Zimbabwe, the data indicates 1102.5 and 374.4 respectively. This greatly 
contrasts with the mean of the ten other countries (17.93) in SADC as in Table 5.3.1. The 
maximum is 183.3 (see Table 5.3.1) against the maximum of 23,773.1 for the twelve countries. 
These countries thus have significant influence, which is why they serve as outliers. As PSTR 
is sensitive to their inclusion, the study reports the results of the sample without these countries 
as the main results. However, Table D.0.4 in Appendix D provides results that indicate the 
effects of the outliers on the threshold values in each region. The descriptive statistics of the 
data used for the 11 countries in ECOWAS and the 10 countries in SADC is presented in Table 
5.3.1. 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.3.1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the study without Ghana, DRC 
and Zimbabwe. The mean inflation of ECOWAS is 8.9% and that of SADC is 17.9% for the 
period 1980–2011. The standard deviation suggests that the dispersion from the mean in 
ECOWAS is relatively smaller than that of SADC. The individual country averages are also 
shown below the Table indicating that on average DRC and Guinea Bissau has the highest 
inflation rate in SADC and ECOWAS respectively. Comparing Guinea Bissau to Ghana, the 
data indicates that the former only experienced few years of high inflation, whereas the latter 
                                                          
33 ECOWAS includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo 
 SADC: Botswana, Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, 




country experienced high inflation almost throughout 1980–2011. Thus, making Ghana having 
influence on the threshold effects of inflation on financial development of ECOWAS. The other 
conditioning variables indicate that on average SADC performs relatively better than 
ECOWAS. 
Table 5.3.1:  Showing descriptive statistics 
ECOWAS SADC 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
findex 352 99.96 31.2 25.7 237.6 320 100.03 23.97 39.8 212.2 
inflation 352 8.9 14.8 -14.9 80.8 320 17.93 20.9 -9.6 183.3 
gov 352 14.4 5.9 4.8 54.5 320 18.3 7.8 6.3 42.2 
rgdppc 352 618.7 409.5 230.09 2886.2 320 1710.5 1890.7 141.8 6592.7 
traop 352 65.8 21.4 27.8 131.5 320 87.1 45.06 13.9 209.9 
finop 352 -0.7 0.89 -1.9 2.4 320 -0.63 1.19 -1.9 2.43 
com 352 101.3 200.7 0.68 940.8 320 151.2 277.04 2.11 1501.8 
Note: Individual summary statistics of inflation; 
ECOWAS: Benin = 4.3, Burkina Faso = 4.0, Cape Verde = 5.2, Cote d’ Ivoire = 5.1, Gambia = 9.5, Ghana = 30.1(max=122.9), Guinea Bissau 
= 32.2 (max=80.8), Mali = 4.1, Niger = 3.4, Nigeria = 20.7, Senegal = 4.3, Togo = 4.9 
SADC: Botswana = 10.0, DRC =1102.5, Lesotho = 10.5, Madagascar = 15.1, Malawi = 19.6, Mauritius = 8.02, Mozambique = 28.7, South 
Africa = 9.7, Swaziland = 10.5, Tanzania = 19.0, Zambia = 48.1 and Zimbabwe = 374.4 
 
The panel unit roots test indicates that inflation, government expenditure and financial 
openness are stationary at levels whiles the rest of the variables are stationary with first 
difference in both regions as revealed by Table 5.3.2. However access to communication 
infrastructure is stationary at levels with IPS approach in SADC but LLC indicates it is only 












5.4 Analysis of Results 
To determine whether there is non-linearity between financial development and inflation in the 
eleven and ten countries in ECOWAS and SADC respectively, Table 5.4.1 reports the linearity 
test. It supports the rejection of the null hypothesis that the model is linear for all the three tests 
at 1% significance level in both regions, indicating that the relationship between finance and 
inflation is indeed nonlinear. 
Table 5.4.1: Test of linearity against non-linearity for ECOWAS and SADC 
 ECOWAS SADC 
Test Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Wald Test (LM)  19.529 (0.003) 30.445 (0.000) 
Fisher Test (LMF)  3.280 (0.004) 5.336 (0.000) 
Likelihood RT (LR)  20.110 (0.000) 32.046 (0.000) 
H0: Linear Model, H1: PSTR model with at least one Threshold Variable (r=1) 
In line with the procedure outlined by Gonzalez et al. (2005), we proceeded to test whether 
there is existence of remaining non-linearity after assuming two regimes model and the test 
Table 5.3.2: Panel unit root result for the two sub-regions 
   
 






                
IPS            LLC 
Variable Level First diff Level First diff Level First diff Level First diff 
rgdppc 2.6224 -13.3326*** 2.3465 -12.2083*** 1.9916 -9.2577*** -0.6281 -8.446 *** 
 (0.9956) (0.000) (0.9905) (0.000) (0.9768) (0.000) ( 0.265) (0.000) 
findex -0.0835 -14.4868*** -0.6872 -15.5133*** 0.5615 -14.41***   -0.8109 -15.01*** 
 ( 0.4667) (0.000) (0.2460) (0.000) (0.7128) (0.000) (0.2087) (0.000) 
traop -1.1321 -17.811 *** -2.1566** - -1.5139* -13.73*** -2.227** - 
 (0.1288) (0.000) (0.0155) - (0.0650) (0.000) (0.013)  
inflation -21.550*** - -8.417 *** - -18.603*** - -3.93*** - 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
gov -2.7883*** - -3.687*** - -3.4189*** - -3.39*** - 
 (0.0026)  (0.0001)  ( 0.0003)  (0.0003)  
finop -3.057***  -3.54***  -1.81*** - -2.07** - 
 ( 0.0011)  ( 0.0002)  (0.0352)  ( 0.019)  
com -1.5719* -10.9*** -0.4466 -10.98***  -1.93**  -0.8099 -8.44*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0000) (0.3276) (0.0000) (0.0268)  (0.2090) (0.0000) 





results are reported in Table 5.4.2. The null hypothesis which states that the PSTR is adequately 
modeled by only one threshold cannot be rejected in the two sub-regions, implying that we 
have one threshold or two regimes that separate low and high inflation regimes, as indicated 
by the probability values of the various tests.  
We, therefore, report the estimated model parameters of our main estimates of PSTR in Table 
5.4.3. The results suggest evidence of a single threshold of inflation in both regions. The 
endogenously estimated threshold values by PSTR reveals relatively lower figure for SADC. 
Particularly, the threshold level of inflation above which inflation significantly slows down the 
development in the financial sector is estimated at 17.9% for ECOWAS and 14.4% for SADC. 
The implications of this threshold results is that it indicates inflationary rate at which the 
transition function reaches an inflexion point beyond which inflation will be detrimental to 
financial development. Hence, the significance of the results is that below 17.9% and 14.9% 
of inflationary rate, inflation may or may not influence the financial sector ability to expand 
and also to allocate resources efficiently in ECOWAS and SADC respectively34. Therefore the 
results have considerable effects for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Therefore, as expected, the inflation-finance coefficient is not only negative in both regions 
beyond this threshold, but statistically significant at 1% level, which is in line with the existing 
theory as shown in Table 5.4.3. This suggests that increases inflation above these thresholds 
present significant detrimental effects for financial development in both regions. As indicated, 
only the estimated signs of the coefficients can be interpreted given one transition function. 
What this implies is that beyond this threshold when inflation increases, the link between 
                                                          
34 For the sample of twelve countries in each region, the PSTR results indicate threshold of 23.6% and 21.3% for 
ECOWAS and SADC respectively in Table D.0.4 in Appendix D reflecting the impact of higher inflationary 
regimes in DRC and Zimbabwe and Ghana.  
 
Table 5.4.2:  Testing the number of regimes: Tests of no remaining non-linearity 
  ECOWAS SADC 
Test Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Wald Test (LM) 10.791 (0.095) 7.635 (0.266) 
Fisher Test (LMF) 1.699 (0.121) 1.187 (0.313) 
Likelihood RT (LR) 10.966 (0.089) 7.731 (0.258) 




finance and inflation becomes more negative. This means that above these thresholds, inflation 
may exacerbate informational friction in the financial system and erode returns on assets.  This 
interferes with the expansion of the financial sectors of the two regions. The implication is that 
policies in the two regions should aim at rates below these thresholds since high inflation is 
economically costly for financial development.  
Furthermore, the inflation-finance coefficient at the lower regime or below the threshold is 
positive but statistically insignificant in ECOWAS, as indicated by the standard errors.  This 
means increases in inflation below the threshold does not interfere with financial sector 
activities in that region, which is also in line with theory. In contrast, the inflation-finance 
coefficient in SADC is not only positive, but also statistically significant at 1% level. The 
implication of this result is that increases in inflation below the threshold support financial 
development, meaning inflation-finance coefficient becomes more positive. This outcome may 
be in line with English (1999) arguments that increases in inflation rate encourages households 
to substitute purchased transaction services for money balances and thereby induce FSD. 
The difference in the results between the two regions may be explained by the role of South 
Africa which is the leading economy in the SADC region. Monetary policy of this country, 
which includes inflation targeting framework, affects countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Namibia and Botswana. Moreover, the financial sector of South Africa, especially, the banking 
industry has footprints all over the region which may implement financial policies of South 
Africa in their destination. However, in ECOWAS, Nigeria and Cote d’ Ivoire which are seen 
as the leading economies in the region are not playing such an important role as South Africa 
even though the banking sector of Nigeria is penetrating the region. 
The results have certainly considerable meaning for the conduct of monetary policy. The study, 
therefore, argues that price stability policies with inflation targeting framework should be the 
primary objective in monetary policy, since high inflation is economically costly to financial 
development of the two regions. 
As indicated earlier, literature in this area is limited. The results presented here is in line with 
earlier findings, such as that of Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) who found the threshold to lie 
between 13 % and 25% (this indicates that the estimated thresholds of this study for both 
regions fall in this range); Boyd et al. (2001) who found threshold of 15% of inflation for FSD 




above it);   Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) who found inflation between 4% and 19%; and 
Abbey (2013) who found a threshold ranging from 11% to 16 % on a single country study on 
Ghana. The thresholds of both regions fall in the threshold range of Rousseau and Yilmazkuday 
(2009). While SADC threshold falls at the range of Abbey (2013), the threshold of ECOWAS 
is slightly above it. Most of these studies, however, only estimated an indirect threshold effect 
of inflation on finance-growth relationship and not directly on financial development. Given 
the existing relationship between financial development and growth and that financial 
development is a potential channel in inducing growth, our result is consistent, since it falls 
within this range of results.   
Furthermore, the findings of this study are in line with the broader existing studies on the effects 
of inflation on FSD. Some of these studies include Aziakpono (2004) on South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Leshoto (SACU countries); McDonald and Schumacher 
(2007), Andrianaivo and Yartey (2009) and Kablan (2010) on SSA. All these studies indicate 
that increases in inflation reverse FSD. More importantly, Chapter 4 of this thesis also indicated 
a strong negative effects of inflation on FSD of ECOWAS and SADC with the effects more 
perverse in ECOWAS. Kim et al. (2010) further argue that there is a negative long run 
relationship between inflation and FSD, but a positive relationship in the short run. Their study 
was made up of 16 countries from both ECOWAS and SADC35. Similarly, Odhiambo's (2005) 
study indicated a negative inflation effects on FSD in Tanzania and Kenya and an insignificant 
effects on the financial sector of South Africa. In another study in 2012, Odhiambo (2012) 







                                                          
35 Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Cote d’ Ivoire, Gambia, Zambia, Madagascar, Mauritius 




The estimate of the slope 𝛾 for ECOWAS is such that the transition from lower regime inflation 
to higher regime is very rapid, as demonstrated by Figure 5.1 which shows the plot of the 
estimated transition function against inflation. The estimated slope is 443.9 which is relatively 
large as shown in Table 5.4.3. In contrast, the transition from lower regime to higher regime 
inflation is relatively smooth in SADC. The slope parameter for SADC is low (2.28), revealing 
that the change in the effect of inflation on finance is relatively smooth from a low inflation 
regime to a high inflation regime than ECOWAS as shown in the Figure. This means that the 
regression coefficients change gradually when transitioning from low regime to high regime 
inflation. The Figure for ECOWAS indicates that the majority of the observations lie in either 
of the one of the extreme regimes. In contrast, even though the majority of the observations lie 
in both regimes in SADC, some lie in-between these two extreme regimes as shown by Figure 
5.1. 
 
Table 5.4.3:  PSTR Result of finance-inflation rate 
    ECOWAS      SADC   
Variables 𝛽0   𝛽1 𝛽0   𝛽1 
inflation 0.073  -0.922*** 0.6709***  -0.7229*** 
 (0.2439)  (0.3018) (0.3282)  (0.3191) 
gov 0.829***  -1.371*** 0.1843  -1.7006*** 
 (0.2478)  (0.3942) (0.3431)  (0.3545) 
rgdppc 0.083***  0.042* 0.0086***  0.0141*** 
 (0.0100)  (0.0215) (0.0025)  (0.0022) 
traop -0.147  0.492*** 0.1321**  0.3424*** 
 (0.0978)  (0.1805) (0.0653)  (0.0609) 
finop 1.633  3.072 -2.0536  7.4981*** 
 (1.8618)  (5.8010) (1.7221)  (2.5476) 
com 0.050***  -2.537** 0.0386***  -0.4631*** 
  (0.0086)   (1.2368) (0.0069)   (0.1010) 
Threshold (𝛿)  17.9     14.5  
Slope (𝛾)  443.95    2.28  
       
*** /**/*show significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and values in parentheses are standard errors 
corrected for heteroscedascity 
Where rgdppc = real GDP per capita, gov = government expenditure (%GDP), traop = international 
trade openness, finop = capital flows or financial openness, com = access to mobile and telephones per 








Regarding the control variables, it is observe that most of the results are consistent with the 
theory as shown in Table 5.3.5. At low inflation regime, the coefficient associated with 
government expenditure (gov) is positive in both regions but only statistically significant in 
ECOWAS (that is, at1% statistically significant level). This suggests that increases in inflation 
results in increases in finance-government expenditure coefficient. This is intuitive because at 
lower inflation rate, increases in government consumption may serve as attractive avenue for 
the financial sector of the region to manage their liquidity. However, expectedly, beyond the 
threshold, increases in inflation in both regions will result in statistically significant negative 
coefficient of government expenditure. This implies that government expenditure affects 
financial development negatively at high inflation rate regime in both regions.  
The implication of negative coefficient at high inflation regime in both regions is that, it leads 
to reduction in financial development. This means that beyond the inflation threshold levels of 
these regions, there is a tendency that high level government expenditure may result in 













































development. Moreover, this may also indicate that increases in government spending at high 
inflation regime further fuels the high inflation, leading to erosion of real returns on assets.  
The coefficients of the level of economic development measured by real GDP per capita is 
positive at both low and high inflation regimes in the two regions at 1% significant level with 
the exception of ECOWAS, where it is statistically significant at 10% level at high inflation 
regime. Intuitively, low inflation rate could be an incentive for the demand of financial products 
since returns on asset may be attractive. Therefore, increases in the threshold variable in the 
low inflation regime may still cause increases in demand for financial services by the real sector 
thus leading to financial development. This is because the increases in inflation may not be 
enough to erode returns on assets completely. In the high inflation regime, the expectation is 
that, the coefficient should be negative to indicate that increases in inflation decreases real 
sector coefficient. However, the results indicate positive coefficient, thus revealing that 
increases in inflation results in increases in the coefficient of real GDP per capita. This means 
that, in both regions, there is demand for financial services as inflation increases at the high 
regime. Intuitively, this may mean that agents do not care much about the effects of inflation 
on returns to assets in the two regions. Furthermore, most Central Banks and Monetary Policy 
Committee of member states usually adjust interest rates in response to increases in inflation 
in order to maintain returns on asset and this could be another possible reason. However, this 
is a costly approach since high interest rates may lead to reduction in borrowing by the private 
sector.  
Furthermore, both coefficients of trade and financial openness are positive at 1% significance 
level at high inflation regime in SADC. However, only trade openness is statistically significant 
at 5% in low inflation in the same region. This implies that, in both low and high inflation 
regimes in SADC, more trade openness alone is related to FSD but this is only true at high 
inflation regime with more financial openness. Since these are structural policy variables, more 
trade and financial openness separately may lead to inflows of capital that will induce financial 
development. This may suggest that at high inflation rate above the threshold, Rajan and 
Zingales’s (2003) hypothesis that require simultaneous opening of both trade and financial 
sector may not be supported. Quite the contrary, this study shows that both trade and financial 
openness coefficient are statistically insignificant at low regime inflation and only the former 





Finally, access to communication infrastructure in both regions indicates statistically 
significant positive coefficient at low inflation regime at 1% and statistically significant 
negative coefficient at the high inflation regime at 1% significance level in SADC and 5% in 
ECOWAS. What this means is that low inflation regime is good for access to communication 
infrastructure to exert positive effect on financial development and the reverse is true at the 
high inflation regime. Intuitively, low inflation rate may make it less costly for access of 
information from the financial sector through communication infrastructure. However, at high 
inflation this may seem costly, resulting in negative coefficient of access communication on 
financial development. 
5.5 Robustness and Sensitivity analysis  
In addition to the base line regressors in equation 5.1, the study added gross domestic saving 
(% of GDP) as a robustness checks and the results are reported in Table D.0.7 in Appendix D. 
This variable is shown to cause financial development as in Odhiambo (2008). As indicated, 
our findings of nonlinearity are again supported by the linearity test which confirmed a single 
threshold in both regions as shown by Tables D.0.5 and D.0.6. The threshold values are similar 
to those obtained in the base line equation, indicating 17.87% and 14.40% for ECOWAS and 
SADC respectively. These findings are in contradiction to the argument of Omay and Oznur 
(2010) who contend that the threshold value are decreasing significantly as new explanatory 
variables are added, but in line with the study of Khan and Senhadji (2001). The results in both 
regions indicate that, statistically, there is significant negative coefficient of inflation above the 
threshold, revealing that high inflation is costly to financial development. The slope parameters 
again indicates relatively smooth transition from low regime to high regime for SADC (𝛾=2.3), 
but rapid transition in ECOWAS (𝛾=429.9), as indicated by the transition graphs of Figure D.1 
in the Appendix D. Furthermore, we replaced domestic saving with exchange rate which is 
another important conditioning variable. The results suggest no significant difference with the 
baseline equation36. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion 
Financial sector development is an important potential channel for economic growth. Hence, 
several efforts are being made in many developing regions such as SSA to raise growth in the 
                                                          
36 The details of the results are not reported here and will be provided upon request. The threshold and slope for 




sector with little or no success. One of the important policy variables that retard financial 
development is increases in inflation. Existing theories contend that the detrimental effect of 
inflation on financial development is only observed after certain inflationary level is reached 
and thus threshold effects exist between inflation and financial development. In this chapter, 
the thesis provided a comparative study between ECOWAS and SADC on the threshold effects 
of inflation on financial development for the period 1980–2011 using a novel Panel Smooth 
Transition Regression technique. In particular, the study examined the inflation level at which 
it is detrimental to financial development. Unlike previous studies that impose the threshold 
value exogenously, this approach has the advantage of endogenously determining the threshold 
value. 
The results suggested a robust single threshold of 17.9% and 14.5% of inflation for ECOWAS 
and SADC respectively. The significance of the results is that below 17.9% and 14.5% of 
inflationary rate, inflation may not interfere with the financial sector’s ability to expand and 
also to allocate resources efficiently in ECOWAS and SADC respectively. However, above 
these thresholds, inflation may exacerbate informational friction in the financial system and 
hence interfere with its expansion. The PSTR results supported this argument with statistically 
significant negative inflation-finance coefficient above the threshold in both regions, but with 
only statistically significant positive coefficient at the lower inflation regime in SADC. 
Therefore paying attention to these low and high inflation phenomena will result in significant 
gain to be achieved in the financial sector of both regions. 
On the control variables, the estimated coefficients are largely consistent with existing theory. 
It revealed that government spending is positive at lower inflation regime in both regions but 
only statistically significant in ECOWAS, indicating that increases in this policy variable raises 
FSD. However, it is significantly negative at higher inflation in both regions. This implies that 
more government spending reversed financial development when inflation is above the 
threshold. This is in line with a prior expectation as more government expenditure in high 
regime inflation will not only fuels the increases inflation but direct resources away from the 
financial system to the government. These process retard the development of the financial 
sector.   
The coefficient of the measure of economic development is both positive at low and high 
regimes inflation showing that demand for financial services increases in both regimes in the 




with only the former indicating statistically significant positive coefficient in ECOWAS. 
Finally,   access to communication infrastructure indicated statistically significant positive and 





















Financial sector development, banking stability and foreign banking 
inflows in ECOWAS and SADC: A panel approach 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The financial system of SSA is broadly bank based. The stock market sector is underdeveloped 
and even absent or at the infancy in many countries with only South Africa having well 
advanced market. Supporting the claim of the banking sector dominancy of the financial system 
of SSA, Quintyn and Taylor (2007) provided evidence that the sector has the highest percentage 
in terms of total financial sector assets in many countries of the region, standing at almost 90%. 
They argue that, the financial system is likely to remain bank-dominated for the foreseeable 
future. The study further revealed that countries such as Gambia, Madagascar and Mali have 
the banking sector representing 97% and 98% and 98.7% of the total financial sector assets 
respectively. Others include Malawi, 71%, Nigeria, 90%, Lesotho, 91.8%, Mozambique, 95%, 
and Mauritius, 95%, with exceptional cases in Botswana and South Africa whose banking 
sector contributes only 40% and 25% respectively (Quintyn & Taylor, 2007).  
However, as noted in Section 2.3.1, the region’s financial system which is broadly bank based 
is dominated by foreign banks. The region has the highest foreign bank presence among other 
developing regions. Considering some selected countries in both SADC and ECOWAS for the 
period 1995–2009, Figure 6.1 suggests that on average eight countries have foreign ownership 
around 64%. These countries include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote d’ Ivoire, Ghana, 
Swaziland, Togo, Niger and Zambia. However Nigeria has the least which is below 12%. The 
figure seems to reveal the dominancy of foreign ownership in the industry in these selected 
economies. Do these foreign banks contribute to greater financial stability since they constitute 



























Author’ own construct with data from Global Financial Data Base, 2014. 
Given the importance and crucial role foreign banks play in the domestic banking industry of 
the host country, and considering the relatively under developed and fragile nature of the 
region’s financial system which is bank based, the main objective and focus of this chapter is 
to examine the impact of foreign banking inflows on the banking sector stability . This 
objective is motivated by a series of financial crisis such as the Chilean crisis37 of the 1970s as 
well as the East Asian crisis of the 1997/8, both of which have their roots directly linked to the 
banking system. In addition, financial stability is closely related to the activities of foreign 
banks in the domestic economy through the volatility of credit supply, the probability of 
banking crises and the potential for contagion. Furthermore, whether developing economies 
should welcome foreign ownership of banks is an important question, particularly as the 
proportion of overall banking assets controlled by foreign banks soar in Africa, Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe in recent years (World Bank, 2001). Moreover, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(1998) noted that if foreign banks increase the probability that a country will experience severe 
banking crisis, then this would make policymakers cautious of easing entry restrictions. 
However, policymakers concern about foreign banks will reduce if foreign banks do not raise 
the possibility of banking crisis. 
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One important concern is that foreign banks are accused of lacking long term commitments to 
the host country and might leave the domestic banking system upon any signal of trouble 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2005). This stimulates capital flight which may lead to 
financial sector instability. In addition, possible potential risks may include over competition, 
exposure of a host country’s economy to widespread shocks, profit remittances and less credit 
allocation to certain market segments such as small and medium-sized firms. Peek and 
Rosengren (2000) as well as Chava and Purnanandam (2011) argue that shocks to parent banks 
can be transmitted to the foreign subsidiaries resulting in contagion with negative implication 
for lending. Further concerns are raised by studies, such as Beck and Martinez Peria (2008), 
Detragiache et al. (2008) and Murinde (2012), which posit that foreign banks tend to “cherry-
pick” lucrative businesses and multinational companies. This leaves more risky businesses that 
are prone to information asymmetry to local banks. This, according to Van Horen and 
Claessens (2012), can undermine and worsen overall access to the services of the financial 
system, since cherry picking worsen the remaining credit pool and interferes with the financial 
development, especially in low income countries where relationship lending is important. In 
addition regulatory complications may ensue if foreign banks comply with both foreign and 
domestic rules. 
Based on the arguments above, and given the significant proportion of foreign banks in the 
banking system of many countries in SSA, this situation could serve as a source of banking 
sector instability and, hence, the total financial sector instability of the region. 
Despite the above concerns about foreign banks in the domestic banking sector, an increase of 
such banks in the host country may have the advantage of causing improvement in efficiency 
in the local banking sector through diffusion of modern technology. It may also result in healthy 
competition and economic growth. According to Grubel (2014), foreign banks often introduce 
superior lending technologies and marketing know-how developed for domestic use at low 
marginal cost in emerging markets. In addition, De Haas (2014) contends that these banks are 
not only efficient themselves, but also generate positive spill-overs to domestic banks which 
may, for instance, copy the risk management methodologies of new foreign competitors, and 
this may lead to banking stability. Others such as De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) and 
Navaretti et al. (2010) show that global banks support their foreign subsidiaries during financial 




Furthermore, it will not only generally increase access to financial services and improve the 
financial and economic performance of borrowers, but also instil greater financial stability 
(Clarke et al. 2003; Classens, 2006; Cull & Martinez Peria 2010). According to Claessens et 
al. (2001), the presence of foreign banks leads to lower costs of financial intermediation and 
lower profitability. Others such as Levine (1996), Dobson (2005) and Mishkin (2006) argue 
that foreign banks are likely to pressure host governments to improve regulations and 
supervision, increase transparency and propel domestic reforms which can all lead to banking 
stability. The above argument, therefore, leaves the debate on the link between foreign banking 
inflows and banking stability open for more empirical investigations and verification. SSA 
countries have experienced a series of bank crisis before and during the financial sector reforms 
of the 1980s. The next section discusses briefly the banking crisis of the region. 
6.1.1 A brief account of banking crises in Africa 
Banking crises can either be systemic or non-systemic. A systemic banking crisis occurs when 
a relatively large proportion of the banking system are financially distressed. This is usually 
characterised by widespread insolvency of banks, resulting in closures, takeovers and mergers. 
According to Laeven and Valencia (2012), a banking crisis is systemic when the following 
requirements are met: (i) a significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as 
evidenced by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations); 
(ii) significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the 
banking system. Non-systemic banking crisis results from bad macroeconomic conditions 
usually external to the banking system.  
SSA has experienced a number of banking crises due to a series of external and internal shocks 
in the late 1980s. The external shocks emanated from worsened terms of trade as well as 
currency depreciation in the 1980s. The region’s high raw material export experienced an 
overall decline in terms of trade, and faced volatile exchange rates, culminating into loss and 
drop in export revenue. This situation was further fuelled by poor weather condition, especially 
in West Africa, which resulted in low output of agricultural products. This means loans 
contracted could not be repaid, which caused non-performing loans to accumulate, resulting 
into bank failure. 
In addition, most SSA countries argued that the operations of the financial system, especially 




independent SSA countries adopted financial sector controls aimed at directing credit to areas 
deemed relevant for overall national development. Accordingly, Brownbridge (1998) argues 
that the main aim was to create an environment where the new governments can exercise 
substantial control over the financial system and safeguard that credit allocations in line with 
the national agenda of the overall economic development of the government. To achieve this, 
state-own banks were created and some banks nationalised. However, this policy was marred 
by credit directives to not only inefficient government parastatals, but also to politically 
connected corporations at preferential rate usually below the market rates. Hence, poor credit 
appraisals and poor loan recovery strategy, which was frustrated by the authority, resulted in 
accumulation of non-performing loans. Brownbridge (1998) noted that in instances were 
politicians had shareholding in a bank, they exerted their political power on regulators and 
supervisors to prevent them sanctioning the banks for violations of the regulations. 
Consequently, this translated into bank failure in many post independent states. 
The post-independent financial sector interventions, which led to unprecedented bank failures, 
resulted in many countries accepting financial sector reforms of the SAP of the IMF and the 
World Bank as a solution to the banking instability. However, the replacement of the 
protectionist economic policies with financial sector liberalisation came with cost – the return 
of banking instability. These crises were largely systemic in nature. Table E.0.2 in the 
Appendix indicates a summary of banking crises using information provided by Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) from 1980 to 2011. It is clear that the period under discussion was 
characterised with unprecedented banking crises, with DRC experiencing the highest crises. 
An additional reason for this could possibly be the political instability DRC experienced. 
Countries such as Nigeria and Cameroun are among troubled banking countries. However, 
countries like Uganda and Madagascar experienced single crisis. The former benefited from 
financial reforms as the reforms allowed weaker banks to exit the financial market leading to 
stability in the sector. More so, the financial reforms improved banking supervision and the 
sale of public-owned banks that were malfunctioning and operating at losses.  
The cost of banking crises is immeasurable. These include cost of recapitalisation of these 
troubled banks by the government in order for them to reimburse depositors. Also, it results in 
output loss to the economy. As mentioned, in this study, we seek to test whether the 
unprecedented increases in foreign ownership of domestic bank, which resulted from the 




Even though there is relatively vast literature relating to banking stability, most studies focus 
on developed economies and the role of financial liberalisation on bank stability. Such studies 
include Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Hellmann et al. (2000), Bordo et al (2001), Caprio and 
Honohan (2009) and Angkinand et al. (2010). A few studies have attempted to examine the 
impact of the growing foreign banking inflows on the host country’s banking sector and hence, 
the financial sector stability. These studies include Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998), Hull, (2002), 
Herrero and Simón (2006). These studies are usually on advanced economies or a mixture of 
advanced and developing economies. Hence, empirical evidence specifically on SSA is limited. 
This study contributes to current literature by extending previous studies to include the 
influence of the growing presence of foreign banking in SSA. Specifically, it analyses its causal 
impact on the banking stability of ECOWAS and SADC38. The study applies two different 
econometric approaches and two different measures of bank fragility which makes it different 
to the earlier studies. These two measures are adopted to ascertain the robustness of the 
relationship between foreign banks and other control variables. 
Since the banking sector in the region accounts for almost 90% of financial sector assets, the 
stability is imperative and a major concern for the overall financial development. From this 
perspective, this chapter could be seen as analysing financial sector development and stability 
given the presence of foreign banking in the region. Hence, this study uses the two term 
interchangeably.   
By employing two econometric approaches, namely the multivariate logit and the two-step 
system generalised method of moment (SGMM) and using bank crisis measure constructed by 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) and bank z-score (Bankscope), the results of the two methods 
indicate evidence that the presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking sector robustly 
reduces the probability of bank crisis. The results lend no support to the widely held view that 
foreign banks’ penetration into domestic banking sector induces the likelihood of banking 
system instability. The logit approach indicates that financial openness and increases in credit 
are responsible for bank crisis. This is opposite when bank z-score is considered. Finally, the 
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approaches revealed that improvement in political institutions reduces the probability bank 
crisis.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the literature review, while 
section 6.3 outlines the method and model specification. In section 6.4, the data is presented. 
Section 6.5 discusses the results and section 6.6 gives the conclusion and policy 
recommendation. 
6.2 Literature Review 
This section gives an overview of both banking crises theories and empirical studies. The 
review is not exhaustive. Rather, it highlights the relevant works significant to this study  
6.2.1 Diamond and Dybvig model of bank runs /Panic model 
There are a number of models that explain reasons for banking crisis. One of the basic models 
is the panic based models or bank runs. The focus is on liquidity shocks and the fractional 
nature of the banking operations. According to Kindleberger (1978), these models are unrelated 
to changes in the economy and it construes banking crises as random actions that ensue 
spontaneously as a result of mob mind-set or panic among depositors. The model explains that 
bank run is a rational response to depositors’ beliefs that bank run will occur resulting in banks 
facing wide-scale withdrawals due co-ordination failure amongst the depositors or shift in 
expectations. Depositors panic and withdraw their deposits for fear that other depositors will 
withdraw their deposits. Conversely, banking system operate under fractional reserve 
arrangements in which a fraction of deposits collected are put in long term investments. This 
results in bank balance sheet making up maturity mismatch of liabilities, which are short-term, 
and assets, which are long-term, and thus illiquid. Considering the nature of the bank balance 
sheet, unanticipated rise in liquidity demands from depositors may compel banks to liquidate 
their assets at a loss resulting in banking crisis.  This crisis becomes self-fulfilling prophecies 
in this equilibrium. Equally, another equilibrium exists if no one expects a crisis, no crisis 
occurs and this is also self-fulfilling. In this equilibrium, agents withdraw their funds according 
to their consumption needs. In this case, their demand can be met without costly liquidation of 
assets. 
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model offers an explanation of how banks subject to bank 




the existence of banks and the bank vulnerability to runs and these runs are costly. They reduce 
social welfare through the interruption of production and destruction of optimal risk sharing 
among depositors. In addition, bank runs have real economic consequences because even 
"strong" banks can fail, causing the recall of loans and the termination of productive 
investment. 
The model analyses bank contracts and its optimality which can prevent bank runs. Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) argue that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those 
of the exchange market by providing better risk sharing among people who need to consume 
at different random times. It contends that there is a feasible contract that permits banks to 
prevent both runs and to provide risk sharing by converting illiquid assets. The model posits 
that deposit contract enables the bank to insure depositors against uncertainty pertaining to 
their demand for liquidity. 
6.2.2 Banking Crises and Foreign banks 
 
The mechanisms through which foreign banks may affect the stability of the host country 
banking system can be identified. Most theoretical mechanisms explain that subsidiaries of 
foreign bank are not completely independent institutions from the parent bank or a larger bank 
holding company. This implies, this parent bank will act like the lender of resort during period 
of financial turmoil. According to Stein (1997) such parent bank do have and manages an 
internal capital market and centralised treasury operations to allocate capital and liquidity over 
its subsidiaries. This implies foreign banks are insulated against the adverse effects of a host 
country bank capital or liquidity shocks and will keep up their credit supply during domestic 
crises.  
However, foreign banks can induce crises if they are more procyclical to changes in the host 
country macroeconomic environment. When the economic activities of the host country 
declines, the activities of the foreign bank in this country may be scaled down in favour of 
other regions whose economies are upturn. Alternatively, foreign bank could also react to 
changes in the parent banks home country. Worsening economic conditions in the home 
country can force a capital-constrained, compelling the foreign bank to reduce their credit at 





On the other hand, it can be argued that when economic conditions in the home country worsen, 
parent banks will increase their efforts to expand their activities abroad, since investment 
opportunities in the home market are scarce. This is substitution effects. When home country 
conditions improve, the opportunity costs of limiting home country lending increase and banks 
may therefore allocate less capital to their foreign subsidiaries (Molyneux & Seth, 1998; 
Moshirian, 2001). This scenario indicates that there is a negative relationship between the home 
country business cycle and the foreign subsidiary’s credit supply. 
6.2.3 Business cycle models 
These models consider banking crises as an inherent component of natural outgrowth of 
business cycles (Babus et al., 2009). Unlike the panic models, business cycle theory interpret 
banking crises as not a random event, but a response of depositors to the arrival of sufficiently 
negative information to unfold the economic conditions. This model posit that an economic 
downturn will cause reduction in the value of assets which will result in the high likelihood 
that banks will be unable to meet their commitments to depositors. Depositors, upon receiving 
information about impending economic downturn in the cycle, will respond by anticipating 
financial difficulties in the banking system, which will lead to withdrawals of funds from the 
banks and culminate into crisis (Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988). 
Furthermore, one strand of the business cycle model as explained by Chari and Jagannathan 
(1988) emphasis the signal extraction problem, where some portion of the population receives 
information on the future asset payoffs. This model explains the role asymmetry of information 
plays in triggering banking crisis. In this view, a panic is a form of monitoring. Chari and 
Jagannathan (1988) argue that some depositors withdraw money for consumption purposes, 
while others withdraw money because they know that the bank is about to fail. In this model, 
the proportion of early consumers is uncertain. Therefore, there is aggregate liquidity risk in 
the economy. Like Diamond and Dybvig (1983), deposit contract is such that, agents with 
investment in period 0 receive a return of one in period 1, and an equal share of bank profit in 
period 2. Early consumers withdraw in period 1, but late consumers can either withdraw some 
or all their deposit in period 1. However, uninformed agents rely on the number of observed 
early withdrawals and attempt to infer whether withdrawals occur as a result of bad signals 
observed, or as a result of high liquidity demands. In this environment, they may fail to 
recognise whether  long lines to withdraw at banks is because of consumption needs or because 




which triggers a bank runs. Hence, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) contend that crises occur not 
only when the economic outlook is poor or gives a bad signal but also when liquidity needs are 
high despite no one receiving information on future returns.  
Another strand of information-based model is by Morris and Shin (2001). This model 
introduced some information uncertainty in the Diamond and Dybvig framework by assuming 
a common knowledge pertaining to economic fundamentals which contributes to co-ordination 
failure and multiple equilibria. In this model, agents are assumed to have some idiosyncratic 
uncertainty about economic fundamentals. The result is a unique equilibrium, where bank runs 
occur with a positive probability. 
Furthermore, Kindleberger’s (1978) model contends that bank runs are endogenous to business 
cycle, which occurs at the peak of the expansionary stage of the cycle. The model argues that 
in an economic upturn, the banking sector anticipate a stronger economic growth in the future 
and, therefore, serves as an incentive for credit expansion to the real sector. This leads to the 
banking sector becoming highly leveraged. However, following a sudden downturn in the 
economy, the real sector may fail to repay loans. This can result in accumulations of non-
performing loans as depositors demand their funds. Hence, banks liquidate their assets at a 
losses which leads to systemic bank crises from the exposure to economic shocks. 
Empirical evidence on the effects of foreign banks on domestic banking sector stability and 
financial stability is mixed and limited. In a study by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) on a bank-
level data for a broad cross section of countries using multivariate logit approach, the study 
found that not only does the presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking sector of a 
country lower the probability of banking crisis, but it also induces economic growth and lowers 
overhead costs and profits of domestic banks. In line with the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(1998), Levine (1999) also indicate that foreign banking reduces the probability of banking 
crisis.  
Furthermore, Levine (2001) argues that more foreign bank presence in the domestic financial 
system is negatively associated with bank profits and bank overhead costs. The study use 
weighted least-squares pooling on bank level data across 80 countries for the 1988-95 period. 
Levine (2001) concluded that foreign banks tend to induce competition and render domestic 
banking markets more efficient. Increased foreign entry forces domestic banks to eliminate 




However, relatively recent work of Beck et al. (2003) on bank concentration and crises using 
data from 70 countries for the period 1980 to 1997 indicates that countries with more 
concentration as well as less regulatory restrictions and institutions that encourage competition 
are less likely to experience crises. Foreign ownership of banks, even though reveals that it 
reduces the likelihood of crises, it was not significant. Hence, no evidence of direct relationship 
between foreign banking activities and the probability of banking crisis.  
In another study, Detragiache and Gupta (2004) compare the performance of domestic banks 
and a long-established group of foreign banks during the Malaysian crisis. Their study provides 
evidence that foreign banks outside Asia perform better during the crisis than domestic ones. 
Contrary to the widely held view that foreign banks have less commitment and will leave the 
domestic financial sector upon least danger, these banks did not abandon the domestic market 
during the crisis, despite receiving less support from the government  compared to their 
domestic counterparts. The study relies on OLS and heteroscedascity-consistent standard errors 
are used to compute t-statistics. 
Arena et al. (2007) on lending channel in emerging economies contend that the presence of 
foreign banks contribute somewhat to overall bank lending stability in a dataset covering 20 
emerging markets. They suggest that this could reduce the probability of bank crisis. The study 
argues that this is possible if the population of foreign banks in a country is sufficiently diverse 
in terms of home countries. This diversity may make aggregate lending more stable. 
De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006, 2010) find that foreign banks in Eastern Europe have less of 
a need to rein their credit supply during a financial crisis. Moreover, the stabilising impact on 
credit growth depends on the relative strength and soundness of the respective parent banks 
(De Haas & van Lelyveld, 2006; 2010). The former result echoes an earlier argument by Dages 
et al. (2000) who explored foreign and domestic bank participation in emerging markets of 
Mexico and Argentina, using bank-specific data on lending by domestic and foreign-owned 
banks. Dages et al. (2000) reveal that foreign banks generally do not only have higher credit 
growth rates than domestic banks, but this credit growth is less volatile, and, in both countries, 
foreign banks show notable credit growth during crisis periods.  By contrast, the stabilising 
impact has been more subdued and diverse in Latin America and Asia (Arena et al., 2007).  
Vogel and Winkler (2010) examine whether increases in market share of foreign banks in many 




countries in the global financial crisis. The study suggests that the stabilising impact of foreign 
banks was limited to the cross-border component of financial globalisation and to two regions, 
Eastern Europe and SSA. Only in the latter region was this translated into more stable credit 
growth. Thus, hopes that a stronger presence of foreign banks might help host countries in 
isolating domestic credit from international shocks did not materialise in the current crisis. 
Other studies such as Barth et al. (2004) on how bank regulation and supervision affects 
banking crises, developed a comprehensive survey database on measures of regulation and 
supervision. They noted that regulatory and supervisory practices that force accurate 
information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for 
private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank performance and stability. 
The study further observes that poorly designed explicit deposit insurance leads to greater 
probability of banking crises, even after controlling for regulation and supervision. Barth et al. 
(2004) further indicate that although there was no evidence of a strong association between 
restrictions on bank entry and bank efficiency in the 107 countries of the study, the results 
found that barriers to foreign-bank entry and foreign ownership are positively associated with 
bank fragility. 
In terms of bank crises and financial liberalisation, large proportion of empirical studies lend 
support to the assertion that liberalisation increases the likelihood of bank crises. These studies 
include: Hellmann et al. (2000), Noy (2004, 2005), and Angkinand et al. (2010). The result is 
the same in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) who argue that banking crises are more 
likely to occur in countries that have liberalised financial systems, even when controlling for 
other country characteristics. However, the study contends that the effect is lessened by a strong 
institutional environment, especially respect for the rule of law, low corruption and good 
contract enforcement. Other empirical studies with similar findings are Mehrez and Kaufmann 
(2000), Glick and Hutchison (2000), Eichengreen and Arteta (2002), and Noy (2004).  
Nevertheless, other studies have found contrary results, which suggest financial liberalisation 
may reduce the chances of crises. These studies include the work of Shehzad and De Haan 
(2009) who argue that conditional on an effective banking supervision, financial liberalisation 
tends to reduce the chances of banking crises. Furthermore, some studies suggest no evidence 
of any relationship between liberalisation and bank crises. These studies include Bordo et al. 




Finally, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) on the determinants of banking crises using 
data for the period 1980-1994 for both developed and developing economies, argue that crises 
occur in countries with weak macroeconomic environment. In particular, economies with high 
inflation, high interest rate and balance payment problem are vulnerable to systemic crises. In 
addition, countries with weak law implementation as well deposit insurance were at risk of 
bank failure. 
From the empirical literature discussed above, it is evident that, there is no study exclusively 
done on SSA where foreign banks are fundamental part of the banking system, rather they 
involve a mixture of countries from SSA and other developing and advanced countries. This 
chapter offers an exclusive study on SSA to determine if the unprecedented level of foreign 
banks in the region provides threat to banking stability. 
6.3. Method and Model specification 
The study tests the hypothesis that foreign banking inflows in the domestic banking sector 
increase the probability of the occurrence of banking crises in the host country. We modelled 
banking crises as linear function of foreign banking inflows and other conditioning variables 
following the works of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) and Claessens et al. (2001). Thus, the 
chapter estimate the following model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡                         (6.1)  
Where i is individual country at time t and i=1 ………N; t=1……….. T.   𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
The variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 refers to banking stability or crisis. In this study, two measures are used to 
indicate banking stability or crisis. The first measure is a binary variable (bankcrisis) showing 
1 for banking crisis in a particular year of a country and 0 for no crisis. The other measure is 
bank z-score (z-score). The bank z-score measure is used to ascertain the robustness of the 
results. It measures the soundness of the banking sector. The z-score is a risk measure and is 
commonly used in the empirical banking literature to reflect a bank’s probability of insolvency. 
Hence, this is a distance-to-insolvency indicator. Z-score plays an important role in the 
assessment of both individual bank risk as well as overall financial stability (Lepetit & Strobel 
2013). 
Banking crises variables, bankcrisis can either be systemic and non-system. In this study, due 




interest, that is foreign banks39, we consider the analysis of systemic crisis as is in Beck et al. 
(2006). This is because crisis incidences experienced in SSA were largely systemic in nature 
due to credit directives and controls especially to areas described as priority areas that induce 
economic growth.  
The data reveals eighteen bank crises, as shown in Table E.0.2 in the Appendix. The countries 
that were hit are Nigeria, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  In addition, we follow Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (1998) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) in including the non-crisis 
countries as controls, and allowing for the errors to be correlated within each country by 
clustering the errors. 
The  𝑥𝑖𝑡 variable is a k-dimensional vector of regressors which are capable of explaining bank 
stability and include our main variable of interest: foreign banking inflows or foreign banks 
(𝑓𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡) at time t and for country i. The others are: financial finopenness (finop), inflation, credit, 
real GDP per capita (rgdppc), real GDP growth (rgdppcgr), exchange rate (exrate), governance 
indicator (pol), deposit insurance (depinss). Countries which introduced deposit insurance are 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. M2 to reserves (M2/res) measures bank fragility. Therefore, 
the probability that a crisis will occur at a particular time in the banking sector in a country is 
modelled by equation 6.1. 𝛽𝑖 is slope coefficients. All variables are in levels. 
Foreign bank (𝑓𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡), which is any bank in the domestic banking sector whose ownership is 
over 50%, is expected to reduce the likelihood of banking crises. Foreign banks do this through 
the improvement in banking services. They also bring in new and better skills, management 
techniques and technology to the domestic banking system. On the contrary, foreign banks are 
accused of lacking long term assurance and their presence could generate banking crises. 
Real GDP per capita (rgdppc) controls for economic development. The implication is that 
increases in real GDP per capita means increase in economic development which is expected 
to reduce the tendency of banking crises in the region. It also implies the opinion that poor 
countries naturally have incompetent legal system, weak enforcement of contracts and 
ineffective prudential regulations is controlled for. The study included real GDP growth 
(rgdppcgr) to control for cyclical output effects.  
                                                          




Furthermore, to test whether banking crisis occurs as a result of sudden capital outflows or 
vulnerability to run on currency, we include the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves 
(m2/res). We expect a positive relationship between this banking variable and banking crisis.  
Credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP (credit) is expected to correlate positively with 
banking crisis. Intuitively, this suggests that countries with high banking sector exposure to 
credit to private sector borrowing will be more vulnerable to banking crisis, especially during 
an economic downturn when this will result in loan default. Moreover in recession,  
The most crucial challenge in testing any hypothesis in a developing region is the issue of 
availability of consistent data. Financial data in developing economies are usually sparse. This 
presents a special difficulty in getting this information. In light of this, some measures are not 
included in this study. Domestic financial liberalisation data are inconsistent and absent in most 
of countries in this study. Even though this presents a short coming to the essay, the study 
mitigate this problem by using the measure of financial openness. According to Baltagi et al. 
(2009), domestic financial liberalization contribute to financial openness and that removing 
entry barriers and regulations may induce more competition. Moreover, financial openness 
measures the level of financial integration. Some of the financial liberalisation indices used in 
studies such as the Adiad and Mody measure, which comprises six aspects of liberalisation 
measures includes international transaction, which is an indicator of openness. Furthermore, 
studies such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) that used financial liberalisation to 
determine banking crises have been accused of not distinguishing domestic from international 
financial liberalisation which critiques blame for crises (Eichengreen and Areta, 2002). Finally, 
the focus of this essay is to test the effects of foreign banking on domestic banking crises and 
not specifically on financial liberalisation. 
Financial openness (finop) is expected to reduce the risk of on banking crises. Financial 
openness creates the opportunity for banks to access funds abroad and strengthen their liquidity 
position. This may lead to the reduction in the likelihood of bank failure and financial 
instability. However, if there is unexpected depreciation of the domestic currency, it will lead 
to increase the likelihood of bank crises. This was the experience that led to the Chilean crises 
in 1981 and the Mexican crises of 1995. It may also expose the banking sector to possibly 
capital flight which may see the sector being vulnerable to crisis. Hence, an ambiguous effect 




Political institution (pol) is supposed reduce the likelihood of banking crisis Institutional 
development, which we proxy with political development will lead to improvement in the legal 
system and thus the protection of the banking system. 
Following the Diamond and Dybvig model, this study included explicit deposit insurance 
(depinss) as a regressor. The aprior expectation of this variable is ambiguous. Deposit 
insurance reduces banking crisis after liberalisation by eliminating possibility of self-fulfilling 
panic analysed in the model. However, increase deposit insurance can lead to moral hazards 
and bank risk taking. 
Finally, to capture loss of monetary control, the study included inflation. Increases inflation 
(inflation) is expected to increase the likelihood of banking crises. Inflation fuels information 
asymmetry in the financial market which causes high risk credit seekers, who are likely to 
default, to remain in the market. Exchange rate (extrate) is also included to measure the impact 
of currency movement on bank fragility. 
To measure the effects of the presence of foreign banks and other control variables on the 
domestic banking sector stability, the study used two econometric approaches: the Multivariate 
Logit and the dynamic System generalised method of moments (SGMM) which are discussed 
in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 respectively. 
6.3.1 The Multivariate Logit Method 
Banking crisis measure is proxied by using binary variable (1= crisis and 0 = no crisis). 
According to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Honohan and Laeven (2005), 
banking crisis occurs when at least one of the following occurs (i) when non-performing assets 
to total assets in the banking system exceeds 10% (ii) banking sector problems result in a large-
scale nationalisation of banks (iii) the cost of rescue operation is at least 2% of GDP and finally 
(iv) extensive bank runs take place.  
The banking crisis indicator which is the dependent variable in this study is based on the studies 
of Laeven and Valencia (2012). The study applied multivariate logit approach to estimate 
equation 6.1 since the variable is binary outcome following Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998). In 
this approach, the probability that a crisis occurs is assumed to be a function of vector of the 
explanatory variables and estimates of the crisis probability is obtained by maximising the 




(1997) and Shehzad and De Haan (2009) in the following ways. (i) It focuses exclusively on 
SSA. (ii) It includes recent information on foreign banking inflows as explanatory variable (iii) 
Different measures are used to proxy banking crisis.   
More formally, in each period, a country experiencing a crisis (=1) or no crisis (=0). Suppose 
the outcome,  𝑦𝑖𝑡, takes the following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
1    with probability  p(i, t) 
      0     with probability 1 − p(i, t) 
              (6.2) 
 
Equation 6.1 is estimated by parameterising p to depend on an index function 𝛽′𝑥. The 
conditional probability in the binary outcome model is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡)  = (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥) =  𝐹 (𝛽
′𝑥(𝑖, 𝑡))                   (6.3) 
 
If  𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡) denotes banking crisis dummy variable,  𝛽 vector of n unknown coefficients to be 
estimated and 𝐹 (𝛽′𝑥(𝑖, 𝑡)) indicates the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated 
at 𝛽′𝑥(𝑖, 𝑡), then the log likelihood function of the model from equation 6.1 is: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑𝑡=1…𝑇 ∑ {𝑖=1…𝑛 𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡) ln[𝐹 (𝛽
′𝑥(𝑖, 𝑡))] + (1 − 𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡))ln [1 − 𝐹 (𝛽′𝑥(𝑖, 𝑡))]}                                                                                        
               (6.4) 






                                (6.5) 
Therefore, the estimated coefficients reflect the effect of a change in the explanatory variables 
on ln 𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡)/(1 − 𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡)). It is important to note that an increase in the probability depends 
upon the original probability and initial values of all independent variables and their 
coefficients.  According to Beck et al. (2006), the estimated coefficients for each explanatory 
variables indicate whether an increases of that explanatory variable increases or reduces the 
probability of crisis. These estimated coefficients do not reveal the magnitude of the impact of 




we present marginal effects estimates which show the magnitudes of the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and banking crisis evaluated at sample mean.  
However, Detragiache (2005) argues that there could be feedback effects from the banking 
crisis to some of the explanatory variables and, therefore, suggests the exclusion from the 
sample years where the crisis were unfolding. Furthermore, Angkinand et al. (2010) propose 
using lagged explanatory variables and dropping years following the onset of the crisis. To deal 
with this simultaneity bias, this study implements the same approach by using one period lag 
of the explanatory variables40. 
In this model, South Africa was dropped for the following reasons. Firstly, the country has 
small percentage of foreign banking presence (see Figure 6.1). Secondly, South Africa (and 
Nigeria) is an important source of pan-African networks. South African banks are dotted across 
the region and more especially in SADC. Thirdly, the financial sector of the country is not bank 
dominated. Unlike other countries such as Malawi, Nigeria and Lesotho where banking sector 
represents, 71%, 90%, 91.8% respectively of the total financial sector assets, it is only 25% in 
South Africa (Quintyn & Taylor (2007). However, the study includes Nigeria because the 
financial system is dominated by the banking system and, moreover, the period under 
investigation witnessed banking crisis in the country. 
6.3.2 The System GMM 
The alternative measure of banking crisis variable is bank z-score. This is not a binary variable. 
Relating these indicators to foreign banking inflows and other control variables may face the 
following problems. Firstly, potential endogeneity bias that may arise from the control 
variables. For example, a more stable banking sector could result in not only economic 
development but price stability, increases in foreign banking inflows and stability in exchange 
rate. The reverse is true if there is banking crisis. Secondly, equally important problem is an 
unobserved heterogeneity which is likely to occur due to omitted variables. This problem 
results in correlation between some of the control variables and the error term. In addition, the 
dataset used in the study has a short dimension and a relatively large country dimension i.e.    
(N > T). 
                                                          
40 According to Green (2008), variables that are predetermined in a model can be treated at least asymptotically 





To address the above potential problems, the study uses dynamic system generalised method 
of moment (SGMM) developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) to relate the banking crisis 
variable to foreign banking inflows and other control variables as indicated by equation 6.1. 
More formally, the study relates in SGMM model an indicator of banking crisis measure to its 
one-period lagged value, foreign banking presence and other control variables. The main 
advantage of this econometric approach is that, it accounts for simultaneity bias, inverse 
causality and omitted variables by using the lagged dependent variable as instruments. The 
approach combines the first difference and level equations, which yield better estimates than 
the original GMM developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) that results in inefficient results 
due to the use of lagged levels as instruments for first difference equation. Lagged levels are 
poor instruments for first difference equation. More specifically, the Arellano-Bond approach 
considers the autoregressive model with additional regressors from equation 6.1 in the 
specification as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑦𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛽0𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                    (6.6)  
 
Where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is error component term given by equation 6.7 below: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                              (6.7) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 measures bank z-score for country i at time t and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 which is the error component 
term includes unobserved panel effect 𝑣𝑖 and the error term 𝑖𝑡 with 𝐸( 𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑣𝑖) =
𝐸(𝑣𝑖 𝑖𝑡) = 0  for all i and t. One period lagged of the dependent variable is represented by 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 denote the same meanings as in equation 6.1.  
To remove the panel specific heterogeneity effect, the GMM uses first differences to transform 
equation 6.6 to equation 6.8 below leading to its name difference GMM: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛽0∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∆𝑓𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡             (6.8) 
 
By transforming the regressors through first differencing, the fixed country-specific effect is 
removed, since it does not vary with time as in equation 6.9. The lagged dependent variable, 
however, is still potentially endogenous. This is because 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 term in ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1= 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 is 






𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖) + ( 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡−1              
∆𝑢𝑖𝑡 = ∆ 𝑖𝑡                   (6.9) 
Hence the Arellano-Bond estimator is based upon the following orthogonality conditions: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠∆ 𝑖𝑡) = (𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑠∆ 𝑖𝑡) = 0      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 3, … 𝑇    𝑎𝑛𝑑  2 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑇 − 1           (6.10) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠 is suitable lags of the dependent variable which are used as instruments for the 
residuals of the differenced equation (equation 6.8). However, Blundell and Bond (1998) point 
out that lagged levels are poor instruments for first difference equation as it often results in bias 
estimates and hence inefficient results of the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond. To 
mitigate this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed the 
SGMM. The SGMM estimator uses the level equation in 6.6 to obtain a system of two 
equations: one differenced and the other in levels which leads to additional instruments. By 
applying the SGMM estimator, this problem is overcome by using the lagged levels as 
instruments for first difference equations and the lagged first differences as instruments for 
level equations. This usually leads to efficiency. 
Furthermore, Blundell and Bond (1998) have also developed a two-step GMM estimator to 
address the problem of heteroscedascity. To obtain this two-step GMM, firstly, they proposed 
getting residuals from the (one-step) first-step estimation. Secondly, they recommend using 
them in order to perform a robust estimation of the variance-covariance matrix. By Monte Carlo 
simulations, they show that this two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the 
one-step method. This study, therefore, uses the two-step SGMM.  
According to   Roodman (2009), Arellano and Bover and Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator 
arguments the Arellano and Bond (1991) by including additional assumption that first 
differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects and this allows the 
introduction of more instruments that dramatically improve efficiency. Therefore, in addition 
to the moment condition specified in equation 6.10, SGMM uses the following moment 
conditions: 
𝐸(∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1(𝑢𝑖𝑡)) = 0    𝐸(∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−1(𝑢𝑖𝑡)) = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 3, … 𝑇                (6.11) 
Equation 6.11 implies that lagged first-differences of the dependent variable are used to 




moment conditions arise from lags explanatory variables in levels. However, the number of 
instruments tends to increase exponentially with the number of periods.  
GMM consistency depends on the validity of the instruments used, as well as the error term of 
autoregressive one, AR (1) and AR (2). The study thus uses two tests proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). The first test is Sargan /Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions which 
is applied to obtain the validity of the instrument. The null hypothesis is that instruments as 
group are exogenous. Therefore the higher the p-values of the Sargan statistics, the better. The 
second test is to determine whether there exists first and second order serial correlations. The 
Arellano-Bond test is used. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation.  The test in 
AR (1) process is expected in first difference to reject the null hypothesis since: ∆ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 −
𝑖𝑡−1  and  ∆ 𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑖𝑡−2 both have  𝑖𝑡−1. On the contrary, the test for AR (2) is 
expected to accept the null hypothesis. 
Finally, Bond (2002) observes that asymptotic standard errors of the two-step system GMM 
estimators tend to be too small, while t-ratios are too big compared to equivalent tests for 
similar sample sizes based on one-step estimators. To eliminate this potential bias, Windmeijer 
(2005) recommends a finite sample correction for the variance-covariance matrix when using 
the two-step GMM estimator. Following this, the study uses finite-sample correction for the 
two-step SGMM estimator asymptotic variance provided by Windmeijer (2005). 
6.3.3 Data  
The data for the study is annual and covers the period 1995-2009 for 22 countries of both 
ECOWAS and SADC. Bankcrisis and z-score41 are from Laeven and Valencia (2012) and 
Bankscope which is compiled by Global Financial Development Database.  Macroeconomic 
data on real GDP per capita, credit to the private sector (%GDP), ratio of M2 to reserve, 
inflation, and exchange rate are obtained form WDI for the same period. Pol (Polity2) which 
measures the level of democracy and autocracy is obtained from Polity IV and financial 
liberalisation index is obtained Chinn and Ito. Finally, deposit insurance is obtained Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2014). Detail description of the data used is shown in Table E.0.1 in the appendix 
E. 
                                                          
41 It is estimated as (ROA+ (equity/assets))/sd (ROA); sd (ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. ROA, 
equity, and assets are country-level aggregate figures calculated from underlying bank-by-bank unconsolidated 




6.4. Analysis of results 
This section discusses the results of both the multivariate logit approach and the two-step 
system GMM estimates of bankcrisis and z-score in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 respectively. The 
descriptive statistics of the variables used are shown below in Table 6.4.1. 
 
Table 6.4.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables obs mean std dev Min Max 
Bankcrisis 374 0.05 0.21 0 1 
z-score 299 13.7 9.0 -4.5 41.5 
fbi 330 57.3 24.2 3 100 
inflation 366 62.8 342.3 -9.6 4145.11 
rdgppc 374 1386.4 1663.95 188.2 6592.8 
pol 374 3.1 5.8 -9 10 
exrate 374 1792.9 25031.9 0.003 480097 
rgdppcgr 374 2.0 3.9 -17.95 18.5 
finop 374 -0.7 1.1 -1.9 2.4 
m2res 369 3.3 5.4 0.19 72.99 
credit 373 24.1 29.2 2.014 167.5 
depinss 374 0.14 0.34 0 1 
All variables are in levels. Fbi is percentage of foreign banks among domestic banks, credit is private credit, 
finop is the financial liberalisation. The variable exrate is exchange rate, m2res is the ratio of M2 to 
reserves. Finally, rgdppc is the real GDP per capita and rgdppcgr is the real GDP growth 
From the Table, it is evidenced that on average the percentage of foreign banking presence in 
the domestic banking industry is about 57%, whereas the maximum is 100% for the period of 
the study. The mean values of the ratio of M2 to reserves and credit to the private sector indicate 
about 3% and 24% respectively. However, the maximum indicates about 73% for ratio of M2 
to reserves and 168% for credit to the private sector. The mean z-score is about 14. This reveals 
relatively low stability in the banking system of the two regions. 
6.4.1 Analysis of the results of Bank crisis obtained from Multivariate logit model 
In this section, the study presents the results of the marginal effects of the multivariate logit 
model, which is shown in Table 6.4.2. This can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient 
estimates are also shown in Table E.0.3 in the Appendix. The estimates seems to corroborate 
the results of the marginal effects. The pseudo R square ranges from 0.03 to 0.49. 
From the Table, foreign banking presence in the region reveals an inverse relationship with 




banking crisis. It implies that increases in the presence of foreign banking in the region robustly 
and significantly reduces the probability of bank crisis, as shown from columns 1 to 10. From 
columns 1 to 9, the coefficients of foreign ownership of domestic banks remain robustly 
negative and statistically significant after each control variable is added to the model one after 
the other. This suggests that there is no indication that foreign banks increase the likelihood of 
bank crisis and fragility. The specifications indicate that on average, increases in foreign 
banking inflows by one unit, it will reduce the probability of banking crisis by 0.001 (0.1%).  
The results therefore provide evidence that support the argument that foreign banks reduce 
incidence of bank crisis (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1998; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006, 
2010). Thus, the result rejects the widely held conventional wisdom that foreign banks stir 
banking crisis and financial sector instability as they are said to lack commitment to domestic 
banking system. This finding is also supported by the evidence existence of some foreign banks 
in the continent for many decades (e.g. Barclays, Standard Chattered). Overall, these results 
indicate that the long-run benefits from the presence of foreign banks in the financial system 
are genuine and not explained by a sort of omitted variable bias. 
It is worth noting that the findings are in line with the argument that foreign banks may 
introduce know-how and good banking practices that might lead to stability in the sector. 
Additionally, it implies that the presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking sector for 
the period under study may have resulted in improvement in regulations and supervision, 
increase transparency and instigation of domestic reforms which are all key to financial 
stability. Thus, foreign presence reduces the probability of crisis and therefore strengthen 
financial stability. 
Furthermore, political development (pol), real GDP per capita (rgdppc) and deposit insurance 
(depinss) all suggest inverse relationship with bankcrisis as suggested by economic theory. The 
result indicates that these control variable have a robust effect in reducing bank crisis. This is 
in line with a prior expectation. Development in political institutions indicates statistical 
significance at 1% level from the all specifications. This suggests strong evidence that it 
reduces the probability of bank failure. The results indicate that an improvement in democratic 
structures reduces the probability of bank crisis on average by 1%. The baseline model, which 
is column 10, indicates that democratic development decreases the likelihood of bank failure 
by about 1.2%. Intuitively, democratic development will include development in the rule of 




either from borrowers or the bank itself.  In the same direction, Table 6.4.2 indicates that 
increases in real GDP per capita, which proxies for the level of development, reduces the 
chances of bankcrisis. This seems to suggest that poor countries are likely to face banking 
crisis. However, the probability is very small. Therefore, countries in these two sub-regions 
may reduce the likelihood of banking crisis through economic development. Intuitively, 
economic development, which is link to the development in the legal system, may reduce the 
level of loan default in the banking industry which is usually blame for bank crises. Studies 
such as García-Herrero and Del Rio Lopez (2003) and Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003), Beck 
et al. (2006), Shehzad and De Haan (2009) also found such relationship between real GDP per 
capita and bank crises. 
The result of explicit deposit insurance is in line with the expectation of the Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) model. It indicates a reverse relationship with banking crisis variable. This 
suggests that it reduces the likelihood of bank failure by 7% from the baseline estimates. This 
means the presence of explicit deposit insurance in the countries that introduced it into their 
banking system minimise the possibility of self-fulfilling panics. This finding is in 
contradiction to earlier studies by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Cull et al. (2005) 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Furthermore, from Table 6.4.2, credit to the private sector as well as financial openness 
variables indicate positive correlation with bank crisis. Increases in credit robustly induces 
bank crisis, as indicated in Table 6.4.2 from columns 5 to 10 at 1% statistically significant 
levels. In column 10, the results suggest that increases in credit delivery by the banking industry 
may increase the likelihood of bank crisis by almost 0.5%.  From this perspective uncontrolled 
increases in credit to the private sector has the power to induce bank crisis which is in line with 
Kindleberger’s (1978) model that argues that expansion of credit  in upturn in the economy 
results in accumulation non-performing loans which causes crisis. The findings of this study 
also corroborates findings of earlier studies by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and 
Klomp (2010). Most banking crisis are blamed on uncontrolled credit to the private sector, 
since they usually result in growth of non-performing loans which induce bank crisis.  In line 
with this view, Brownbridge and Gockel (1998) argue that prior to the financial liberalisation, 
many state owned banks accumulated non-performing loans as a results of uncontrolled credit 
issuance to some sectors that were deemed growth enhancing priority areas at below market 
interest rates. This was brought about by non-repayment of loans by the sectors.  
In addition, the openness indicator like credit variable also enters in the model with positive 
coefficient, suggesting that it induces the chances of bank crisis. It presents relatively strong 
evidence of increasing the likelihood bank fragility. The variable indicates statistical 
significance at 5%, even though loose significance at model 5. On average, the coefficient 
suggests that the variable increases the probability of crisis by 3%.  Even though the baseline 
estimates indicate that openness induces the chances of bank crisis, it is only statistically 
significant at 5% level, but robust to almost all the specifications. This introduces fragile 
domestic bank to intense competition. This may lead to some banks failing due to exposure to 
liquidity risk, credit risk and exchange rate risk. In addition, the result could mean financial 
openness exposes developing countries vulnerable to financial shocks through increase capital 
flows and its vulnerability. exposure to In addition, the results seem to suggest that financial 
liberalisation does not improve banking stability by enabling them to better diversity their 
assets portfolio and widening depositor base. 
This is in line with the widely held view that there are increases in bank fragility in more 
competitive banking markets from more financially liberalised markets. The results lend 
support to the works of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Glick and Hutchison (2000) 




However, inflation, which measures the level of control of monetary policy, is not statistically 
significant. In the same vein, real GDP per capita growth, despite indicating the expected sign 
of reducing the likelihood of banking crisis, is statistically insignificant. This indicates that the 
growth rate is impotent in combating banking crisis. Implying, poor countries are prone to 
crisis. 
Finally, the baseline estimates suggest that the vulnerability to sudden capital outflows 
measured by the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves is marginally significant, but enters 
the estimates with a negative coefficient. This means an increase in M2 reduces bank crisis as 
shown in Table 6.4.2 which seems counter-intuitive. Adoption of flexible exchange rate 
suggests negative correlation with bank crisis, with probability almost zero.  
Therefore, the study concludes that, increases in foreign banking presence in the domestic 
banking industry, development in democratic institutions, increases in economic development 
and implementation of deposit insurance reduce the likelihood of bank failure and crises. These 
measures induce financial stability. However, financial liberalisation and increases in credit 
deliverance to the private are most important factors that trigger bank crisis and financial sector 
instability. 
The next section discusses the estimates of the two-step system GMM approach when bank z-




6.4.2 Analysis of the results of Bank z-score obtained from two-step system GMM 
 
In this section we discuss to what extent bank insolvency or stability measured by bank z-score 
can be captured by the dynamics of both bank specific and macroeconomic variables. In this 
analysis, explicit deposit insurance was dropped because including time-invariant regressor 
may cause the estimates to be biased. According to Roodman (2009), any dummy that is 0 or 
1 for most might cause bias, especially if T is very small. In addition, using the SGMM, the 
number of instruments increase exponentially according to the time period. This might result 
in finite sample bias and the likelihood of the specification test, such the Hansen (1982) J-test, 
having a relatively high pass rate (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, following Roodman (2009), the 
instruments are collapsed and two lags for the SGMM is employed. This approach was also 
adopted by Heid et al. (2012). As mentioned in section 6.3.2, the standard errors are corrected 
using Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction of the standard errors. 
 
Table 6.4.3, as with Table 6.4.2, we have seven estimates. This is because the candidate 
variable, foreign banks, was not statistically significant in the first three specifications. We 
therefore report were its start to be statistically significant. The Table suggest that in all the 
estimates, the instruments are valid, as is evidenced by the p-values of the Sargan and Hansen 
J-tests for overidentification restrictions. The null hypothesis for these tests state the validity 
of the overidentification restrictions and each specification, the null is not rejected. In addition, 
the test for the first and second order autocorrelation in the disturbance reported by AR (1) and 
AR (2) suggest there is first order autocorrelation, and no evidence for significant second order 
autocorrelation. This is in line with our expectations. Based on these tests, we can conclude 
that we have the right specification. 
From Table 6.4.3, the coefficient of lagged z-score indicates strong persistence. As expected, 
it confirms significant positive relationship with the present z-score. This suggests that previous 
bank probability of default is highly related to the current probability of default by banks in the 
region. As lagged z-score depicts the bank’s capital buffer built in the past, this measure 
confirms its significant positive relationship with the current z-score.  
Foreign banks variable indicates statistically significant positive correlation with the z-score. 




distance-to-insolvency of the domestic banking sector of the region. This corroborates our 
earlier discussion under section 6.4.2.  
                                                          
42 The difference-in-difference Hansen-j also confirmed these results. 
Table 6.4.3: Results of two-step system GMM for bank z-score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) (7) 
𝑧𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 0.673*** 0.702*** 0.704*** 0.668*** 0.694*** 0.663*** 0.555*** 
 (0.113) (0.125) (0.127) (0.0802) (0.121) (0.110) (0.0935) 
fbi 0.0576** 0.0604* 0.0669* 0.102* 0.114** 0.105** 0.0909** 
 (0.0290) (0.0314) (0.0369) (0.0573) (0.0537) (0.0509) (0.0418) 
credit 0.0447* 0.0413* 0.0396* 0.0280 0.0271 0.0611 0.0854*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0235) (0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0341) (0.0496) (0.0298) 
pol 0.174 0.198 0.244 0.732** 0.579 0.587** 0.505** 
 (0.412) (0.362) (0.271) (0.313) (0.372) (0.230) (0.243) 
finop  -0.0433 -0.0936 -0.0239 -0.223 0.729 2.470* 
  (0.675) (0.645) (0.766) (0.816) (1.467) (1.453) 
exrate   -0.000733 -0.00141 -0.00219 -0.00378 -0.00465* 
   (0.00165) (0.00248) (0.00252) (0.00284) (0.00251) 
inflation    0.0210* 0.0133 0.0112 0.00645 
    (0.0121) (0.00970) (0.00711) (0.00579) 
m2res     -0.392 -0.419 -0.878** 
     (0.277) (0.291) (0.353) 
rgdppc      -0.00119 -0.00229* 
      (0.00118) (0.00121) 
rgdppcgr       0.178 
       (0.138) 
Constant -0.863 -1.333 -1.683 -5.491 -4.714* -0.944 5.508 

































































Obs 213 213 213 211 211 211 211 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Windmeijer-Corrected robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
fbi is percentage of foreign banks among domestic banks, credit is private credit, finop is the financial openness. 
The variable exrate is exchange rate, m2res is the ratio of M2 to reserves. Finally, rgdppc is the real GDP per 












Again the same reasons of foreign banks bringing in know-how and other good practices given 
in section 6.4.2 for such a relationship can be assigned for this result. However, the result is 
relatively stronger when z-score is used than when bank crisis variable is employed. The 
estimates of the six specifications reported in Table 6.4.3, suggest that foreign banks presence 
in the region robustly increase the domestic bank distance-to-insolvency. The result is robust 
to each of the seven specifications indicated in Table 6.4.3. The implication of the findings 
obtained from these two approaches is that the presence of foreign banks in the region is an 
important integral part of factors responsible for the reduction of probability of bank crises and 
financial sector instability.  
In line with the discussion under 6.4.2, development in political institutions reveals statistically 
significant positive correlation with bank distance-to-solvency at 5% level, as shown by the 
baseline specification. We can thus give credence to these findings that in order to reduce the 
likelihood of bank crises in this region, more improvement needs to occur in the political 
institutions and other institutions 
However, unlike the discussion in section 6.4.2, openness of the financial sector indicates a 
positive correlation with z-score, but marginally significant at 10% level with specification 7. 
Specifications 2 up to 6 indicate that the coefficients are not statistically significant. This 
implies that the impact is not robust to the different specification. Thus, much credence cannot 
be assigned to this result. 
Considering the banking variable, the ratio of M2 to exchange rate reserves, the data indicates 
that it reduces bank distance-to-insolvency at 5% statistical significance level under the 
baseline specification. This suggests that bank exposure to currency vulnerability induces 
banking crises in the region. An increase in bank exposure to currency vulnerability in the 
region by 10% will result in decreases in bank distance-to-insolvency by about 9%. This 
corroborates earlier findings by Eichengreen and Arieta (2002), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005) and Klomp (2010). 
However, inflation which is expected to indicate a reverse correlation with z-score is again 
statistically insignificant with the baseline specification. Real GDP per capita growth indicates 
its expected sign, but is not statistically significant. Real GDP per capita reveals a negative 





Finally, credit to the private sector indicates positive relationship with distance-to-insolvency 
with the baseline specification. The data also suggests that in specification 1, 2 and 3, it is 
positive and marginally significant at 10% levels. However, it loses significance when 
inflation, M2 to exchange rate reserves, inflation and real GDP per capita are added 
progressively. The a prior expectation of the relationship between credit and z-score should be 
negative but the data indicates contrary. The reason could be inter bank credits. However, the 
results are not robust to the different specifications. Study of Worrell et al. (2007) also obtained 
such results.  
6.5 Robustness and sensitivity analysis 
This section of the chapter discusses robustness and sensitivity tests of the results from the logit 
model. This is done by investigating the sensitivity of the results to alternative model 
specification. To test if the results are sensitive to alternative specification and distributional 
properties as well as the functional forms of p as a function of the regressors, the multivariate 
probit model is specified. The probit model has a different logistic distribution. The probability 
distribution is specified as  𝐹(. ) = ∫ ∅(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
?́?
−∞
.  The errors in probit are standard normally 
distributed but they are logistically distributed in logit model. Table E.0.4 provides the results. 
The result largely corroborates the baseline estimates and reassures that it is robust. It indicates 
that the coefficients of foreign banking inflows are still negative and statistically significant 
throughout the ten specifications. This reveals that more banking inflows into the region 
reduces the likelihood of banking crisis during the period under study. The overall results point 
towards the effects of the presence of foreign banks in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis 
in the banking sector. It is robust and genuine and not explained by a sort of omitted variable 
bias or model specification problem. 
Furthermore, like the multivariate logit results, more development in political institutions 
strongly reduces the chances of financial instability. On the contrary, more openness of the 
financial system as well as increases in credit tend to be detrimental, and enhances the chances 
of banking crisis. The coefficients of real GDP per capita are again negative and statistically 
significant. This implies that more economic development reduces banking crisis. Deposit 
insurance reduces the chances of crisis, but unlike the logit specification, the variable became 




6.6 Summary and conclusion 
Foreign banks play a progressively important role in the banking sector and thus the financial 
system development in many developing countries. Foreign banks hold relatively greater 
proportion of banking assets in many countries of these regions.  In SSA, it is more than 50%. 
Banks constitute over 90% of the financial system’s assets in the region. Given the crucial role 
that foreign play in the domestic banking, the issue concerning their entry continue to be 
question, especially in relation to banking stability. In this study, given the relatively under 
developed and fragile nature of the Sub-Saharan Africa’s financial system which is broadly 
bank based, we examined the impact of foreign banking inflows on the banking sector stability 
in countries of ECOWAS and SADC for the period 1995-2009.  
To capture this relationship, the study employs two econometric approaches, namely, the 
multivariate logit and the two-step system generalised method of moment using bank crisis 
measure constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2012) and bank z-score. The results of the two 
methods indicate evidence that the presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking sector 
robustly reduces the probability of bank crisis. The study, therefore, cautiously interprets the 
results as foreign banks being a panacea to banking crises. However, the logit approach 
indicates that financial openness and increases in credit are key determinants responsible for 
bank crisis. This is opposite when bank z-score is considered. Finally, the approaches revealed 












Conclusion and Policy Implications 
7.1 Summary 
 
This thesis offers a detailed analysis of the effects of financial development on economic 
growth and the role of foreign banks, inflation and openness in the process of financial sector 
development. These issues are examined in four empirical essays where each essay constitutes 
a chapter centred on the main objectives of the research. Specifically, the thesis considered a 
comparative study between ECOWAS and SADC in three essays. The fourth essay combined 
the two regions. This study is the first of its kind to be studied in SSA. The two regional 
economic blocs were chosen because they do not only seem to be one of the oldest regional 
economic groupings in SSA, but constitute more than half of SSA. The study included 12 
countries in each region which was determined by the availability of data. The first three 
empirical essays cover the period 1980 to 2011 whiles the last essay is from 1995 to 2009.  
The thesis is discussed in seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction which included the 
background with motivation, justification and objectives of the study. In chapter 2, the study 
provided detailed discussions of economic performances as well as the financial sector 
landscape of ECOWAS, SADC and SSA. Furthermore, chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 provided the 
empirical essays and chapter 7 gave the summary, conclusion and policy implications of the 
findings of the research. 
One of the critical issues in financial development literature is the problem of proxy for 
financial system development. This issue usually leads to inconclusive results in many 
empirical studies.  Motivated by this observation, this thesis addressed this problem by 
constructing a composite measure of financial development using three indicators: liquid 
liabilities, ratio of domestic bank asset to the sum of central bank asset and domestic bank 
assets and, finally, bank private credit. This, new measure of financial system development is 
used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The individual measures of this new measure are also considered 
in the studies. 
Chapter 3 presented the first empirical essay. It investigated the effects of financial 
development on economic growth between the two regions. Specifically, the chapter 




through the development in governance on economic growth. Apart from the use of the 
composite measure of financial development, the chapter contributed to the current literature 
by examining a comprehensive comparative study between the two regional blocs. More 
importantly, the chapter addressed the issue of heterogeneity in the two regions, which is 
usually ignored in panel studies, by adopting a more robust econometric approach, the PMG, 
developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). Other methodologies used to examine the robustness of the 
results are the MG and DFE approaches. 
The main findings of the essay indicated evidence of a long run statistically significant positive 
effect of the financial development on economic growth in both regions. Specifically, it showed 
that the effects in SADC are stronger than that for ECOWAS for the period under study. In 
addition, the individual measures of the FSD also indicated a robust positive effect on growth 
in SADC, but with only one measure indicating positive effect on that for ECOWAS. This 
implies that the relatively underdeveloped financial system of ECOWAS does not induce 
economic growth in the same way as the financial system of SADC. Furthermore, more 
political development supported the financial sector to impact on growth positively in 
ECOWAS, but not in SADC. This suggests that democratic development in SADC may be 
weak and do not complement financial development to influence growth positively in that 
region.  
The speed of adjustment to the long run path indicated by the ecm following a shock, suggested 
13% and 15% per year for ECOWAS and SADC respectively. This hints that economies in 
SADC will be on a relatively faster trajectory towards their long-run steady-state growth than 
countries in ECOWAS. For country-level, error correction model (ECM) estimates showed 
that South Africa will quickly recover following a shock to SADC, then Malawi and 
Zimbabwe. The rest of the countries revealed relatively slower speed of adjustment in the 
region. Comparing ECOWAS with SADC, only two countries, Nigeria and Ghana, indicated 
relatively faster reversion to the equilibrium path when there is disturbance in the region. The 
rest of the economies, like those in SADC, indicate relatively slow recovery rate to their 
equilibrium path in the event of any shock in ECOWAS. 
Sensitivity analysis to ascertain the robustness of the estimates was done by re-specifying the 
baseline model with the replacement of governance variable with political rights. The results 




The second essay, presented in Chapter 4, investigated the issues concerning the 
underdeveloped state of the financial system of the two blocs, with specific focus on the effects 
of inflation and openness (Rajan and Zingales Hypothesis) on financial development. The 
contribution of this chapter is not only an exclusive comparison between the two blocs and the 
use of composite measure of financial development, but also the inclusion of measure of 
communication infrastructure in the finance equation. More importantly, as a contribution, the 
chapter applied a number of panel approaches which included SURE. It gave detailed analysis 
of the issues at country-level and addressed the problems of contemporaneous correlation 
among countries in each bloc. The main findings provided evidence that, in both regions, 
inflation strongly reversed financial development with the effect in ECOWAS more than that 
of SADC. This is   indicated by the three panel approaches applied. Country-level analysis also 
corroborated these findings in the two regions. Financial systems of countries such as Mauritius 
(SADC) and Cape Verde (ECOWAS) are heavily affected. 
In addition, the study indicated that even though more simultaneous opening of the financial 
sector and trade led to more financial development in SADC, trade openness alone can still 
cause development in the sector. However, more financial openness alone is detrimental to 
financial development of the region. This provides partial support for the hypothesis. However, 
the hypothesis is rejected in ECOWAS. Finally, increases in access to communication will 
benefit the financial system of both regions but with SADC benefitting more if there is an equal 
percentage increases in the measure. 
The third essay, presented in Chapter 5, sought to investigate the asymmetric relationship 
between inflation and financial development, since inflation is shown to reverse financial 
development. This chapter is motivated by the existing theories that argue that the detrimental 
effects of inflation on the financial development are only observed beyond certain threshold 
level. This chapter contributed to the existing literature by not only being the first study to 
investigate such threshold effects of inflation on financial development in SSA (on regional 
blocs), but also, in contrast to  existing studies, it used a more robust approach that test and 
estimated the threshold level endogenously. The principal results suggested the existence of a 
robust single threshold of inflation in both regions. Specifically, it indicated 17.9% and 14.5% 
of inflation for ECOWAS and SADC respectively. This suggested that inflation above these 
thresholds presents statistically significant detrimental effects for financial development in 




carried out by re-specifying the baseline model with the inclusion of savings and exchange rate. 
The estimates largely confirmed the main results.  
Finally, the fourth empirical study, presented in Chapter 6, focused on financial sector stability 
via banking sector stability. This is motivated by the evidence that the financial system of the 
two regions are broadly bank based with over 50% foreign bank dominated. Thus, the essay 
specifically investigated the effects of foreign banking inflows on banking crisis (financial 
instability) of both regions from 1995 to 2009. This follows from the widely held conventional 
wisdom that foreign banks lack commitment and may leave the domestic banking sector on the 
least suspicion which could stir instability in the sector. The study employed two econometric 
approaches, namely, the multivariate logit and the two-step system generalised method of 
moment using bank crisis measure constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2012) and bank z-
score (Bankscope). The main results of the two methods indicated that the presence of foreign 
banks in the domestic banking sector robustly reduces the probability of bank crisis. Thus, 
foreign banks contribute positively to banking stability and, consequently, financial sector 
stability and development. Thus, the study rejected the widely held conventional view that 
foreign banks are mostly blameable for banking crisis. Financial openness and credit increase, 
though, are found responsible for the likelihood of crisis. 
7.2 Policy Implications of the findings 
The study has significant implication for policy formulation since it is the first study on 
comparative analysis between two regional economic groups. The findings in Chapter 3 argues 
that policy makers should continue the effort to improve both their financial sector and 
governance system. Measures should be taken to improve the current supervisory and 
regulatory role of Central Banks over the financial system. The formation of financial stability 
department by monetary authorities can go a long way to help. In this direction, South Africa 
has already created such department in the Reserve Bank.  
Furthermore, more steps need to be taken specially to improve democratic institutions. 
Democratic impediments that impair governance from providing support or complement the 
financial sector to influence growth positively should be removed. This could be abstinence by 
political authorities from interfering in the financial system. Furthermore, good governance 
system supported by good and sound macroeconomic policies should be at the centre stage of 




Finally, as a policy measure, more trade openness is necessary for economic growth and 
development as envisage by theory. Developing economies especially SSA and its regional 
economics blocs should further takes steps to remove impediment on trade. 
The study also advocate for a discrete increase in government spending. A more discipline 
fiscal policies should take the centre stage of policies so as to mitigate the detrimental effect of 
government expenditure on economic growth. This could be in the form of cutting expenditures 
on unproductive areas such as spending on recurrent expenditures. Even though measures are 
being taken to improve the healthcare delivery, education and training, the study argues that 
this should take more attention in policy formulation and implementation since it robustly 
propels economic growth. More schools and hospitals should be made accessible.  
Furthermore, the findings in Chapter 4 generally suggests that price stability policies and 
measures to increases access to communication infrastructure can help expand the financial 
system. The main policy recommendation is attainment of low and single digit inflation, since 
high inflation is economically costly to the FSD. The study, therefore, indorses the adoption of 
monetary policy that will stabilise the general price level.  
In the light of the findings in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 determines the level of inflation rate policy 
makers should target in order to avoid the detrimental effects of inflation on financial 
development. The chapter proposes that inflation of the two regions should be maintained 
below the estimated threshold of 17.9% and 14.5% for ECOWAS and SADC respectively. To 
achieve this, monetary policy of the Central Banks of these two regions can adopt inflation 
targeting framework, as is done in some countries such as Ghana and South Africa. The 
inflation targets of the two countries fall below the estimated low regime threshold of inflation 
in this study. South Africa has adopted a flexible inflation targeting regime where inflation 
band is set. Currently, the band is 3%-6%, which is in line with the lower inflation regime in 
this study. However, Ghana’s current medium term target band is set at 8% plus or minus 2%. 
Hence, inflation targeting monetary framework may be adopted by all member states in 
regional blocs, since they strive towards common macroeconomic goals in order to reach the 
convergence criteria. This can be replicated in other regional blocs of SSA.  
The study therefore argues that continued reforms in the monetary, fiscal and financial 




Also more investment in the telecommunication industry and easing imports duties on Smart 
phones (as is demonstrated in 2015 budget of Ghana) can reduce the impediments to financial 
development. Since many countries have demonstrated partial support for the Rajan and 
Zingales hypothesis, it is necessary for developing economies especially, SSA to consider 
optimal opening of trade and capital account flows. For Cote d’ Ivoire though, more 
simultaneous opening of the two holds the key to financial development of the country.  
Finally, on the empirical evaluation on the impact of foreign banks on financial stability 
discussed in Chapter 6, the findings implied foreign banks reduce the probability of financial 
crises and therefore beneficial to the financial system. This study indorses a more cautious 
approach towards attracting more foreign banks as well as more opening of the financial sector. 
In terms of policy recommendations, the main policy response proposed by this essay is the 
improvement in the financial system through improving supervisory and regulatory 
framework. This can go a long way in sustaining and controlling the activities of foreign banks 
and the overall banking development. 
7.3 Suggestions for future research 
Considering future research, studies can focus and investigate smaller regional groupings such 
as WAEMU in ECOWAS. WAEMU includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The group has a common accounting system, periodic 
reviews of member countries’ macroeconomic policies based on convergence criteria, a 
regional stock exchange, and legal and regulatory framework for a regional banking system. 
Other sub-groups include SACU which is made up of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland. SACU arrangement requires free duties on goods locally produced 
within member states, but a common restriction to goods imported from the rest of the world. 
Other smaller groups include CMA. This is monetary and exchange rate arrangement between 
South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. A comparative study can, therefore, be 
conducted between these subgroups on the same issues relating growth, financial and foreign 
banking inflows. Others are CEMAC and EAC. 
Furthermore, since the hypothesis of Rajan-Zingales is not fully supported in this study, further 
investigations on the role of financial and trade openness on the financial sector development 
should be the focus. The financial openness variable is partially blamed for such outcome. Even 




openness variable is not readily available. Thus, effort should be made to obtain such 
alternative measure to test this hypothesis. Also, the absence of any effects of trade openness 
on the financial sector development of ECOWAS merits further investigations. 
Lastly, as part of further studies, the effects of political openness on financial development of 
both regions should be investigated using an alternative political openness variable. Even 
though different econometric approaches have been used in this study, this measure seems to 
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Appendix for chapter 2 
 
Table A.0.1: Regional comparison of foreign banking inflows into the banking system 
    1995     2000     2005     2009   
Region Domestic Foreign total Domestic Foreign total Domestic Foreign total Domestic Foreign total 
All countries 3120 774 3894 2993 1058 4051 2805 1175 3980 2576 1334 3910 
Fraction 0.8 0.2   0.74 0.26   0.7 0.3   0.66 0.37  
                   
East Asia and 
Pacific 254 57 311 272 64 336 289 69 358 282 95 377 
Fraction 0.82 0.18   0.81 0.19   0.81 0.19   0.75 0.25  
                   
Latin America and 
Caribbean 596 198 794 479 256 735 395 217 612 367 232 599 
Fraction 0.75 0.25   0.65 0.35   0.65 0.35   0.61 0.39  
                   
SSA 213 94 307 229 135 364 209 152 361 152 181 333 
Fraction 0.69 0.31   0.63 0.37   0.58 0.42   0.46 0.54  
                   
SSA/Developing 
Economies   54%     50%     46.10%     47%   






Figure A.1: Inflation in SADC 
 
 
Figure A.2  











































































Table B.0.1: Showing description of data and source 
Variable Description source 
bankprcr Ratio of bank private to GDP. Global Financial Development Database,  
 
dmba ratio of deposit money bank assets to the 2012 
 ratio of deposit money bank assets  Global Financial Development Database,  
 to the sum of deposit money bank 2012 
 assets  and Central Bank assets  
 
Life 
expectancy Number of years a new born infant will live 
World development Indicators, 2012 
 
m3 
ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP  
 




















traop Trade openness which is the sum of  World Bank’s Africa Development 




Measures from 1 showing total right and 7 
demonstrates absence of these rights 
Freedom House 
 
   
Polity2 
 
Measures system of governance. -10 means 









Table B.0.3: Long run estimates without South Africa 
    SADC   
Variables PMG MG DFE 
lnfindex 0.436*** 0.862 0.0171 
 (0.0706) (10.65) (0.589) 
findexins 0.000933*** 0.0182 -0.000143 
 (0.000125) (0.0139) (0.000826) 
inflation -0.0401 8.300 -1.603 
 (0.0564) (7.983) (1.251) 
pol -0.0649*** -1.823 0.0977 
 (0.0125) (1.443) (0.103) 
traop 0.142*** -17.76 1.350 
 (0.0485) (18.94) (0.878) 
gov 0.0406 -8.389 -0.0257 
 (0.0322) (8.857) (0.861) 
lnlifeexp 0.651*** -24.80 4.767** 
 (0.199) (27.52) (2.370) 
ecm -0.104** -0.307*** -0.0169* 
 (0.0451) (0.110) (0.00966) 
Constant 0.129** -1.254 -0.291** 
 (0.0563) (2.029) (0.133) 
Hausman Test   5.55   
  (0.4758)  
Observations   341 . 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table B.0.2: Showing countries used in sample of both regions 
ECOWAS SADC 
Benin Botswana 
Burkina Faso Democratic Republic of Congo  
Cape Verde Lesotho 
Cote d’ Ivoire Malawi 
Gambia Mauritius 
Ghana Madagascar 
Guinea Bissau Mozambique 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Botswana: Real GDP Per capita and Life expectancy











































































Lesotho: Real GDP Per capita and Life expectancy













































































South Africa: Real GDP per capita and Life expectancy











































































Swaziland:Real GDP per capita and Life expectancy





Table B.0.6: Robustness test using different governance indicator (political right). 
  ECOWAS    SADC  
  PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE 
findex 0.149 3.089 0.851** 0.791*** 2.390 0.737 
 (0.379) (2.841) (0.348) (0.306) (2.560) (0.656) 
finpol -0.0024** -0.0053 -0.0022* -0.000838 -0.00315 -0.00121 
 (0.000947) (0.0056) (0.0012) (0.000722) (0.00482) (0.00108) 
inflation 0.222 1.449 0.576 -0.389** -0.743 -0.815 
 (0.447) (1.207) (0.698) (0.169) (1.356) (0.558) 
polright 0.186* 0.326 0.203** -0.171** 0.170 -0.0941 
 (0.108) (0.321) (0.097) (0.0803) (0.517) (0.192) 
traop 1.241*** 2.481 0.666** 0.208 -0.301 0.891** 
 (0.316) (2.564) (0.282) (0.129) (0.931) (0.441) 
gov 0.247** 0.653 -0.154 0.645*** 0.248 0.139 
 (0.126) (0.555) (0.21) (0.151) (0.425) (0.517) 
lifeexp 5.013*** 5.639* 1.967 0.981*** 1.709 1.400* 
 (1.177) (3.366) (1.441) (0.378) (3.028) (0.737) 
ecm -0.051*** -0.597*** -0.053** -0.0245* -0.0925 -0.030** 
 (0.0184) (0.119) (0.0253) (0.0143) (0.0672) (0.0135) 
Constant -1.005*** -3.530** -0.403 -0.0638 -0.158 -0.152 
  (0.371) (1.795) (0.308) (0.0427) (2.022) (0.184) 
Hausman Test 4.73    6.66  
  0.5794    0.3539  
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 









































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.0.4: LSDV results without Zimbabwe and DRC 
 No Zimbabwe No DRC  No Zimbabwe and 
DRC 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
findext-1 0.829*** 0.824*** 0.848*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0322) (0.0223) 
rgdppc -0.00475 0.0434 0.0612** 
 (0.0344) (0.0242) (0.0226) 
inflation -0.0340*** -0.0540*** -0.164** 
 (0.00860) (0.0122) (0.0605) 
gov -0.0457** -0.0493** -0.0323 
 (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0194) 
pol 0.00293 0.000941 0.00262 
 (0.00321) (0.00261) (0.00240) 
traop 0.0662* 0.0729* 0.0714* 
 (0.0327) (0.0367) (0.0381) 
finop -0.0643** -0.0524** -0.0625** 
 (0.0220) (0.0189) (0.0240) 
fintraop 0.000609** 0.000498** 0.000550** 
 (0.000219) (0.000195) (0.000206) 
com 0.0251** 0.0182*** 0.0111* 
 (0.00843) (0.00542) (0.00590) 
trapol -3.53e-05 -2.38e-05 -3.41e-05** 
 (2.03e-05) (1.77e-05) (1.40e-05) 
Constant 0.585* 0.291 0.0532 
 (0.312) (0.166) (0.176) 
Hausman test 17.13 19.01 24.78 
prob (0.0468) (0.0401) (0.0032) 
    
Observations 341 341 310 
R-squared 0.870 0.856 0.883 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix for chapter 5 
 
 Table D.0.1: Showing description of data and source 
Variable Description Sources 
bankprcr Ratio of bank private to GDP. Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), 2012 
   
dmba Ratio of deposit money bank assets  Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), 2012 
 to the sum of deposit money bank  
 and   Central Bank assets  
   
M3 ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), 2012 
   
gov Government expenditure (%GDP) World Bank' Africa Development Indicators, 2012 
   
rgdppc real GDP per capita (at 2005 US $) World Bank' Africa Development Indicators, 2012 
   
Inflation annual percent change of the consumer price index World Bank' Africa Development Indicators, 2012 
   
traop This is trade openness which is the sum of  World Bank' Africa Development Indicators, 2012 
 exports and imports to GDP  
   
com Telephone lines per 1000 people World Bank' Africa Development Indicators, 2012 
   
gdsav gross domestic savings as a percentage  World Bank' Africa Development Indicators, 2012 
 of GDP  
   
finop financial openness (KAOPEN) Chinn and Ito Index 






Appendix D: Results that include DRC Ghana and Zimbabwe 
 
Table D.0.2 indicates that linearity is rejected at 1% significance levels both regions. However, 
Table D.0.3 reveals the relationship is adequately modeled by a single threshold (two regime), 
hence, rejecting double threshold at 1% and 5% significance level. 
Table D.0.2: Test of linearity against non-linearity 
  ECOWAS   SADC   
Test Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Wald Test (LM)  23.621 (0.001) 41.450 (0.000) 
Fisher Test (LMF)  4.000 (0.001) 7.398 (0.000) 
Likelihood RT (LR)  24.404 (0.000) 43.946 (0.000) 
H0: Linear model H1: PSTR with at least one threshold variable (r=1) 
 
Table D.0.3: Testing the number of regimes: Tests of no remaining non-Linearity 
  ECOWAS   SADC   
Test Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Wald Test (LM)  4.449 (0.616) 12.343 (0.055) 
Fisher Test (LMF)  0.690 (0.658) 1.956 (0.071) 
Likelihood RT (LR)  4.476 (0.613) 12.553 (0.051) 





Table D.0.4: PSTR results with DRC Ghana and Zimbabwe 
    ECOWAS      SADC   
Variables 𝛽0                      𝛽1 𝛽0   𝛽1 
inflation -0.091  -0.085*** 0.573**  -0.575** 
 (0.2189)  (0.2355) (0.2735)  (0.2736) 
gov 0.918***  -2.572*** -0.345  -0.793* 
 (0.2393)  (0.4353) (0.3157)  (0.4093) 
rgdppc 0.078****  0.014 0.010***  0.050** 
 (0.0102)  (0.0204) (0.0024)  (0.0195) 
traop 0.086  0.332* 0.544***  -0.144 
 (0.1107)  (0.1843) (0.1023)  (0.0993) 
finop 4.200*  15.852*** -2.445  11.200*** 
 (2.1517)  (4.9133.) (1.5816)  (2.316) 
com 0.054***  0.830*** 0.039***  -0.072*** 
  (0.0082)   (0.2230) (0.0071)   (0.0158) 
Threshold (𝛿)  23.6     21.3  
Slope (𝛾)  74.8    1.25  
       
***/**/*show significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and values in parentheses are standard errors 
corrected for heteroscedascity. 
Where rgdppc = real GDP per capita, gov = government expenditure (%GDP), traop = international trade 
openness, finop = capital flows or financial openness, com = access to mobile and telephones per 1000 people. 
Variables are not in logs 
 Sensitivity Analysis 
The test of linearity suggests that the relationship is not linear from Table D.0.4 and hence we 
tested for no remaining nonlinearity and results on Table D.0.5 supports the existence of one 
threshold as indicated by the p-values 
 
Table D.0.5: Test of linearity against non-linearity-savings 
  ECOWAS   SADC   
Test Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Wald Test (LM)  20.026     (0.006) 31.739     (0.000) 
Fisher Test (LMF)  2.879     (0.006) 4.774     (0.000) 
Likelihood RT (LR)  20.638     (0.000) 33.484     (0.000) 






Table D.0.6: Testing the number of regimes: Tests of no remaining non-linearity 
  ECOWAS   SADC   
Test Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
Wald Test (LM)  11.098     (0.134) 8.391     (0.299) 
Fisher Test (LMF)  1.485     (0.172) 1.109     (0.358) 
Likelihood RT (LR)  11.282     (0.127) 8.507     (0.290) 
 
The PSTR results are reported on Table D.0.6 which shows evidence of single threshold for 
the two regions similar to the baseline results. 
Table D.0.7: Sensitivity analysis of PSTR results without DRC Ghana and Zimbabwe 
   ECOWAS   SADC  
Variables 𝛽0   𝛽1 𝛽0  𝛽1 
inflation -0.0508  -0.9414*** 0.6891**  -0.7523** 
 (0.2463)  (0.3054) (0.3336)  (0.3228) 
gov 1.226 ***  -1.2341 -0.7523  -1.7479*** 
 (0.4272)  (1.3335) (0.3429)  (0.3435) 
rgdppc 0.0803***  0.0433** 0.009***  0.013*** 
 (0.0100)  (0.0214) (0.0026)  (0.0026) 
traop -0.1575  0.4914*** 0.1310**  0.3585*** 
 (0.0993)  (0.1800) (0.0652)  (0.0585) 
finop 1.1622  3.5255 -2.1058  7.3755*** 
 (1.9662)  (6.0652.) (1.6723)  (2.4884) 
com 0.0505***  -2.5945*** 0.0377***  -0.4555*** 
  (0.0088)   (1.2538) (0.0075)  (0.1040) 
gdsav -0.4209  -0.1256 -0.0692  0.0632 
 (0.3625)  (1.1874) (0.1302)  (0.1037) 
Threshold 
(𝜹) 
 17.87   14.4  
Slope (𝜸)  429.9   2.3  
       
***/**/*show significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and values in parentheses are standard errors 
corrected for heteroscedascity 
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